Identity, Oppression, and Group Rights by Pierce, Andrew Jared
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
2009
Identity, Oppression, and Group Rights
Andrew Jared Pierce
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2009 Andrew Jared Pierce
Recommended Citation
Pierce, Andrew Jared, "Identity, Oppression, and Group Rights" (2009). Dissertations. Paper 209.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/209
  
 
 
 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
 
 
 
 
 
IDENTITY, OPPRESSION, AND GROUP RIGHTS 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
 
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
BY 
 
ANDREW J. PIERCE 
 
CHICAGO, IL 
 
MAY 2010 
  iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION                                                                                                               1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: MINORITY CULTURES AND OPPRESSED GROUPS: 
   COMPETING EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORKS            16 
   Minority Cultures                                                                                                            17 
   Theories of Oppression                29 
   Defining Oppression                           40 
   Normative Intentionalism                49 
 
CHAPTER TWO: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY, GROUP RIGHTS, AND THE    
LIBERAL TRADITION OF LAW                                                   60 
   Intersubjectivity and the Internal Relation between Democracy and the Rule  
      of Law                  62 
   Collective Identity and Political Integration             72 
   Pathologies in the Actualization of Rights                         82 
   The Right to Self-Ascription: Its Type and Justification            94 
 
CHAPTER THREE: IDENTITY POLITICS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF    
   DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY             106 
   Retributive Identity Politics                         108 
   Discursive-Democratic Identity Politics                               124 
   Misrecognition and Material Deprivation    `                    140 
   Conclusions and Synopsis                                  149 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE FUTURE OF RACIAL IDENTITY: A TEST CASE       153 
   Race and Racial Oppression: Another ‘Internal Relation’?         154 
   A Discursively Justifiable Conception of Racial Identity          167 
   White Racial Identity              176 
   Culture Reconsidered                                   185 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                     197 
 
VITA                                                                                                                                204 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditional liberal political theory is characterized in large part by its focus on 
individuals and individual rights. That is, it begins with the presumption that the 
collective political life of citizens is preceded (if not historically, at least conceptually) by 
a state of nature in which each individual is sovereign. This complete and brutal freedom 
necessitates a social contract that places limits on individuals for the sake of law and 
order, but ultimately, the goal of such a contract is to preserve as much of the original 
freedom of the individual as possible. This standard trope is familiar to any student of 
political philosophy, as are the many criticisms that have been leveled against it. These 
criticisms vary widely, but many revolve around the claim that individuals did or could 
preexist the social relationships that make us who we are, objecting that individuals are 
constituted by these very relationships, as their product, in some sense, and not their 
precondition. More recent liberal theory has tried to speak to such criticisms by 
acknowledging the importance of group memberships and social relationships to 
individual identity and even individual citizenship. Thus theorists like Will Kymlicka, 
Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, and others aim to preserve liberal 
principles of freedom and equality while acknowledging that human beings are social 
creatures, whose individuality in many ways depends upon certain group affinities. 
On a related, but nonetheless distinct front, political movements organized around 
identity – race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so on – have taken a central 
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place in the contemporary political landscape. And while these various movements, 
grouped together under the moniker of ‘identity politics,’ differ significantly, some 
vehemently opposing liberalism and others framing their politics squarely within the 
liberal tradition, mainstream liberalism has almost unequivocally objected to identity 
politics on the grounds that it allows for grave injustices to individuals, undermines the 
pursuit of universal social justice, and with its “balkanizing” effects, generally 
destabilizes the very foundations of civil society. 
In the chapters to come, I argue that such criticisms are unwarranted, though their 
purveyors are right at least in noticing that identity politics of a certain sort (namely, the 
politics of oppressed groups) does represent a significantly different approach to group 
membership and group rights than the dominant liberal approach, which I call 
“multicultural liberalism.” The first chapter, then, outlines this dominant approach as well 
as its shortcomings, including, perhaps most importantly, that it fails to adequately 
address or even acknowledge a whole set of group-based injustices – those involving 
oppression. This is not surprising, I suggest, since oppression is premised upon group 
membership, while liberal theories of group rights are still ultimately premised upon the 
rights of individuals. That is, the paradigm of group membership for liberalism is the 
voluntary association, and cultural groups are understood primarily as providing contexts 
for individual choice, including even the choice to participate in the culture itself. 
Whether or not this is an accurate account of cultural groups (and there are good reasons 
to think it is not) it certainly does not capture the essence of oppressed groups, 
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membership in which is decidedly not a matter of individual choice, but is instead 
ascribed by forces outside of the individual’s control. 
Will Kymlicka is the primary target of my critique here, insofar as his version of 
multicultural liberalism is the most explicit about accounting for communitarian and 
multicultural critiques within a fairly traditionally liberal framework (based, that is, on 
the idea of individual freedom). Kymlicka argues, for example, that cultural membership 
must be considered one of the basic goods that individuals require in order to pursue 
whatever other ends they might aspire to.1 Therefore any schema of distributive justice 
must assure and protect cultural membership just as it assures and protects other basic 
goods, such as political representation, equality of opportunity, income and wealth, and 
so on. For the majority, such access to cultural membership is mostly unproblematic. For 
those “minority cultures,” however, whose cultural identity may come to be threatened in 
various ways, special rights and protections may be justified. Kymlicka thus argues that 
certain group rights – rights to sovereignty, for example – can be justified on liberal 
grounds for certain kinds of cultural minorities.  
The main problem with such an approach is that it fails to account for some of the 
most normatively pressing group-based injustices, those experienced by oppressed 
groups. And insofar, I argue, as oppression is premised upon group membership, an 
account of group rights based upon the (individual) freedom-securing function of culture 
will do little to clarify or mitigate these sorts of injustices. That is, unlike cultural groups, 
which can be understood as depending on the conscious, collective intentionality of their 
                                                 
1
 Will Kymlicka. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995. 
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individual members, as well as providing a precondition for their individual freedoms, 
oppressed groups are non-intentional, or “ascriptive” – formed and maintained by 
external forces – and limiting, rather than enabling of the freedom of their members. This 
is not only, or even primarily a descriptive difference in the kinds of groups that exist, but 
a theoretical difference in the way one understands group membership. That is, I suggest 
that not only are the accounts of Kymlicka and other multicultural liberals too narrow to 
account for many if not most social groups, but worse, that their “cultural” approach 
misses important dimensions even of the specific types of groups it aims to investigate. It 
misses, for example, the important differences between those immigrant groups that 
integrate more or less successfully into the dominant political, legal, and social structures, 
and those that, for a variety of reasons including especially issues of racism and 
economic exploitation, become ghettoized and remain unassimilated. It also misses 
important differences between those groups that have become national minorities through 
confederation or other more or less peaceful means, and those that have been minoritized 
through processes of conquest, colonization, and other forms of violence. It seems 
reasonable to think that such differences might matter for determining what types of 
group rights can legitimately be claimed by the groups in question. 
Accordingly then, I suggest that an analysis of group rights should begin from 
considerations of oppression rather than considerations of culture, and should further 
recognize that, since oppression is a kind of group harm, irreducible to the individual 
harms experienced by group members, group rights aimed at remediating such harms are 
also irreducible to the individual rights of group members. In other words, I argue that 
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certain group rights must be understood as rights possessed by groups qua group-hood, 
and not rights possessed by groups qua individual group members. In particular, I argue 
that groups possess a right to self-ascription, understood as a right to determine the 
meaning and extent of group membership. Oppression is the paradigmatic violation of 
this right.  
The first chapter then, draws from important work on oppression done by Marilyn 
Frye, Ann Cudd, Sally Haslanger and others. It draws also from the work of Charles 
Mills, which I argue can be thought of in terms of oppression, as well as the “realist” 
social ontology of Paul Sheehy, which provides a basis for thinking about groups as 
irreducible social entities.  
The second chapter further explains and supports the idea of a right to self-
ascription, drawing from Jurgen Habermas’ discursive justification of rights and the 
communicative intersubjectivity upon which it is ultimately based. Habermas’ rich body 
of work provides a unique model of how norms implicit in communication bind us 
together in discourse. That is, it shows how effective communication presupposes mutual 
agreement on norms of truth, rightness, and sincerity. The grounding of communication 
in mutually recognized norms (undertaken primarily in The Theory of Communicative 
Action) makes intersubjectivity the foundation upon which Habermas develops his moral, 
political, and legal theory. This foundational intersubjectivity provides the philosophical 
basis for the right to self-ascription.  
  It is somewhat surprising then, that in the places where Habermas explicitly 
discusses group rights and the “claims of cultures,” he defends a conception of law that is 
  
6
“individualistic in form.”2 I begin by looking at this claim, and showing that, while 
Habermas recognizes that the idea of positive law entails that individuals are the bearers 
of rights, the democratic justification of law points to a prior communicative 
intersubjectivity. That is, insofar as individual rights are themselves only justified 
discursively, the kind of intersubjectivity that makes discursive justification possible 
must be seen as the precondition for individual rights. Further, this intersubjectivity is not 
just the abstract intersubjectivity of communicative competence, but the concrete 
intersubjectivity of collective identity. 
 The extent to which a shared collective identity of some kind is a necessary 
condition for citizenship or political participation is another central theme of 
communitarianism and multicultural liberalism. And though Habermas rejects the 
communitarian claim that citizenship is or should be based on a strong “ethical-cultural” 
identity, he nonetheless admits that a weaker, “ethical-political” identity is necessary to 
provide the kind of solidarity constitutive of any effective political community. 
Moreover, Habermas sees particular identity groups as playing an important role in 
expanding the scope of supposedly universal rights as, for example, the Civil Rights 
movement and the “feminist politics of equality” did. In many ways then, I argue, 
collective identity and real-world collectivities are central to and even foundational for 
Habermas’ discourse theory of democracy and individual rights. 
                                                 
2
 See especially Habermas’ essay on “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State” in Charles 
Taylor’s Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994, as well as “Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern 
Liberalism,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 13 no.1 (2005): 1-28. 
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 Similar claims have been pressed by students and interpreters of Habermas, 
especially feminist philosophers and critical theorists like Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, 
Simone Chambers, Drucilla Cornell, and others. Fraser argues, for example, that healthy 
democratic deliberation is exemplified by a plurality of counterpublics – identity groups 
engaged in discourses of self-clarification and interpretation of their collective identities 
– rather than a single, overarching public sphere. My discussion of Habermas, as well as 
the explication of the right to self-ascription, builds upon some of these critics. Still, none 
to my knowledge develop a systematic approach to political discourses on identity in 
order to provide a discursive normative foundation for identity politics in general. 
 Habermas’ reflections on democracy, rights, and intersubjectivity help to clarify 
the meaning of a right to self-ascription. It becomes clear, in particular, that the right to 
self-ascription is not a legal right in the specific sense. Rather, it must be understood as a 
moral right that undergirds and makes possible legal rights, insofar as those rights depend 
upon intersubjective processes of discursive justification. A right to self-ascription then, 
is based upon respect for the formative character of intersubjectivity (formative in the 
sense that it gives rise to the content of individual rights, through discourse, but also in 
the sense that it is a precondition for individuation in general), and the necessity of self-
ascribed identity groups for healthy democratic functioning.  
  Yet as helpful as Habermas is, the strict proceduralism of his later work does not 
illuminate the ways in which intersubjectivity could give rise to something like a right to 
self-ascription. This is because, insofar as a right to self-ascription is, I argue, a 
precondition for discursive justification, it cannot itself be justified by discursive 
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procedures alone. Rather, I suggest that the right to self-ascription must be justified by 
substantive argumentation. In making a substantive case for such a right then, I draw 
from the recognition-based theory of another student of Habermas, Axel Honneth, as well 
as the capability theory of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. I conclude then, that the 
right to self-ascription must be seen as having an intrinsic value, in addition to its 
instrumental value in making possible individual rights of the type discussed above, and 
that it can be understood as providing a model of intersubjective human flourishing: an 
ideal of associational life that is not exhausted in or reducible to the ideal of the 
flourishing individual. 
 The third chapter examines the ways in which such a right provides a foundation 
for contemporary identity politics. In particular, it circumscribes the limits of the right to 
self-ascription, based on a set of principles derived from Habermas’ “discourse ethic”. In 
this way, a major criticism of identity politics – that it cannot make normative 
distinctions among the demands of different identity groups – is circumvented. In short, I 
argue that taking identity politics seriously does not require claiming that any and all 
identity groups deserve equal (or any) recognition. Here procedural criteria allow one to 
avoid making substantive judgments about the content of particular identity 
constructions, while nonetheless explaining why certain identity groups (for example, 
hate groups and other “illiberal” groups) need not be granted rights and accommodations 
that other groups deserve and require.  
In making this argument, I distinguish between two kinds of identity politics. 
“Retributive” identity politics asserts as a matter of strategy that the best and most 
  
9
consistent advocate for ending the oppression of a particular identity group is that group 
itself. It thus asserts that women must join together to fight patriarchy, gays must join 
together to fight heterosexism, African-Americans must join together to fight anti-black 
racism, and so on. This does not imply, I claim, that such groups must be concerned only 
with their own oppression, nor that no one but a particular group should be concerned 
with that group’s oppression. Still, the rules of discourse outlined by the discourse ethic 
are not particularly useful for understanding identity politics of this sort, in part because 
the fight against oppression makes necessary certain kinds of strategic exclusions, 
insincere posturing, and other tactics that might not be justified under ideally just 
circumstances. Retributive identity politics basically concerns the best means for 
eliminating oppression, and as such falls squarely within the scope of so-called “non-
ideal” theory. 
“Discursive-democratic” identity politics however, is distinct from identity 
politics aimed at eliminating oppression. The distinction derives from the thought that 
collective identities, being crucially important to the constitution of personal identities 
and political interests, will not cease to be politically salient even under ideal conditions. 
Discursive-democratic identity politics thus aims to specify an appropriate relation 
between identity groups and the society/state at large. Here, I suggest, is where an 
adaptation of the discourse ethic is illuminating. I argue that the kinds of group identity 
that are justifiable within the context of a democratic social order are those that 
approximate the rules of discourse internally. They must be open and inclusive (to a 
certain degree), provide equal opportunity for the growth and development of their 
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members, and be adopted sincerely and without coercion. The application of these 
conditions or “rules” to the process of collective identity formation requires taking certain 
liberties with the discourse ethic as Habermas explicitly develops it, but I argue that such 
liberties are justified and perhaps even implied in a certain way by Habermas’ own 
analyses.  
What such an application provides is a picture of the “social construction of 
identity” that is both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in the sense that it aims 
to describe what identity construction would look like under ideal (non-oppressive) 
conditions, and it is normative in the sense that it aims to identify principles according to 
which claims for recognition can be judged. In this way it is analogous to the discourse 
ethic proper, which holds that the agreements of interlocuters engaged in discourse are 
normatively binding in part because such norms are involved in the way persons actually 
do communicate with one another. Still, I argue that the normativity of discursive 
principles of collective identity formation is not best understood in terms of coercive 
rules and regulations, but rather in terms of “normal” development and functioning. That 
is, identities that require recognition and accommodation are those that provide for their 
members the benefits typical of collective identity. The burden of the argument is thus to 
show that those groups that fail to meet the requirements of discourse also fail, as a result, 
to provide such benefits.  
 I end the chapter by considering how the right to self-ascription and the kind of 
identity politics that is derived from it relate to traditional concerns for material wealth 
and distributive justice. I argue that attempts to correlate identity politics with 
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recognition, and reserve concerns for distribution for some other kind of politics are 
mistaken. Identity politics is perfectly capable of accounting for concerns of distribution, 
and in fact most identity-based movements have given a central place to such concerns in 
their explicit political programs. Further, I show that concerns of material wealth – 
unemployment, wage discrepancies, and so on – are a major reason why certain illiberal 
groups continue to exist despite the lack of communicative resources they provide for 
their members. In making this argument, I look to the interesting and fruitful debate 
between Fraser and Honneth presented in their dialogue on redistribution and 
recognition.3 I draw also from key contributions to the philosophy and politics of identity 
from theorists like Linda Alcoff, Amy Gutmann, and others.  
In the fourth and final chapter, I show how this theory of discursive identity 
formation can be applied fruitfully to current debates about race and racial identity. I take 
it that biological theories of race, which understand race as a biological natural kind, have 
been thoroughly debunked. Most race theorists agree that race is a social construction, 
drawing more or less arbitrarily upon certain physical and/or phenomenal features of 
persons. But the political implications of this basic agreement are far from clear. Some 
have taken it to mean that we ought to stop talking about “races” as though they were 
real, and work to develop other kinds of identifications to replace so-called “racial” 
identities. Others have suggested that, thought race may not be ontologically “real,” 
political structures that take races as basic make race an unavoidable social reality. And 
others still have argued that racial identity can be reinterpreted in such a way as to shed 
                                                 
3
 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange. 
(London: Verso, 2003). 
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its deterministic connotations, but retain important features that have come to flourish 
under the oppressive force of, say, black identity. In short, the fact that race is “socially 
constructed,” important an insight as it is, tells us relatively little about what role, if any, 
race ought to play in a more just social order and in the construction of legitimate group 
identities. 
Current debates about racial identity provide a useful point of application since 
one of their central questions is whether a collective identity that has been constructed 
largely as a means of oppression can be reconstructed in a normatively justifiable way, or 
whether it must be abandoned altogether. It considers, in other words, the possibility of 
transforming an oppressive, ascriptive identity into a positive, self-ascribed identity, 
precisely the process that I outline in general philosophical terms. Using the discursive-
democratic model of identity construction as a guide then, my aim is to determine 
whether racial identity would be justifiable under ideal, non-oppressive conditions.  I 
conclude that discursively justifiable racial identities are conceivable, separable from 
their origins in ascriptive, oppressive practices, though I stop short of the claim that racial 
identities are a necessary or inevitable feature of social organization.  
I begin then, by presenting a brief genealogy of the idea of race, then engage in 
the debates, undertaken by Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack, Lucious Outlaw and others, as 
to whether or not that history demands a wholesale rejection of racial concepts, or 
whether some notion of race remains necessary or desirable. I argue, against Appiah and 
other “racial eliminativists” that race can be uncoupled from racial oppression, such that 
some conception of race might be discursively justifiable. I then discuss two kinds or 
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conceptions of racial identity, mestizo racial identity and white racial identity. I argue 
that something like mestizo racial identity could be discursively justified, while white 
racial identity, insofar as it is inextricable linked to white supremacy, cannot. Having 
provided examples of both acceptable and unacceptable conceptions of racial identity, I 
end by returning to the question of culture and examining specifically the attempts to 
understand African-American racial identity in cultural terms. I argue there, against 
certain varieties of “cultural nationalism,” that it is unwise to think of African-Americans 
as a culture in the thick sense of the term that multicultural liberals employ.    
Though this dissertation draws heavily from what I take to be an original and 
useful interpretation of Habermas (with, of course, important precedents that I have 
pointed to above), it is ultimately topical. I mean to present a normative account of group 
formation and group identity that resolves some of the enduring problems in liberal 
multicultural theory, as well as provides a firmer foundation for identity politics, which 
has too often been attacked for being a flimsy sort of anything-goes relativism, or for 
reducing politics to issues of personal identity. I use racial identity as a test case for the 
discursive account of identity because it is, as Kymlicka points out, a difficult case, and 
one that has not received the same attention as other kinds of (cultural, ethnic, and 
gender) identity. If a discursive account of identity is useful, it ought to be able to provide 
an answer to the question of whether racial identities are legitimate in an ideal democratic 
polity. That is, if race is “socially constructed,” as we often hear, a discursive norm of 
identity formation ought to suggest parameters for its legitimate reconstruction.  
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Habermas’ discourse ethical mode of justification has stimulated much discussion 
in recent political and moral philosophy, but much of this discussion understands the 
theory in relative isolation from its roots in the theory of communicative action, choosing 
instead to see it as a more or less freestanding theory similar in some respects to Rawls’ 
original position. Habermas himself sometimes seems to lend credence to such an 
interpretation, despite his relatively minor criticisms of the Rawlsian project. Yet the 
application of the discursive mode of justification in real world scenarios raises a distinct 
set of issues regarding group identity and inclusion. If, as Habermas admits, the 
justification of moral norms relies upon real-world communities, then “solidarity is 
simply the reverse side of justice.”4 And if, as one would expect, solidarity has its limits 
(that it is, at least in some respects, a function of group membership), then the question of 
groups becomes central to the Habermasian project. That is, groups would appear then to 
be the fundamental units of Habermas’ liberal democratic theory, and not a special 
problem for liberalism, as they often appear for theorists like Kymlicka. This question of 
priority is even more pressing given that Habermas’ recent engagement with 
multicultural and cosmopolitan theory has brought problems of ethnic and national 
identity to the forefront of his thinking. 
Moreover, the relatively recent growth of race theory, which promises to make 
substantial contributions to philosophical knowledge, and perhaps even to the vital 
political task of reorganizing racial relations in the United States and other racially 
divided nations, has occurred larg ely in isolation from that Habermasian strand of 
                                                 
4
 Jurgen Habermas The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory” Trans. William Rehg, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, (1999a): 14 
  
15
critical theory that becomes ever more abstract as it considers the rational and linguistic 
preconditions for consensus, but not the social and political preconditions for actual 
public discourses. For identifying the latter, conversations across race theory and critical 
theory would prove, I think, quite fruitful. In the most general terms then, this is what the 
following pages aim to do. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
MINORITY CULTURES AND OPPRESSED GROUPS: COMPETING  
EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORKS 
 
 In recent years, communitarians and other theorists have developed a critique of 
traditional liberalism that focuses on its inadequate understanding of cultural membership 
and other group affinities, often tracing this deficiency to liberalism’s tendency to focus 
methodologically on individuals rather than groups.5 More recent liberalism has tried to 
speak to this deficiency by giving liberal justifications for the protection of minority 
cultures. One might see such a multicultural liberalism as promising for addressing the 
concerns of other sorts of group harms, harms like racism, sexism, class exploitation, and 
so on. In fact, the tendency to focus on minority cultures of a specific type is often 
presented as an intentional limitation of scope, one which could be developed and 
expanded to justify retributive measures for other sorts of groups (say, racial minorities, 
women, or the poor).6 However, I will argue that the strategies for dealing with the 
concerns of such groups, namely oppressed groups, are fundamentally different, and even 
incommensurable with the types of liberal justifications given for the protection of 
minority cultures, for at least two reasons: (1) Multicultural liberalism presumes that 
                                                 
5
 See for example Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998; Alistair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988;  Michael Walzer. Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983; and Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
6
 See for example Will Kymlicka, “Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, 
Young, Parekh and Forst.” Constellations, 4, no. 1 (1997): 72-87. 
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cultures are complete and self-sufficient, and come into conflict only accidentally, 
while theories of oppression understand conflict as constitutive of group formation, and 
(2) Despite concerns for certain types of groups and a willingness to grant certain types 
of “group rights,” the methodology of multicultural liberalism is still ultimately 
individualist, while theories of oppression take groups as their fundamental conceptual 
units.  
Minority Cultures 
The term ‘culture’ is used in a variety of ways, and with a certain ambiguity. One 
hears reference to Western culture, but also American culture, and African-American 
culture. It is not uncommon also to hear reference to workplace culture, capitalist culture, 
and so on. Culture thus sometimes seems to refer to the beliefs, customs, practices, and 
experiences held by a particular group of people, and sometimes it seems to refer to the 
group itself. The difference is not inconsequential. If culture refers in the first place to 
customs and practices, then one might think that persons enjoy a certain agency in 
relation to the sorts of practices they adopt; that customs and practices, in other words, 
are amongst the social goods that individuals choose to pursue. But if cultures refer in the 
first place to the groups themselves, then culture seems more like an identity than a social 
good, and one might think that it is more a constitutive condition of agency than an object 
of choice. Ranjoo Seodu Herr points to something like this distinction by differentiating 
between liberal autonomy and generic valuational agency.7 Her point is that culture not 
only provides a range of meaningful choices required for autonomy, but that it also limits 
                                                 
7
 Ranjoo Seodu Herr. “Liberal Multiculturalism: An Oxymoron?” The Philosophical Forum. 38 no.1 
(2007)  23-41.  
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the range of choices available to individuals. This is an important insight, since 
multicultural theorists tend to equivocate between the two notions of culture. But Herr 
does not challenge, nor see the need to challenge the liberal presumption that individuals 
are primary, and so she cannot explain why the dominant approach to protecting minority 
cultures fails when generalized to other kinds of groups. I will begin then by looking at 
liberal multiculturalism with this question in mind. 
Will Kymlicka’s seminal work Multicultural Citizenship asserts a theory of group 
rights situated within the liberal tradition and based upon the conceptual categories of 
national minorities and ethnic groups. National minorities are “previously self-
governing” groups, groups that, whether by conquest, colonization, or confederation, 
have fallen under the rule of a majority government that is not their own.8 Native 
Americans and francophone Canadians, for example, are included in the category of 
national minorities. Ethnic groups, on the other hand, are groups that have voluntarily 
immigrated to another nation, and seek, more or less, to assimilate to its political 
structure as citizens. Kymlicka then goes on to try to specify what kinds of rights and 
protections each type of group can claim within a liberal framework of justification. The 
rights that ethnic groups can claim are limited, since those who voluntarily immigrate to a 
nation can reasonably be expected to integrate to the dominant culture, within certain 
limits. If such groups are to claim any sort of special rights or protections, then they must 
be remedial, aimed at eventual integration. But national minorities are a different case. 
Kymlicka argues that for national minorities, special rights and protections are justified, 
                                                 
8
 Kymlicka (1995): 10. 
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up to and including rights to political autonomy and exemption from the laws of the 
dominant culture.  
His analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. He admits that the status of African 
Americans, for example, is “very unusual,” and fits neither model. He explains: 
[African Americans] do not fit the voluntary immigrants pattern, not only because 
they were brought to America involuntarily as slaves, but also because they were 
prevented (rather than encouraged) from integrating into the institutions of the 
majority culture…Nor do they fit the national minority pattern, since they do not have 
a homeland in America or a common historical language.9 
 
 He also recognizes that the “new social movements” representing those who “have been 
marginalized within their own national society or ethnic group” (he mentions gays, 
women, the poor and the disabled) raise their own distinctive issues.10 Iris Marion Young, 
in her critique of Kymlicka’s framework of national and ethnic groups, expands the list of 
those groups that appear anomalous within this framework.11 She points out that refugees, 
guest workers, former colonial subjects, and others do not fit neatly into the dichotomy of 
national and ethnic groups either. As it turns out then, Kymlicka’s classificatory scheme 
fails to account for quite a large portion of those groups that populate contemporary 
multicultural societies. This is, in the first place, because Kymlicka employs a “thick” 
conception of culture. 
This thick conception specifies the term ‘culture’ by reference to what he calls 
“societal culture”. A societal culture is “a culture which provides its members with 
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meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life.”12 Such a culture must be 
embodied in institutions, including governments, schools, economies, and etc. A societal 
culture is thus an institutionally embodied culture that is more or less complete (providing 
meaning “across the full range of human activities”). The result of this thick conception 
of culture is that it drastically narrows the set of groups that count as cultures. Since 
immigrants, for example, generally do not have separate institutions within the countries 
to which they immigrate, only national minorities really count as minority cultures in the 
strict sense.13 And though Kymlicka denies that all Americans share a common culture, 
he does go so far as to claim that there is a “dominant culture that incorporates most 
Americans, and those who fall outside it belong to a relatively small number of minority 
cultures.”14 Ultimately then, Kymlicka sees a given territorial state containing within it a 
dominant culture and a few minority cultures. 
If one accepts Kymlicka’s thick conception of societal culture, it makes a certain 
amount of sense that only a few groups within any given state count as cultures, since 
there are only so many institutional structures that can fit, so to speak, within a given 
society. If all cultures in a looser sense were deemed societal cultures in Kymlicka’s 
sense, one would be claiming that they all have (or at least have a right to) separate and 
complete institutional structures. If one thinks about the way ‘culture’ is often used 
(Italian-American culture, gay and lesbian culture, popular culture) one can immediately 
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see that this claim would be inadequate both as a description of social reality and as a 
norm. It would be nearly impossible, and probably undesirable, for each of these groups 
to retain their own governments, economies, and etc. As Kymlicka rightly points out, this 
underestimates the “impressive integrative power” of the United States and perhaps 
“American culture” generally. Yet Kymlicka overestimates its power, overlooking 
serious integration problems and important differences within the “dominant culture”. 
His social ontology thus runs the risk of concealing integration problems in groups that 
do not fall under his very stringent category of minority cultures. Further, understanding 
culture in this way leads Kymlicka to overlook important differences among those who 
supposedly share the same “cultural” institutions. Before developing this argument 
however, let me consider another important representative of multicultural liberalism. 
The employment of a thick conception of culture, and the problems that it raises, 
is not unique to Kymlicka. In fact, it is characteristic of many multicultural liberals, if not 
multicultural liberalism generally. Charles Taylor, for example, makes use of a similarly 
broad conception of culture, which gives rise to similar criticisms. Though Taylor does 
not define culture as explicitly as Kymlicka does (and, surprisingly, not at all in his essay 
Multiculturalism) his conception of culture can be clarified by his more recent work. 
 In Multiculturalism, Taylor attempts to disclose the historical-theoretical 
underpinnings of contemporary debates about political representation of cultural 
minorities, as well as controversies over multicultural curriculum.15 He explicates these 
issues in terms of two political principles: The “politics of equal dignity” requires the 
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assumption that individuals (and later in the book, “cultures”) are of equal value. No 
one is assumed to be of greater value than another simply by reason of birth, lineage, 
social position, or etc. The “politics of difference” on the other hand, requires recognition 
of one’s individual identity, that which makes that person not only unique, but authentic. 
This latter principle is derived from the former, in that part of what it means to treat 
individuals equally is recognizing the unique value of their particular identity. These two 
principles together make up the “politics of recognition”. Problems arise, however, in 
negotiating the precarious balance between these two principles; that is, in trying to 
specify what it means to treat people equally differently in particular cases. Taylor points 
out two kinds of examples. On the one hand, political problems (in a narrow sense) arise 
when representing a particular cultural group equally (francophone Canadians, for 
example) requires granting special rights or protections. On the other hand, problems in 
the sphere of secondary and higher education arise when the assumption of the equal 
worth of a particular culture can only genuinely be made by careful study of that 
particular culture’s literary and artistic contributions; by enacting a “fusion of horizons” 
between it and one’s own culturally-bound worldview.16 
 The latter problem is largely pedagogical, and beyond the scope of my analysis. 
The political problem is of more immediate concern, as the reader will see. But I mention 
these problems in the first place only in order to try to identify the conception of culture 
that binds them together. In both cases, we are asked to evaluate a demand for 
recognition: political representation in the first case, and representation in the literary 
“canon” in the second. Both have to do, in Taylor’s words, “with the imposition of some 
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cultures on others, and with the assumed superiority that powers this imposition.”17 So 
Taylor, like Kymlicka, appears to oppose “dominant” cultures to “minority” cultures. 
Yet, again like Kymlicka, Taylor emphasizes the cohesiveness of culture to a degree that 
underestimates its ambiguous boundaries. This problematic emphasis is solidified in 
Taylor’s more recent Modern Social Imaginaries.18 In this book, Taylor again gives a 
historical genealogy of the political principles that guide modern liberal societies. Yet 
here, Taylor is more interested in examining the status of these principles then their 
content. Are they universal? “Merely” cultural? Both? Taylor attempts to answer this 
question by formulating the category of “social imaginary”. Taylor explains: 
By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellectual 
schemes people may entertain when thinking about social reality in a disengaged 
mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how 
they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the 
expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that 
underlie these expectations.19 
 
Taylor clarifies that the social imaginary is not primarily a theoretical paradigm, but deals 
with “the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings” which is more often 
“carried in images, stories, and legends,” is “shared by large groups of people, if not the 
whole society,” and “makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of 
legitimacy.”20 Taylor goes on in the rest of the book to describe in great detail the 
particular social imaginary of “Western modernity” reiterating his earlier claim that 
although we can only make sense of our experience through the lens of this social 
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imaginary, we can still attempt to “fuse horizons” with other non-Western social 
imaginaries. To this end, he concludes his book with a plea for “provincializing Europe” 
by recognizing that “our” social imaginary is only one model among many others which, 
we must remember from Multiculturalism, are deserving of the presumption of equal 
value. 
Given that Taylor refrains from specifying his conception of culture in 
Multiculturalism, and that he returns to the central issues presented there and explains 
them in terms of a social imaginary, it seems reasonable to conclude that the social 
imaginary is Taylor’s model of culture. Yet even (and perhaps, especially) with this 
specification, certain important questions remain unanswered. It is still unclear the extent 
to which social imaginaries are shared within “multicultural” societies. Taylor hints that 
“even within the West” there are significant differences in the development of social 
imaginaries (he points to his chapter on the differing courses of the French and American 
revolutions as evidence), but he fails to specify whether these are mere variations or 
different social imaginaries altogether. Moreover, Taylor’s “broad and deep” conception 
of culture as social imaginary tends toward a troubling agnosticism. Even with the 
possibility of “fusing horizons” with different social imaginaries, we must still recognize 
the “humbling insight” that “we lack even the adequate language to describe these 
differences.”21 If this were true, it would be humbling indeed for those who mean to 
pursue political solutions to concrete problems of misrecognition and oppression. 
Taylor’s social imaginary, like Kymlicka’s conception of culture, conceals important 
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social divisions and conflict dynamics. While it purports to recognize the unique and 
authentic difference of individuals, it conflates important differences among groups.  
The crucial point to make clear is that this criticism of multicultural liberalism is a 
matter of principle, and not merely of scope. Kymlicka admits as much by considering 
and rejecting an alternative way of justifying group rights "as a response to some 
disadvantage or barrier in the political process which makes it impossible for the group's 
views and interests to be effectively represented."22 He attributes this position Young, 
who he quotes as claiming: "In a society where some groups are privileged while others 
are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular 
affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce the 
privilege."23 Kymlicka's rejection of this way of conceiving of group rights refers to the 
superiority of ideal theory. He claims that to conceive of rights in this way is reactionary, 
and that the best one could hope for would be "temporary measure[s] on the way to a 
society where the need for special representation no longer exists".24 Such temporary 
measures must be subject to periodical reconsiderations to see if the rights are still 
justified. In opposition to such "political affirmative action", Kymlicka conceives of 
group rights in a more universal way, as "inherent" in the categories of ethnic groups and 
national minorities as such.25 This defense however, underestimates the flexibility of the 
categories used to refer to underprivileged or oppressed groups. Even by Kymlicka's own 
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social ontology, the status of groups is not static. "It is possible, in theory," he says, 
"for immigrants to become national minorities, if they settle together and acquire self-
governing powers."26 Given this admission of the historical contingency of his categories, 
his notion of group rights is just as subject to periodical re-evaluation as a notion of group 
rights deriving from historical injustices.  
 But the differences between a liberal theory of minority cultures and theories that 
take seriously the concerns of oppressed groups go even deeper. In order to see how, one 
must understand that Kymlicka’s argument for the protection of minority cultures (as 
well as Taylor’s “politics of recognition”) is derived from the liberal value of individual 
freedom. Kymlicka understands individual freedom as the fundamental principle of 
liberalism.27 And individual freedom, he claims, is dependent upon access to a societal 
culture. This is because the very possibility of choosing how to live one’s life requires a 
range of meaningful options from which to choose, which is only provided by a “shared 
vocabulary of tradition and convention,” or what Kymlicka calls a “cultural narrative.”28  
His picture of individual freedom then, is not the picture of the isolated individual 
unburdened by tradition – a picture that has often been criticized by communitarians like 
Sandel, Walzer, Macintyre and even Taylor – but rather that of a culturally embedded 
individual guiding his or her life “from the inside,” choosing from a rich variety of 
options provided by his or her societal culture. It is important to notice though, that this 
kind of argument makes cultural membership instrumental. It is not valuable in itself, but 
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only insofar as it is necessary to the well-being of the individual. Cultural membership 
should thus count among what Rawls calls “primary goods,” basic rights that any 
individual requires to pursue their own particular conception of a good life. Kymlicka’s 
theory should thus be distinguished from those theories that see cultural membership as 
intrinsically valuable, as well as those theories that see cultural diversity as valuable to 
society in general. 
One objection that might be made here is that Kymlicka is unrealistically 
optimistic about cultural membership. By focusing on the positive value of cultural 
membership, he may overlook its negative or limiting aspects. As Herr points out, 
cultural membership not only makes choice possible, but it also limits the range of 
choices available to culturally embedded individuals. It may be true that the societal 
culture of the Amish, for example, provides a range of meaningful choices for its 
members. But this does not preclude the criticism that this range of choices is 
unnecessarily narrow. An accurate picture of cultural membership must take both its 
enabling and limiting aspects seriously.  
In a series of articles, Gerald Doppelt makes a similar point in a way that links 
this objection to the concern about the exclusion of relevant social groups. He argues that 
Kymlicka employs a “sanitized” conception of cultural identity, which leads him to 
overlook the negative, illiberal aspects of not only minority cultures, but dominant 
cultures as well. “Societal cultures,” Doppelt notes, “are also the source of prejudice, 
discrimination, exclusion, hatred, and violence – not just between groups, but within 
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them as well.”29 The force of this criticism, he thinks, is that group rights based on 
cultural identity may in fact perpetuate the very kinds of group harms that they are 
intended to address. Imagine, for example, a minority culture that oppresses some 
subgroup within its own group, say, women. For this subgroup then, Kymlicka’s 
justification for the protection of the minority culture will not hold up. It is not the case 
that the culture provides for women a range of meaningful opportunities; in fact, quite the 
opposite is true. Doppelt points out that “members of an oppressed subgroup within an 
illiberal national or ethnic minority may well be better off seeking to participate in the 
dominant culture, even though they may well confront discrimination and prejudice there 
[also].”30  
Kymlicka does not seem to dispute this optimism about cultural identity. In a brief 
reply to some of his critics, he addresses the criticism that his account of group rights 
fails to apply to so many social groups by denouncing a “defeatism” that would presume 
that all relations between cultures are “inherently characterized by conflict and 
inequality.”31 Instead, he claims that such cases are “exceptional,” and that the majority 
of cultural groups in fact accept the basic values of liberalism. His project then, focuses 
on “successful” accommodations of cultural minorities, and he even suggests that such a 
focus may be applicable to the so-called exceptional cases “indirectly.”32 If it is not yet 
clear, I think that this presumption is deeply mistaken. In the first place, even if cultural 
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minorities do exhibit something like the basic values of liberalism, this does not mean 
that their practices do not stray from these basic principles in serious, systematic ways. 
One need not even look to eccentric minority cultures to see such deviations from liberal 
principles. The dominant culture of supposedly liberal democratic states, in its 
employment of multidimensional structures of oppression, can demonstrate the point just 
as easily. But again, the fundamental point of contention is one of substance rather than 
scope, and Kymlicka identifies it clearly in his reply. Theories of cultural minority deny, 
as Kymlicka does, that “conflict and inequality” are central features of the organization of 
social groups. Theories of oppression on the other hand, see conflict as constitutive of 
group formation. Additionally, the methodology of theories of oppression takes groups as 
fundamental in their social ontology, as opposed to multicultural liberalism’s 
methodological individualism, which I have begun to demonstrate above. Let me now 
turn to these points, and explain these fundamental differences in more detail.    
Theories of Oppression  
In the same reply discussed above, Kymlicka sets the parameters for evaluating 
his own theory. He asserts that “the only way to defend my approach…is to show that 
alternative approaches have even greater costs in terms of our moral ideals.”33 This is a 
difficult task, he maintains, primarily because there are not enough alternatives with 
which to contrast his own. Theories of oppression, I will argue, represent just such an 
alternative, In what follows, I will present the main points of contrast and show that 
theories of oppression are superior, both in terms of their explanatory power and in terms 
of “our” moral ideals.  
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Multiculturalism pictures cultures as organic, self-contained, self-sufficient, 
and relatively isolated from one another. The idea one gets from such a view is that under 
normal circumstances cultures flourish side by side, coming into conflict only when there 
is not enough room, so to speak, for more than one of them (for example, government 
business, education, and so on must be undertaken in some language or another). But 
such conflicts appear as departures from the norm, the inevitable consequence of 
squeezing several cultures into a limited space. Theories of oppression, on the other hand, 
are agonistic. That is, they assert the fundamentality of conflict for understanding the 
reality of social groups. Oppressed groups exist in relation to one or more oppressor 
groups, which in turn define themselves in contrast to the groups they oppress. Unlike the 
concept of culture, the concept of oppression is a relational concept.  
The locus classicus of this alternative view is Marx, whose critique of classical 
liberalism’s avoidance of class conflict remains influential and informative. Marx, 
following Hegel, criticized liberalism for a social ontology that saw individuals, 
unencumbered by social relations, as the fundamental agents of political economy. For 
Marx, this individualism concealed the fact that society is divided into classes based upon 
the individual’s relation to the means of production. A system of bourgeois rights that 
aims to secure political emancipation not only leaves this more fundamental group-based 
injustice untouched, it serves, ideologically, to conceal and reproduce it. In other words, 
liberalism’s failure to understand (or acknowledge) the ways in which a certain kind of 
social group structures liberal capitalist societies serves to entrench a certain kind of 
group harm – exploitation – even as it purports to eliminate certain fundamental 
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individual harms. The insistence upon individual freedom actually conceals a basic 
unfreedom premised upon one’s group membership; and the insistence on equality 
among individuals actually conceals a basic inequality among classes. Thus Marx 
professes to give an immanent critique of liberalism, based upon its own values of 
freedom and equality. 
Though Marxism generally has been widely criticized, rightly and wrongly, in 
ways that it is not my concern to analyze, it is undeniable that the Marxist critique of 
liberal individualism has made possible analogous critiques of other kinds of group-based 
harm, which focus on social groups other than class, such as race, gender, and etc. 
Charles Mills’ account of white supremacy is an example of such an analogous 
immanent critique, and a paradigmatic theory of oppression. Mills provides a systematic 
explanation of the perpetuation of racial oppression alongside liberal principles of 
freedom and equality that would appear to condemn such a phenomenon. Unlike the 
common liberal response, which understands racial inequality as an unfortunate departure 
from nonetheless admirable liberal ideals, Mills shows how the fundamental principles of 
liberalism are symbiotic with the continued existence of racial oppression.34 Racial 
oppression can coexist with liberal principles of individual freedom and equality because 
the development of these principles was actually premised upon the previous exclusion of 
nonwhites. The enshrinement of individual rights and freedoms then, and the supposedly 
universal and abstract justification of those rights and freedoms conceal the fact that it 
was only certain kinds of individuals, whites, that could be considered bearers of 
individual rights deserving of equal treatment. In fact it is this very feature of white 
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(male) persons that is supposed to distinguish them from nonwhite subpersons, and 
thus establish their superiority and “civilization” as opposed to the inferior nonwhite 
“savage,” who lives in a perpetual state of nature, and lacks the rationality necessary to 
escape this brutal state.35 Traditional liberalism then, actually employs a dual normative 
standard, one set of rules for whites, and another for nonwhites. Thus the continued 
inequality and oppression of nonwhite peoples is not a “deviation” from liberal norms, 
but in fact adheres to the dual standards of a “racial liberalism.”36  
Mills’ theory clearly exhibits the key features of a theory of oppression as I have 
identified them. Liberal individualism, it claims, actually obscures a more fundamental 
group-based racial ontology, the division of human beings into white and nonwhite, and 
the privileging of the one over the other. This group-based account of white supremacy 
will look very different from individualist accounts. The latter tend to psychologize 
racism, understanding it as a psychological aberration that must be eliminated through 
education, therapy, and so on. Mills echoes this point: “The attitudinal and atomistic, 
individualist focus of at least some varieties of liberalism,” he points out, “reduces the 
issue to bigotry, which needs to be purged through moral exhortation.”37 Individualist 
approaches will thus miss important systematic and structural features of white 
supremacy that would persist even if everyone adopted a properly tolerant attitude. This 
is because the apologist for the racial polity can always point to some successful 
nonwhite individual, and conclude from this that it is possible to succeed, and that those 
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who have not must have not because of their own personal moral failings: laziness, 
lack of motivation, and so on. Likewise, the apologist can point to white individuals who 
face serious obstacles and systematic disadvantages that (they assume) are at least as bad 
as those faced by nonwhites. These assumptions are clearly debatable, but my intention is 
not to debate them. The point is that the very enterprise of comparing and contrasting 
individual successes and failures has no bearing on the claim that whites as a group are 
privileged and nonwhites as a group are oppressed. Such a claim is perfectly consistent 
with a few black Horatio Algers (or Barack Obamas) and a few whites at the bottom of 
the barrel.  
Mills’ theory also takes conflict as fundamental. He suggests “conceptualizing 
personhood as a battlefield, a terrain of political contestation.”38 This allows groups 
categorized by racial liberalism as “subpersons” to assert their full humanity. It remains 
an open question, and one much discussed in black political theory, whether this fight to 
be seen, finally, as a full person ought to lead to integration into the dominant social, 
legal, and political structures, or whether separate institutional structures are warranted. 
Kymlicka and other multicultural liberals may be helpful for thinking about these issues, 
but not without first taking existing racial divisions seriously, and recognizing the deep, 
constitutive conflict that they generate within racialized societies. In other words, a 
multiculturalism that took race seriously would look much more like a theory of 
oppression, and it would provide a very different picture of social reality, as I will now 
begin to show.   
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I argued above that Kymlicka’s multicultural liberalism conceals integration 
problems in groups that do not fall under his very stringent category of minority cultures, 
and that understanding cultures the way he does leads him to overlook important 
differences among those who supposedly share the same “cultural” institutions. Mills’ 
analysis of immigration illustrates this in a particularly poignant way. Mills agrees with 
Kymlicka that immigration policy long employed an assimilationist ideal. Yet, Mills 
notes that what immigrants must assimilate to is not (or not only) the dominant culture, 
but the existing racial dichotomy. So, upon arrival to the United States for example, some 
immigrants are deemed "white" without further review. Others, like Italians, Irish, and 
especially Jews, were "whites with a question mark" or "probationary whites".39. Those 
ethnic groups that achieve "whiteness" are integrated, while those that do not remain 
segregated. Further, those that are not integrated often begin to have more in common 
with Kymlicka's description of national minorities. They retain cultural, if not legal 
autonomy, by being involuntarily segregated in urban areas in which they form a 
majority. They often speak little English, retaining their native language not necessarily 
by choice, but as a result of inadequate resources for linguistic integration. It is not 
surprising then, that residential segregation is a feature common to both “ethnic groups” 
in Kymlicka’s sense, and nonwhites. For Mills the two categories are mutually inclusive, 
at least insofar as race is subsumed theoretically under ethnicity.40 Ethnic groups that are 
decided to be nonwhite are excluded from the white polity, while ethnic groups that have 
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been deemed “white” are integrated in much the way Kymlicka describes ethnic 
groups as such. This illustrates both the danger of essentializing disadvantaged groups, 
and the fungeability of Kymlicka’s social categories. 
Kymlicka also overlooks important differences among groups he describes as 
national minorities. Kymlicka's clearest examples of national minorities are the 
Quebecois in Canada, and Native Americans in the United States and Canada. As 
national minorities, he argues that these groups ought to enjoy some self-government 
rights, as well as weighted input upon issues in the majority culture that adversely affect 
them. According to Kymlicka, this is already true of these two groups, albeit in a limited 
way. So, for the first example, the francophone province of Quebec, Kymlicka says it 
"has extensive jurisdiction over issues that are crucial to the survival of the French 
culture, including control over education, language, culture, as well as significant input 
into immigration policy."41 In this case, national minorities are accommodated through 
federalism. For Native Americans however,  
self-government has been primarily tied to the system of reserved lands…Substantial 
powers have been devolved from the federal government to the tribal/band councils 
which govern each reserve. Indian tribes/bands have been acquiring increasing 
control over health, education, family law, policing, criminal justice, and resource 
development. They are becoming, in effect, a third order of government.42 
 
Though it may be truer in Canada, (in the corresponding footnote, Kymlicka gives 
only the Canadian example of the Inuit as evidence of his claim) to say that tribal 
reservations in the United States are becoming "a third order of government" is 
misleading at best. Though in recent years steps have been taken to give special rights to 
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indigenous groups (exclusive licenses to run casinos for example) Native Americans 
remain the poorest minority in the United States. Control over resources on indigenous 
lands has led to a continuation of the policies of "Indian removal" which are older than 
the United States itself. 
Describing indigenous peoples as self-governing national minorities allows the 
majority culture to shirk its responsibility to acknowledge and respond to the vast 
inequalities that are the result of historical injustices committed against the minority 
culture, injustices usually committed in the name of racial superiority. Further, by 
euphemistically describing national minorities as "previously self-governing" Kymlicka 
conflates two very different historical processes: conquest and confederation. The case of 
Quebec is a case of one dominant white European power accommodating the culture of 
another through federalism. The case of Native Americans is a case of white Europeans 
decimating the culture of a nonwhite people, and placing (most often by force) the small 
remainder of them in reservations. The ignorance of issues of race in this context leads 
Kymlicka to overlook the important fact that the reservation system was not implemented 
in order to accommodate the self-government rights of a minority culture, but was more 
comparable to a concentration camp, in which a people deemed racially inferior were 
forcibly relocated according to the convenience of the "master race". 
Finally, a raceless account of cultural minorities misses not only important 
differences, but important commonalities as well. Kymlicka points out that the category 
of ‘Hispanic’ actually conflates many different issues and individuals. Some individuals 
counted as Hispanic meet his definition of national minorities (Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, 
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and perhaps Cuban exiles). Others fall under his definition of ethnic groups (most other 
voluntary immigrants from Latin America). Kymlicka further points out that individual 
members of these groups often do not self-identify as Hispanic but as Puerto Rican, 
Mexican, Ecuadorian, and so on.43 Certainly Kymlicka is right about all this, and one 
should be cautious about ascribing artificial social categories to groups that do not self-
identify with them. But what Kymlicka misses is that these various groups do have at 
least one thing in common. They are, at least in the context of the United States and its 
system of racial classification, most often grouped together and classed as nonwhite, such 
that they face some of the same barriers and disadvantages as other racial minorities and 
some that are unique to “Hispanics” (such as the presumption that all people of Latin 
American descent are in the United States illegally). Even though the categorization 
might be artificial (as is the category of race itself), it still has very real consequences for 
those it purports to describe. Thus Kymlicka precludes any sort of political affinity 
around Hispanicity, and nonwhiteness generally, a phenomena that could combat the 
unjust advantages of whiteness and systematic racism.   
Further, the shortcomings of a purely individualist approach to identifying and 
remedying group-based disadvantages (cultural or otherwise) can be made in a more 
general way, without reference to any group in particular. In The Reality of Social 
Groups, Paul Sheehy demonstrates the inadequacy of individualism alone for explaining 
important social phenomena. Explanations that reference groups causally are fairly 
common. Consider the following example. In Seattle in 1999, massive protests virtually 
shut down the third ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization. By taking 
                                                 
43
 Ibid: 16. 
  
38
control of key intersections, and also by sheer number, protestors made it impossible 
for WTO delegates to reach the conference destination. Setting aside issues of the 
morality of tactics, the events just described cannot even be explained, let alone evaluated 
on an individualist model. It is true that the group was comprised of several thousand 
individuals. Yet this fact is inadequate at best, and irrelevant at worst to the explanation 
of the events. The actions of the group cannot be reduced, in this case, to the actions 
and/or intentions of its individual members. Sheehy writes “if the joint action is broken 
down into its individual components, then the essential element in its effectiveness is lost 
– the jointness or coordination of the actions.”44 An individual, however determined, 
cannot by mere presence make a street inaccessible, breach a barricade, or halt factory 
production. Such effects must include the group qua group among its causes. In such 
cases, the collective nature of the group is irreducible.  
The same can be said also for group harms. An individual can be harmed in a 
number of direct ways: through acts of violence, discrimination, humiliation, and so on. 
But groups can also be the irreducible objects of harm. Hate crimes, for example, take the 
form of individual harms, but are additionally, and even primarily group harms. A person 
attacked in virtue of their race, gender, or sexuality is obviously harmed individually. But 
other members of her group can also be said to be harmed, even though the attack was 
not aimed at them individually. The lynching of African Americans, for example, is an 
attack on blacks as a whole, and not just the individual victims. This is part of the 
justification underlying harsher penalties for crimes that target individuals based upon 
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their group memberships.45 Further, it is not just the threat of potential harm to other 
like individuals that justifies saying that they are harmed. To use Sheehy’s example, a 
Kurd living in a western democracy may have no reason to fear individual mistreatment 
based on reports that Kurds are being mistreated in Iraq, or elsewhere, but she may still 
feel harmed by the fact that members of her group have suffered because of their group 
membership.46 
Sheehy’s criticisms of pure individualism also illuminate the reasons why a 
theory based on such a methodology tends to overlook conflict, instead imagining and 
overestimating cooperation, voluntary interaction, and consent. Multicultural liberalism 
takes voluntary association as the paradigm of group membership. If it didn’t, then it 
couldn’t understand the value of group membership in terms of primary goods: things 
individuals pursue as part of their vision of a worthwhile life. Whether one focuses on the 
enabling conditions of group membership as a context for meaningful choices, or on its 
limiting conditions, the focus remains on the individual – the extent to which he or she 
chooses to associate with other individuals, and the effects of this choice on his or her 
other choices. Such an understanding of groups – call it intentionalism – tends to 
overlook groups that are formed by forces outside of the individual’s control, or at least, 
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sees such groups as anomalous, and oppressed groups fit precisely this definition, as I 
will now argue. 
            Defining Oppression  
Oppression should be understood as a group harm of the type Sheehy identifies. 
In a brief but informative essay, Marilyn Frye defines oppression in a similar way. “If an 
individual is oppressed,” she asserts, “it is in virtue of being a member of a group or 
category of people that is systematically reduced, molded, immobilized. Thus, to 
recognize a person as oppressed, one has to see that individual as belonging to a group of 
a certain sort.”47 Accordingly, she makes a similar distinction between individual and 
group harm. She imagines a “rich white playboy,” who breaks a leg in a skiing accident. 
Clearly such a person is harmed, but he is not oppressed, she claims, even if his injury 
can be traced to someone’s negligence or intentional malice.48 Even violations of 
fundamental individual rights do not automatically translate to instances of oppression. If 
the government seizes my property, for example, or denies my right to freedom of 
speech, this violation should not automatically be characterized as oppression. If, 
however, the government seizes the property of, or denies the right to free speech of a 
certain group, based solely or primarily on preexisting group membership, then the 
violation is properly called an instance of oppression. When oppression is used loosely to 
name any and all forms of harm and human suffering, it loses much of its critical 
                                                 
47
 Marilyn Frye. “Oppression.” The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. (New York: Crossing 
Press, 1983): 8. 
 
48
 Ibid: 11. 
  
41
potential. Oppression points to a phenomenon that may include individual harm, but is 
nonetheless analytically distinct from it.     
But this definition is not yet precise enough. Must we count the mandatory 
registration of sex offenders, for example, as an instance of oppression? If sex offenders 
count as a social group, and if this restriction is placed upon them in virtue of being a 
member of that group, then it seems we must. If this seems intuitively problematic, it is 
because the idea that oppressed groups are social groups of a “certain sort” has not yet 
been specified clearly enough. The key to specifying this further condition, as suggested 
above, lies in the rejection of intentionalism. Oppressed groups are paradigmatically non-
intentional. That is, they do not depend upon, and generally do without the voluntary 
consent of their members. The existence of a racial group, for example, does not depend 
upon the identification of a shared purpose on the part of those it purports to classify. 
Instead, these groupings are often understood as somehow “natural”.49 But sex offenders, 
difficult questions of nature versus nurture aside, are grouped together based upon some 
individual criminal action(s) that they committed. So though they might not share a 
common purpose in any robust sense, they still count as an intentional group, given that 
society has seen fit to aggregate their actions together in a way that defines them as a 
group.   
 In other words, they share a characteristic that is deemed socially relevant in an 
important way. But individuals can share other socially relevant features besides 
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individual actions and intentions. They can share external characteristics, like social 
disadvantage, and these also bind individuals together as social groups. In Analyzing 
Oppression, Ann Cudd focuses on these latter features in attempting to define oppressed 
groups.50 She argues against those who claim that social groups are necessarily defined 
by shared intentions. Many relevant social groups do not meet this qualification, 
particularly oppressed groups. But what, then, qualifies an oppressed group as a group? 
For her, the key feature is shared social constraints. She explains that constraints are 
social “when they come about as a result of social actions,” including “legal rights, 
obligations and burdens, stereotypical expectations, wealth, income, social status, 
conventions, norms, and practices.”51 Such constraints can and do shape intentional as 
much as non-intentional groups, as the sex offender example illustrates, but oppression 
proper occurs when these constraints are based upon non-voluntary group membership.  
 Social groups do not always fit neatly into this dichotomy, however. In reality, 
they are often shaped by both intentional and non-intentional forces. Consider, for 
example, Jews. As a social group, Jews are defined in reference to both intentional and 
non-intentional characteristics: in terms of religious belief, and in terms of race. One may 
not practice Judaism, but still be considered Jewish either by self-identification or 
ascription. And one may not be Jewish “by birth,” but convert to Judaism and come to 
see oneself as a Jew, and be so seen by others as well. The question of what, if anything, 
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makes one “really” Jewish is irrelevant here.52 The point is that oppression aims to 
eliminate this complexity, deemphasizing or eliminating intentional aspects of group 
membership, and attempting to demarcate group membership completely non-
intentionally. The practice of forcing Jews and other minorities to wear special 
identifying badges, founded in medieval Islam and Christianity and adopted by the Third 
Reich, illustrates this tendency in one of its starkest forms. And while greater 
phenotypical differences tend to make such a practice unnecessary for racial 
classifications in the United States, other standards, such as the so-called “one drop rule,” 
achieve the same effect.53  
 Of course, such a process is rarely if ever completely successful. Movements 
against oppression often take the form of redefining group identity by reintroducing and 
emphasizing elements of intentionality. This involves not only replacing perceived 
negative characteristics of group membership with positive ones (“black is beautiful,” 
and so on), but revealing how the very construction of the group is based upon human 
convention rather than natural fact. Thus the movement to recognize group membership 
as “socially constructed” allows gender benders, race traitors, and others to make 
voluntary choices about membership where previously choice was thought (or made to 
appear) impossible. But it does not follow from the fact that oppression never completely 
eliminates intentional aspects of group membership that oppression does not necessarily 
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involve the attempt to do so. The movement to eliminate intentional features of group 
membership is a necessary condition for oppression. 
 But is it also a sufficient condition? That is, does the attempt to eliminate 
intentionality lead in all cases to oppression? Superficially, it seems that it does not. 
Certain kinds of groups might be thought to be non-intentional but not necessarily 
oppressed. Consider the group of people with green eyes. Here is a group based upon a 
non-voluntary characteristic, but one that is probably not oppressed, at least not in virtue 
of this specific characteristic. But such a group does not really count as a social group, 
because the characteristic of having green eyes is not normally deemed socially relevant. 
The group is a “series,” to use Sartre’s term: a mere aggregate. Now, if green-eyed 
persons came to be thought of as less intelligent, or somehow less “pure” than other 
groups, and were, further, subject to harm based on their group membership, then the 
characteristic would become socially relevant, and we ought to consider the group of 
green-eyed persons oppressed.54 
 Let us consider a more difficult case, the case of oppressor groups. On what basis 
can we distinguish these groups from the groups that they oppress? If, as has been said, 
oppression is a kind of group harm involving the attempt to eliminate intentional aspects 
of group membership, then one might claim (and some have claimed) that oppressor 
groups are themselves oppressed. After all, in a racially categorized society, whiteness is 
just as non-voluntary as blackness. And in a gendered society, maleness is just as non-
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voluntary as femaleness.55 Further, whites, males, and other individual members of 
oppressor groups may experience their membership as a social constraint. Perhaps a man 
has a difficult time pursuing a career that has traditionally been associated with women, 
or a white person is harassed for moving into a predominantly black neighborhood. To 
see how oppressor groups are distinct from the groups they oppress, one must appreciate 
the distinction between individual and group harm. 
 One could make a case that non-intentional social groupings are unjust in general, 
insofar as they place restrictions on individual autonomy. One’s social group ought to 
have no bearing on the opportunities available to him or her, whether that group is 
oppressed or not. In fact, such an argument is central to liberal individualism, and 
provides the justification for many of the civil and political rights enshrined in liberal 
democracies. However, the key to distinguishing oppressor and oppressed groups is that 
the social constraints imposed upon the former do not harm the group qua group, even if 
they do constrain individual members of that group in certain ways. In fact, quite the 
opposite is true. In general, the constraints imposed upon individual members of 
oppressor groups are beneficial to the group as a whole. Categorizing certain sectors of 
the workforce as “women’s work” preserves better, higher paid sectors for men, reduces 
competition in those sectors, and so on. Consider Frye’s example: 
The boundaries of a racial ghetto in an American city serve to some extent to keep 
white people from going in, as well as to keep ghetto dwellers from going out. A 
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particular white citizen may be frustrated or feel deprived because s/he cannot 
stroll around there and enjoy the “exotic” aura of a “foreign” culture, or shop for 
bargains in the ghetto swap shops. In fact, the existence of the ghetto, or racial 
segregation, does deprive the white person of knowledge and harm her/his character 
by nurturing unwarranted feelings of superiority. But this does not make the white 
person in this situation a member of an oppressed race…[the barrier] is a product of 
the intention, planning and action of whites for the benefit of whites, to secure and 
maintain privileges that are available to whites generally, as members of the dominant 
and privileged group…This barrier is not oppressive to whites, even though it is a 
barrier to whites.56 
 
 The non-intentionality of group membership alone, then, is not sufficient to 
demonstrate oppression. The elimination of intentionality must lead to group harm. It is 
not surprising that liberal multiculturalism misses this distinction, since it fails to see 
groups as separate from the individuals that comprise them, and so fails to distinguish 
between individual and group harm. Without this distinction, one may recognize that the 
harms caused by certain kinds social constraints differ in degree (perhaps racial 
minorities, women, etc. experience them more frequently, or more intensely), but one 
will miss that they are fundamentally different kinds of harms. And since it is in part 
group harm that characterizes oppression, the very category of oppressed group will not 
seem to be a sound ontological category from that perspective. 
 Not all accounts of oppression take groups as fundamental. Some accounts aim to 
extend the term oppression to (or even reserve it for) certain individual harms. Sally 
Haslanger, for example, distinguishes structural oppression, which is what I have offered 
an account of above, from “agent oppression.”57 She understands the latter simply enough 
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as an individual agent “misusing their power to harm another.”58 Under this 
description, oppression is fundamentally an issue of individual moral wrongdoing. One 
who reserves the term oppression for only this type of harm must maintain that structures 
or institutions either cannot be oppressive, or can be only in a derivative sense, insofar as 
they embody the oppressive intentions of individual agents.59 Haslanger rightly notes that 
this conception alone is inadequate, in the first place because the complexity of 
institutions and practices often prevents or makes irrelevant the identification of some 
individual agent responsible for their effects. For her part then, Haslanger recommends a 
“mixed” approach, which would apply the term oppression to both structural and 
individual instances. 
 In my view, such a “mixed” approach is too broad, and fails to distinguish 
oppression from immoral acts in general. If oppression is simply a case of one individual 
harming another, then virtually all (or at least a great deal of) immoral actions will count 
as oppression. If a valet misuses his or her “power” to steal my car then the valet 
oppresses me. A paperboy (or girl) who intentionally breaks my window (perhaps I am a 
particularly ill-tempered customer) oppresses me. A stranger who assaults me arbitrarily 
oppresses me. Such uses of the term oppression seem misused, and stretch, devalue, and 
water down the meaning of the term, which ought to remain a powerful name for a 
serious and systematic normative failure. As Haslanger herself notes “unless more can be 
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said about unjust action as distinct from immoral action, oppression would just 
collapse into wrongful harm.”60 
Secondly, power, on any understanding of the term that goes beyond mere 
physical force, is itself structurally distributed, such that the ability to misuse one’s power 
is itself related to one’s position in a complex web of social arrangements. Consider 
Haslanger’s example: she imagines a bigoted professor who consistently gives low 
grades to women of color, regardless of their performance. Such women, Haslanger 
thinks, are not structurally oppressed, though they may nonetheless be individually 
oppressed by the professor’s bad behavior.61 Yet, given my definition above, what is 
really oppressive about such a case is that certain individuals (women of color in 
Professor X’s class) are being harmed because of their membership in a certain group 
(women, nonwhites, or both). This membership is non-voluntary, and is constructed by 
processes outside of both the students’ and the professor’s control. Thus the very ability 
of the professor to “oppress” certain of his or her students is determined by a preexisting 
social arrangement that is itself oppressive. Thus the women of color students are 
structurally oppressed, and the professor’s actions are an instance of that oppression. 
  Finally, even if one does make the important distinction between unjust and 
immoral acts, one should make distinctions among kinds of injustice as well. I would 
hesitate, for example, to use oppression as an umbrella concept to capture what is wrong 
with a variety of injustices. For example, Iris Marion Young suggests that oppression 
includes at least five different forms of injustice: exploitation, marginalization, 
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powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and systematic violence.62 Again, such an 
approach (which is otherwise insightful and illuminating, especially in linking oppression 
to group identification) risks conflating too many different phenomena, bringing 
oppression ever closer to a kind of empty signifier, used and (by some) abused to name 
every kind of harm a group can suffer. I doubt for example, that any single concept can 
capture what is going on in, say, the structure of wage-labor under a capitalist mode of 
production as well as the devaluation of traditional forms of life in under-developed post-
colonial nations, as well as the use of mass rape as a genocidal strategy in regions marred 
by war and ethnic violence. For this reason, my definition of oppression is intentionally 
narrow and, though it may be somewhat stipulative, it nonetheless captures the sense of 
oppression most relevant to contemporary liberal democracies. 
Normative Intentionalism  
I have argued that an intentionalist account of group membership, to which 
multicultural liberalism subscribes at least implicitly, is inadequate as a foundation of 
group rights, not least because it fails to recognize oppressed groups. Such an oversight is 
unacceptable insofar as oppressed groups represent (or at least ought to represent) one of 
the most normatively pressing concerns for supposedly liberal democracies. Now 
whether or not intentionalism about groups is desirable as a normative goal remains to be 
seen. One might think that group membership ought to be based solely on voluntary 
association, and that groups formed by coercion or other external forces are somehow 
illegitimate. But multicultural liberalism does not make this claim explicit. Rather it 
commits the fallacy of presuming that what ought to be (if indeed it ought to be) already 
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is. And so non-intentional groups fall off of its radar, and are treated only peripherally, 
if it all. One should not forget, however, that the task of political philosophy is not only to 
accurately diagnose injustices but, perhaps more importantly, to suggest ways in which 
they might be remedied. For the latter task, intentionalism deserves further consideration.  
Carol Gould recognizes many of the shortcomings of multicultural liberalism 
noted above, and tries nonetheless to develop a normatively intentionalist account of 
group rights that takes cultures as its fundamental units. She too begins with an analysis 
of racial oppression, and multicultural liberalism’s failure to address it. She notes that the 
problem with racial identity is that it is “ascriptive” (her term for non-intentional). 
“Here,” she argues, “the basis for membership in the group is not common purposes or 
shared understandings, but rather the objective circumstance of being put in a particular 
situation of oppression not by choice.”63 Ascriptive identities of this sort do not mesh 
well with the democratic ideals of freedom and equality. The normative goals of 
democratic politics then, should include “the freedom to shape one’s group identity with 
others and to develop multiple group identities, where the criterial features – bodily or 
otherwise – are open to continuous interpretation and choice.”64 In other words, the goal 
is to “move to self-ascription.”65 This ideal is central to what she calls “inclusive 
intercultural democracy”.  
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Interestingly, Gould chooses to understand normatively justifiable group 
identity in terms of culture. “The concept of culture,” she says, “has the advantage of 
being more open and more fully free than the alternatives of ‘race,’ ‘ethnicity,’ and 
‘nationality.’66 Presuming that this is true (and that is no small presumption67), it is 
difficult to see why only these alternatives are relevant, or why a general account of 
groups could not do the philosophical work that Gould requires of culture. At any rate, it 
is surprising that Gould specifies her normative conception in this way, given her many 
reservations about the use of culture in multiculturalist discourse. She notes in several 
places that understanding groups in cultural terms risks “reification,” by overlooking 
important differences and establishing false commonalities.68 Accordingly, she criticizes 
Kymlicka, Taylor, and others for employing a conception of culture that is too strong and 
encompassing. She distinguishes her own looser conception of culture, which 
acknowledges that “there is a wide range of highly significant culturally defined groups 
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that lie outside this strong definition of culture.”69 Her focus then, is cultural identity in 
this weaker sense, which allows that individuals may identify with more than one culture, 
and denies that cultural membership requires the kind of infrastructure that makes it 
“societal” in Kymlicka’s sense. 
Still, like Kymlicka, Taylor, and others, she sees culture primarily as “a condition 
for the agency of individuals,” and derives the rights of cultural groups ultimately from 
the rights of its individual members.70 So, despite her concerns for oppressed groups, she 
must ultimately admit that oppressed groups “are not simply characterizable as cultural 
minorities,” though she does think that the two categories “overlap” insofar as some 
cultural minorities are also oppressed.71 This makes oppression a secondary concern, and 
she argues rather simply that a “parallel case” can be made for group rights for oppressed 
groups, based upon the same interpretation of freedom and equality that undergirds her 
conception of cultural rights.  
Yet more so than Kymlicka, Taylor, and other multicultural liberals, Gould’s 
general normative strategy is informative. If oppression is marked by non-intentionality, 
then the mitigation of oppression must make self-ascription possible. That is, groups must 
be free to develop their own interpretations of their collective identity, without coercion 
or external constraint. This, I will argue, is the fundamental right that groups possess: 
formulated positively, a right to self-ascription; formulated negatively (but amounting to 
the same thing), a right not to be oppressed. Such a right requires specification. It implies 
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that understanding group rights requires understanding group identity. Further, a 
conception of group identity that can sustain a theory of group rights must be normative. 
That is, it must tell us how groups would or ought to construct their collective identity in 
a (more) just society. Initially, this claim may sound frighteningly tyrannical. I do not 
mean to give an account of what certain groups should be like, since this marks precisely 
the kind of coercive, ascriptive, non-voluntary process that I aim to condemn. I do mean 
to give an account of what it would look like for groups to be able to freely construct 
their own identity, and what sort of social and political framework would be most 
conducive to such processes. 
In other words, my account will be, in part, procedural. Accordingly, I draw 
inspiration from the work of Jurgen Habermas, in particular his theory of communicative 
action, which grounds rationality in the intersubjective structure of communication, as 
well as his discourse ethic, which shows how such a communicative intersubjectivity 
gives rise to universally binding norms. Though his theoretical aims are much more 
ambitious and far-reaching than mine – purporting to reconstruct a new and foundational 
form of rationality as well as a renewed foundation for morality in general – I will argue 
that his theories provide insight also into the process of constructing group identity, and 
can provide a clue as to how one might give a normative account of group identity 
without ascribing to a substantive account of what groups must be like. More specifically, 
I will argue that his central claims about how moral utterances can be normatively 
justified can also apply to the process of negotiating collective identity, a claim he 
sometimes flirts with, but never systematically develops.   
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I have argued that oppression cannot be understood in terms of individual 
harm, and so we should not expect it to be remedied by individual rights. Since 
oppression involves harm to the group qua group, then group rights that aim to alleviate it 
must also attach to the group itself, not just as a shorthand way of referring to certain 
kinds of individual rights. To acknowledge this is not to deny the existence of individual 
rights, nor even to say that group rights are in all cases primary. Nor does the existence of 
cases where group rights conflict with individual rights justify the rejection of one or the 
other, any more than the existence of ethical dilemmas in general justifies the rejection of 
the duties or principles that they show to be conflicting. Such cases cannot be decided in 
a general way, though I will try to give some guidelines for resolving them in the 
following chapters. I do mean to suggest that, in order to understand and address 
oppression, groups and group rights must be understood as fundamental and irreducible. 
This is why I claim that theories of oppression are essentially different from liberal 
theories of cultural minority, not as complementary approaches to understanding 
overlapping social categories, but as competing theoretical frameworks for understanding 
group-based injustices. What’s more, I take these competing frameworks to be 
incommensurable with one another, for reasons I will now make explicit. 
Though certain groups may in fact be understood as both oppressed groups and 
cultural groups (and so the term ‘oppressed culture’ is not meaningless), when rights are 
attributed to such a group they are attributed either in virtue of their culture-hood, as 
providing a range of meaningful individual choices, etc., or in virtue of their oppression, 
as a response to a certain kind of group harm. I suspect that most often, it is in virtue of 
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their oppression that the question of group rights becomes most pressing.72 If this is 
true, then an account of group rights based upon a theory of oppression will be more 
fruitful than theories based upon the values of cultural membership, not only because it 
can deal with cases that multiculturalism fails to address, but also because it gives a more 
accurate picture of the cases that multiculturalism does address. In other words, to 
reiterate, a theory of oppression, including a theory of rights for oppressed groups, is not 
just a supplement to or “parallel case” of a theory of group rights based upon cultural 
membership. It is an alternative theory, and a superior one, for the moral and 
epistemological reasons noted above.  
One may object, however, to the very desirability of a normatively intentional 
account. Michael Walzer argues, for example, that “the ideal picture of autonomous 
individuals choosing their connections (and disconnections) without restraints of any sort 
is an example of bad utopianism.”73 He argues that generalizing the value of voluntary 
association to all human associations is sociologically naïve and philosophically suspect. 
Some associations, he thinks, are simply non-voluntary, and (what is the more important 
claim here) that this fact is perhaps unavoidable and not necessarily morally or politically 
egregious. He thus concludes that “freedom requires nothing more than the possibility of 
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breaking involuntary bonds and, furthermore, that the actual break is not always a good 
thing, and that we need not always make it easy.”74 In support of this conclusion, Walzer 
points out that our associational life is constrained in a variety of ways: by the kinds of 
families, cultures, and political structures we are born into, by the forms of association 
that are socially available, and by the rules of morality. In other words, he posits a 
“radical givenness” of our associational possibilities, and argues that this givenness is 
morally justifiable in that without it “society itself would be unimaginable.”75  
It seems to me that Walzer is right about this radical givenness. Of course 
individuals are born and socialized into certain associations, traditions and practices. 
Taken to the extreme, one could deduce from such constraints that none of our choices, 
associational or otherwise, or voluntary, since they are always conditioned by a variety of 
factors outside of our control. Still, there are important distinctions to be made. Race, 
gender, and other ascriptive categories are involuntary in a much stronger sense than 
political affiliation, religion, citizenship, and so on. In a society like ours, there is little or 
no possibility of “breaking [those] involuntary bonds.” Indeed, the fact that Walzer 
admits that the possibility of exiting involuntary associations (and identities) must be 
retained is itself a kind of weak voluntarism (or as I prefer, normative intentionalism), 
since completely involuntary associations are for the most part impossible to leave.76 One 
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does not need to imagine individuals completely unencumbered by social, political, 
and cultural ties in order to argue that ideally, groups (including associations and identity 
groups) ought to be voluntary, at least in a weak sense like the one Walzer himself 
expresses. 
To the contrary, my account of self-ascription, as the reader will see, begins from 
a similar kind of social embeddedness. It begins, that is, with groups, rather than 
individuals, as I have argued that any account which aims to understand and remediate 
oppression must. Whatever else might be said against such an approach, it is clearly not 
the target of Walzer’s critique. Rather, as becomes apparent toward the end of his essay, 
the real target of his critique is a certain kind of postmodernism that sees the construction 
of identity and association as a project for individuals, a kind of “self-fashioning,” to use 
the term Walzer attributes to Julia Kristeva, George Kateb, and similar thinkers.77 Yet 
this is only one interpretation of the claim that identities are “socially constructed” and 
not, I will argue, the best one. Unlike these accounts, I do not advocate (or imagine) that 
a just society must eliminate all constraints on association and identity formation, only 
those that are oppressive, as noted above. A normatively intentional account that 
acknowledges the inevitability of some constraints, and takes groups rather than 
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individuals as the fundamental agents of (collective) identity ascription avoids 
Walzer’s objections to individualistic voluntarism. 
Finally, it is necessary to address the criticism that the normative intentionalist 
approach I have described marks a return to the very ideal theory that Kymlicka invokes 
to defend his focus on minority cultures, and so perhaps suffers from the same oversights 
that ideal theory is especially prone to. Recall that Kymlicka rejects conceiving of group 
rights "as a response to some disadvantage or barrier in the political process” on the 
grounds that such rights are at best temporary, and so amount to a kind of “political 
affirmative action” that fails to address the deeper issue of accommodating cultural 
minorities.78 I have argued, to the contrary, that freedom from oppression is central to the 
accommodation of groups in general, including cultural groups. This is a crucial point for 
understanding why theories of oppression and theories of cultural minority are competing 
rather than complementary or analogous theories. The attempt to eliminate intentionality 
leading to group harm (that is, oppression), is precisely what is at issue in cases where 
accommodating cultural minorities becomes problematic. That is, it is not minority 
cultures simpliciter, but oppressed minority cultures that deserve to be considered as 
candidates for special rights or accommodations. Therefore, a theory of oppression is 
necessary for properly understanding even the paradigm cases of group rights based upon 
cultural membership.  
In other words, ideal theory is not in itself objectionable. It is even unavoidable 
insofar as all normative theory is in some sense ideal. What is objectionable is an ideal 
theory that idealizes in such a way that certain problems can no longer be addressed 
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within its mechanisms of abstraction; a theory that makes certain “non-ideal” problems 
disappear. Oppression represents such a problem, and one should not be satisfied with a 
theory of group rights that abstracts it away as if by magic, with a few conciliatory 
remarks. Alternatively, a responsible social theory must take stock of the situation “on 
the ground”. More specifically, a normative account of group identity must be informed 
by how groups actually do construct their identity. This is why Habermas is useful, since 
his normative theory is grounded in a certain way in actually existing communicative 
practice. Further reflections on this link between ideal discourse and the actual 
preconditions of communication will serve to clarify the link between ideal and non-ideal 
theory. That is, what follows will be an attempt at a more responsible ideal theory. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY, GROUP RIGHTS, AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION OF  
 
LAW 
 
 In the previous chapter, I introduced the claim that the fundamental right 
possessed by groups is the right not to be oppressed or (formulated positively) the right to 
self-ascription. This claim stands in need of further argumentation. In this chapter, I will 
argue that such a right is not only equal in importance to rights as they attach to 
individuals, I will argue further, that it is actually foundational for traditionally-conceived 
individual rights, and so in some sense prior to them. A proper understanding of the 
discursive justification of individual rights, I argue, vindicates this claim. Since I have 
developed this argument in opposition to liberal theories of multiculturalism, and drawing 
from Jurgen Habermas’ discourse theory, I will use Habermas’ own commentary on 
Charles Taylor’s version of multicultural liberalism as a starting point for investigation.79 
 In that commentary, Habermas raises the question central to this chapter: “Can a 
theory of rights that is so individualistically constructed deal adequately with struggles 
for recognition in which it is the assertion of collective identities that seems to be at 
stake?”80 Fairly straightforwardly, he answers in the affirmative. He argues that the 
recognition of cultural minorities “does not require an alternative model that would 
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correct the individualistic design of the system of rights through other normative 
perspectives.”81 So, it would appear in the first place that Habermas would not agree with 
me about the shortcomings of a liberal individualist model, nor about the 
incommensurability of theories of cultural minority and theories of oppression. In fact, 
his commentary on Taylor amounts to a defense of a certain kind of liberalism, and relies 
on a distinction between “ethnic and cultural minorities” and “nationalist movements” 
that is virtually identical to Kymlicka’s problematic distinction between ethnic groups 
and national minorities.82 Still, Habermas’ particular brand of liberalism is distinct from 
the theories of cultural minority that I have criticized; so much so in fact, that I will argue 
that it can provide a crucial pillar in the normative foundation of a theory of oppression. 
This is because his apparent defense of liberal individualism can only be understood if 
one first grasps his critique of “subject-centered philosophy,” and the “intersubjectivity” 
that replaces it and grounds the entirety of his philosophical project. It is in this 
intersubjective mode of analysis (that is, in groups of a special sort) that individual rights 
find their ultimate justification. I take this to be Habermas’ unique philosophical 
contribution, which, again, is vastly different from the traditional liberal justification of 
rights, group or individual. In what follows, I will attempt to bring out this underlying 
theme and show how it goes a long way (though unfortunately not all the way) toward a 
justification of what I have identified as the fundamental group right: the right to self-
ascription. 
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Intersubjectivity and the Internal Relation between Democracy and the Rule of Law 
Habermas’ dispute with Taylor’s multiculturalism stems from his reading that 
“Taylor proceeds on the assumption that the protection of collective identities comes into 
competition with the right to individual (subjektive) liberties.”83 The former falls under  
Taylor’s “politics of difference,” while the latter falls under his “politics of equal 
dignity,” both of which he thinks are equally necessary but often conflicting principles of 
modern liberalism. Yet Habermas finds this to be a false dichotomy.84 When properly 
understood, he thinks, individual rights and collective identities do not conflict, but form 
an “internal relation.” That is, for Habermas, public and private autonomy are 
“equiprimordial.”85 This thesis is central to Habermas’ legal and political philosophy, and 
is perhaps the central focus of his recent work on law and human rights. 
  According to Habermas, modern political theory has never really reconciled its 
two fundamental influences. On the one hand, Republicanism prioritizes the public 
autonomy of the citizen over the private autonomy of the individual. This view is 
supported by the insight that private liberties can only be exercised under the protection 
of a system of law. Going back at least to Aristotle, republicanism sees law as proceeding 
from a collective vision of the good life; i.e., it presupposes a shared ethical worldview, 
since citizenship is a kind of collective identity. On the other hand, Liberalism prioritizes 
private autonomy and pre-political human rights. This view is supported by the insight 
that political will formation is only possible given the presumption of certain natural 
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rights. These rights are understood as constraints on any system of law, rather than as a 
product of political will formation. Therefore one is a private individual first and a citizen 
second.86  
These two traditions are often seen as conflicting, the former taking popular 
sovereignty as the foundation of modern democracy, and the latter taking human rights as 
the inalienable foundation of the modern constitutional state. Of course, the two are only 
opposed in concept, being actualized in the same structures of modern constitutional 
democracies. And for Habermas, the two forms of legitimation presuppose one another. 
This is because, as Kant recognized, law itself has a dual character. It must be considered 
simultaneously as a coercive mechanism limiting individual freedom, and also as an 
expression of an autonomous will self-legislating.87 That is, in spite of the fact that laws 
are coercive, they are legitimate only insofar as we can, at least in principle, consent to 
them. Thus legitimate laws are also “laws of freedom”. Yet, unlike Kant, whose primary 
concern is the unchanging and eternal moral law, Habermas is concerned with positive 
law, which is historical and in principle revisable. “The idea of self-legislation by 
citizens,” he says, “should not be reduced to the moral self-legislation of individual 
persons.”88 This is because Habermas means to reconstruct an alternative justification for 
a system of rights, one that is freestanding in relation to the justification of morality 
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generally, and one that is not dependent upon a “monological” metaphysics of the 
individual.  
According to Habermas, the trenchant difficulties involved in synthesizing the 
Liberal priority of private autonomy and the Republican priority of public autonomy stem 
from “certain premises rooted in the philosophy of consciousness” as well as “a 
metaphysical legacy inherited from natural law, namely, the subordination of positive law 
to natural or moral law.”89 The two phenomenonon are related, insofar as both rely on a 
traditional metaphysics of the subject, one which Habermas challenges in a unique way. 
For Liberalism, the fundamentality of individual rights is normatively justified by 
reference to either natural law or a “metaphysics of morals.” For Hobbes and Locke for 
example, the fundamental rights of the private individual are justified by reference to 
certain laws of nature that are considered innate. Having such rights is simply part of 
what it means to be a rational human being, and is thus thought to require no further 
justification. What these theorists are more concerned with is the genesis of political 
authority and public rights. Such rights are justified only in a second step: the creation, 
through collective agreement, of an external sovereign to protect the private rights of 
individuals. Political sovereignty then, and the set of political rights that citizens retain 
(which vary greatly from Hobbes to Locke), are only instrumentally valuable, and only 
legitimate insofar as they are derived from the pre-political rights of private individuals. 
Whether or not this is a convincing account of the justification of political 
authority, it does not provide a very sophisticated account of the justification of private 
“natural” rights, especially when the natural law account is uncoupled from its 
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metaphysical and religious foundations. Kant aimed to provide a deeper justification 
for these fundamental private rights, in relation to morality rather than prudential 
rationality. The inviolability of individual persons expressed in private rights derives its 
legitimacy from a priori principles of practical reason demonstrable through a principle 
of universalizability: the categorical imperative. As moral beings, humans have the 
unique capacity to represent their will as objective law; that is, to express their autonomy 
in and through willing. The principle that binds the human will also proceeds from it. 
This makes practical reasoning a reflexive process, and it makes of each person an end in 
him or herself. The categorical imperative is the fundamental principle that expresses 
respect for persons as ends in themselves. In terms of right, it amounts to “the freedom of 
each to the condition of its harmony with the freedom of everyone.”90 The social contract 
then, or “public right” is the differentiation of this single right into a system of rights, 
designed to protect this morally necessary harmony.91 Yet these latter rights, though 
derived from the moral law, and so still a priori, are nonetheless “external” to it insofar 
as the moral law itself does not depend upon them for its legitimacy. So, although Kant 
imports rational (cognitive) moral content into the concept of public autonomy (unlike 
Hobbes or Locke) he still sees public autonomy as subordinate to private autonomy. 
Habermas finds this problematic, in the first place because he finds the 
individualism of these explanations untenable. “At a conceptual level,” he argues, “rights 
do not immediately refer to atomistic and estranged individuals who are possessively set 
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against one another.”92 For liberals like Hobbes and Locke, whose social contractors 
have only self-interested reasons to enter into civil society, the rights bestowed upon 
them by this arrangement are only instrumentally justified. That is, in Kantian terms, their 
obligations to the law are only hypothetical, and not unconditional. Yet for Kant, the 
“monological” design of the Categorical Imperative fails to capture this very insight. For 
Hobbesian liberals, the parties to a social contract “would have to be capable of 
understanding what a social relationship based upon the principle of reciprocity even 
means.”93 But as pre-political individuals, they would only understand their freedom as a 
“natural freedom that occasionally encounters factual resistance,” but not as a “freedom 
constituted through mutual recognition.”94 And though Kant recognizes this, and so 
attempts to give the social contract a more substantive moral foundation in rational 
autonomy, this foundation turns out to be incompatible with modern pluralist societies, 
which require “postmetaphysical” justifications of law and morality. Let me now explain 
this point in more detail. 
 As I have said, Kant’s conception of morality, and thus, in turn, of private and 
public right, is founded upon the idea of freedom as autonomy. The free will that his 
moral theory requires is of a different sort than the simple freedom of choice that most 
liberal theories of right aim to protect (as is expressed in the German terms Wille and 
Wilkur). A central focus of Kant’s critical project then, is to reconcile freedom of the will 
with deterministic laws of nature, both of which he sees as equally necessary. This 
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complex project leads Kant to posit a two-tiered metaphysics. In the phenomenal realm 
of appearances, the behavior of objects is governed by deterministic natural laws. This is 
the world of objects as we experience them. However, Kant finds it necessary to posit, in 
addition, the noumenal realm of “things in themselves,” which must be considered 
exempt from these laws. However, “even with the closest attention and the greatest 
clarity that the understanding can bring to such representations, we can attain to a mere 
knowledge of appearances but never to knowledge of things in themselves.”95 This 
cognitive gap applies not only to objects outside of the subject but, perhaps more 
importantly, to the subject itself. Kant asserts that an individual “must necessarily assume 
that beyond his own subject’s constitution as composed of nothing but appearances there 
must be something else as basis, namely, his ego as constituted in itself.”96 Of this 
“transcendental ego” however, we can have no further knowledge. In particular, the 
freedom that grounds the moral law here becomes speculative, since free will must be a 
property of the transcendental ego. Free will then, becomes a “postulate of pure practical 
reason,” an axiomatic moral belief that cannot itself be theoretically justified.97  
Habermas sometimes refers to this as the “doubling of the relation to self,” and 
understands it as the result of “the objectifying attitude in which the knowing subject 
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regards itself as it would entities in the external world.”98 This “philosophy of the 
subject” (or sometimes “philosophy of consciousness”), of which Kant is the prime 
example, is inadequate as a moral and legal foundation. Since the relation of the 
empirical (phenomenal) self to the transcendental (noumenal) self amounts, in the end, to 
a leap of metaphysical faith, morality must find a new justification within phenomenal 
reality; that is, within the “lifeworld” of empirical subjects. This justification cannot be 
based upon the individual subject, as is Kant’s Categorical Imperative. It cannot assume 
that “each individual can project himself sufficiently into the situation of everyone else 
through his own imagination.”99 Instead, this act of individual imagination must be 
replaced by an actual discursive process. “When the participants can no longer rely on a 
transcendental preunderstanding grounded in more or less homogenous conditions of life 
and interests,” he claims, “the moral point of view can only be realized under conditions 
of communication that ensure that everyone tests the acceptability of a norm.”100 The 
result is a principle of discourse, which is meant to apply not to individuals, but to groups 
of language users. In the concept of the lifeworld, the locus of intersubjective 
communication oriented toward mutual understanding, “concrete forms of life replace 
transcendental consciousness in its function of creating unity.”101 Understood as 
“intuitively present group solidarities,” these concrete forms of life “only emerge in the 
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plural.”102 Thus Habermas effectively replaces the monological reason of the 
philosophy of the subject with the communicative reason of a foundational 
intersubjectivity. 
Why then, to return to the central question, would he deny that an 
individualistically constructed theory of rights is problematic, or that it requires an 
alternative normative justification, which is precisely what he affirms against Kantian 
morality? To answer this question, one must recall that Habermas resists the attempt to 
justify positive legal rights in moral terms. These public rights must be justified in their 
own terms, “in the medium of law itself.”103 So, one cannot assume that his criticisms of 
Kantian morality (including its monological individualism and its need of an alternative 
discursive normative foundation) apply automatically to individualistic justifications of 
law. However, Habermas does suggest that the principle of discourse he offers as an 
alternative to the Categorical Imperative can be “operationalized” for other types of 
discourse, including legal discourse.104 The result is not a principle of morality, but a 
principle of democracy. The difference in the two principles derives from the difference 
in the types of norms that they purport to justify. Moral norms are universal in the 
strictest sense – that is, across space and time. They are the result of the internalization of 
the discourse principle by moral agents. That is, one acts morally when one acts 
according to reasons that everyone could accept. Such maxims cannot (and need not) in 
principle be legally regulated since they refer to internal motivations rather than external 
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actions. Legal norms, on the other hand, govern the external relations of individuals 
insofar as they do or do not conform to certain rules of action. This is why legal norms 
take the specific historical form of individual rights, rather than the general abstract form 
of moral principles.105 The principle of democracy then, is the result of the 
institutionalization of the discourse principle in the form of a system of rights. It assumes 
the private rights necessary for the creation of a political community, then it justifies 
those rights retroactively, from the perspective of members of the political community 
themselves. This is what is meant by the co-originality of (or internal relation between) 
public and private autonomy; democracy, and the rule of law. 
So, though legal norms are “individualistic” insofar as they must take the 
institutional form of individual rights, they are still justified discursively. The point is 
only that the discourse principle cannot be applied to moral and legal norms in a uniform 
way. The “legal person” is a necessary creation of a system of law that is nonetheless 
legitimated by reference to intersubjective processes of will formation. The fact that “the 
legal form has an atomizing effect,” Habermas says, “does not negate the intersubjective 
bases of law as such.”106 That is, Habermas views the individuation of persons as a social 
process arising necessarily from established collective identities. This means that “every 
legal community and every democratic process is inevitably permeated by ethics.”107 
However, the principle of democracy means to regulate this permeation, assuring that all 
ethical views receive fair hearing, and that none unfairly biases the process of 
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establishing basic rights. In short, though ethics may (and even should) permeate the 
democratic process, it does not determine it. 
Now Habermas’ subtle criticism of Taylor can be understood more clearly. By 
describing and then criticizing a view of the liberal state as ethically neutral, Habermas 
finds Taylor to be employing a straw-person fallacy. A system of rights that is 
individualistic in form can deal with struggles for the recognition of collective identities 
because it must deal with such identities in the first place, in order to be legitimate as a 
system of law. This is the very substance, Habermas thinks, of the democratic process. 
Furthermore, Habermas does not see his interpretation of liberal democracies as an 
alternative to traditional liberal and republican theories so much as a reconstruction of 
the self-understanding of liberal democracy. This is why ultimately, despite his 
fundamental critique of traditional individualism and the philosophy of the subject, and 
despite his reinterpretation of the basis of legitimation in terms of intersubjectivity, he 
denies the need for an “alternative model” based on “other normative perspectives”. He 
thinks that liberal democracy itself implies his model of legitimation, and so it does not 
need to be supplemented or replaced, so much as properly understood. In light of this 
explication, let me now return to the issue of groups and group identity in order, 
ultimately, to show how the fundamental right of groups fits with Habermas’ discursive 
account of legal rights. 
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Collective Identity and Political Integration 
As the above analysis begins to show, groups are essential to Habermas’ 
discourse theory, despite his complex defense of a system of law that is “individualistic” 
in form. One could even go so far as to say that this is the main difference between his 
reconstruction of liberalism and classical liberalism. The latter, he thinks, fails to take 
into account the “forms of solidarity that link not only relatives, friends and neighbors 
within private spheres of life, but also unite citizens as members of a political community 
beyond merely legal relations.”108 These two forms of solidarity are linked but 
nonetheless distinct. They form two levels of integration, corresponding to two levels of 
collective identification, which must not be conflated.  
“Ethical-cultural” identity is a strong collective identity involving shared beliefs, 
traditions and practices. As such, it has much in common with Rawls’ idea of a 
“comprehensive doctrine,” as well as the idea of culture that informs the work of 
multicultural liberals like Kymlicka and Taylor. The difference, however, is that these 
groups are not mere aggregations of individual choices about the good life, but 
foundational intersubjectivities in which “persons are so to speak nodal points in an 
ascriptive network of cultures and traditions.”109 That is, this strong collective identity is 
the soil from which individuation and personal identity grow.110 This makes groups prior 
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to individuals, both conceptually and actually, at the level of ethical life. But Habermas 
carefully distinguishes ethics and ethical life from both morality and legality. While 
morality and legality employ discourses of justification aimed at demonstrating the 
validity of their respective norms, ethical discourses are discourses of self-clarification, 
in which members of the group come to an agreement about their particular values and 
their ethical-political self-understanding. In modern pluralist societies this strong form of 
collective identity cannot form the basis of citizenship, since these societies contain 
diverse groups with fundamentally different values.  
 However, unlike Rawls, whose political liberalism sees the state as the neutral 
location for an overlapping consensus of worldviews, Habermas does see political 
membership as requiring a certain kind of shared collective identity, though much weaker 
than the identity shared by members of ethical-cultural groups.111 The collective identity 
that constitutes citizenship “is rooted in an interpretation of constitutional principles from 
the perspective of the nation’s historical experience.”112 Habermas thus sometimes refers 
to this kind of collective identity as “weak constitutional patriotism,” but also as “ethical-
political” identity. As a discourse on citizenship, it establishes the parameters within 
which the legal norms and the system of basic rights established by the constitution 
apply. This weak collective identity can integrate ethical-cultural groups without 
demanding that they assimilate to a particular value system or form of life (that is, a 
strong collective identity). In other words, all that can be demanded of members of the 
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political community is “assent to the principles of the constitution.”113 Yet even this 
assent is interpreted from, and so rooted in, the perspective of particular ethical-cultural 
identities. That is, though political membership does not require allegiance to any 
particular ethical-cultural identity, it does ultimately derive its legitimacy from ethical-
cultural identities in general.114 This is why Habermas asserts that “solidarity is the 
reverse side of justice.”115    
Oppression stands as a serious impediment to this type of political integration, 
and to the creation of a weak national solidarity, for a variety of reasons. This is most 
obvious when oppression takes the form of outright exclusion from the polity, as it often 
has in the past and sometimes still does today. However oppression can impede political 
integration in more subtle ways, perhaps more common in contemporary liberal 
democracies. Insofar as oppression results in material inequalities, it may de facto 
preclude the possibility of the political participation of oppressed groups, even though 
such participation is supposedly protected in principle. This is the force of the Marxist 
criticism that liberal rights are merely formal rights, and fail to secure the material bases 
necessary for enjoyment of those rights. Additionally, oppression destroys the trust and 
mutual respect necessary for the type of solidarity Habermas outlines. One might call this 
the affective basis of solidarity, distinct from its material bases, which have received 
greater theoretical attention. This suggests that, even if the formal and material bases of 
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political integration are in place, such integration fails in the face of both “official 
disrespect” from the legal apparatus and lack of mutual respect among the ethical-cultural 
groups that would seek to form a minimal alliance for the purposes of democratic will 
formation.116 Of course, in most cases of oppression, these forms overlap and coexist. 
Still, it makes some sense to make these analytic distinctions (which are, it will become 
clear, forms of group harm) in order to compare Habermas’ thoughts on oppression with 
the definition of oppression provided in the first chapter.  
Habermas takes oppression seriously as a failure of political integration, so much 
so that he states categorically that “in a legal community, no one is free as long as the 
freedom of one person must be purchased with another’s oppression.”117 However, he 
does not ultimately see oppression as a fatal flaw in the system of rights he describes. By 
making rights subject to reinterpretation and revision according to a principle of 
democracy, Habermas thinks that the ideals of freedom and equality (which in principle 
rule out oppression) can be progressively realized. Habermas consistently uses feminism 
and the “feminist politics of equality” to illustrate this point. The oppression of women as 
a group has changed shape throughout history. Until relatively recently, this oppression 
took the most obvious form of outright exclusion from the polity. It was only within the 
past century that the formal equality of women was recognized in law, through the 
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extension of voting rights.118 However, Habermas correctly notes that “the formal 
equality that was partially achieved merely made more obvious the ways in which 
women were in fact treated unequally.”119 In part to address this problem, the liberal 
paradigm of law, with its focus on formal equality, gave way to a social-welfare 
paradigm focusing on material equality. This paradigm urged not only formal equality, 
but also legal recognition of relevant differences between men and women. So, for 
example, the legal recognition of the fact that women (and not men) bear children led to 
the implementation of special protections and leaves of absence for pregnant women.120 
Such measures aim to ensure the effectiveness of equal basic rights by ensuring their 
material bases. However, as feminists like Nancy Fraser have pointed out, these measures 
of the social-welfare state have tended to further stereotypes of women as dependent, 
replacing the private paternalism of the husband with the public paternalism of the 
State.121 In other words, though these measures aim to ensure the formal and material 
bases of inclusion, they fail to secure the affective basis of inclusion, instead showing 
women a kind of official disrespect that prevents them from being full autonomous 
members of the polis. 
Habermas understands these two paradigms of law – liberal formalism and social 
welfare materialism – as two poles of a “dialectic of legal and factual equality.” A strict 
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focus on formal legal equality – the right to vote, for example – aims to secure public 
autonomy at the expense of private autonomy. It legally mandates equal rights while 
ignoring the private barriers to exercising such rights: employment, education, health, 
wealth, and etc. On the other hand, a strict focus on material equality – through social 
welfare programs, for example – aims to secure private autonomy at the expense of 
public autonomy. In aiming to secure the material bases for the effective exercise of 
formal rights, the social welfare state transforms the active, participatory citizen role into 
a passive, consuming client role. It thus disempowers the very groups it means to enable. 
Drawing from his thesis on the co-originality of public and private autonomy then, 
Habermas introduces a third, proceduralist paradigm of law. According to this paradigm, 
the process of actualizing rights is discursive, based upon the self-interpretation of the 
groups to which laws and social programs are meant to apply. So, in the case of women, 
for example, neither a formal equality that ignores difference nor a social welfare policy 
that reifies it will suffice. Instead, the relevant aspects of equality and difference (in short, 
the meaning of equal treatment) must be determined on a case by case basis by way of 
the deliberation of the affected parties themselves.122 Here discourses of self-clarification 
take on a political character. Only through the self-interpretation of needs and the self-
clarification of what it means to be (in this case) a woman can the relevant rights be 
actualized. This is the substance of a kind of “identity politics” that Habermas sees as 
crucial for the legitimation of a democratic system of rights.123 I will discuss this 
discursive conception of identity politics in more detail in the next chapter. For now I 
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only mean to point out that Habermas’ proceduralist program for the actualization of 
rights requires something like what I have described as the fundamental right of groups: 
the right to self-ascription. 
In the first chapter, I defended a definition of oppression as the systematic attempt 
to eliminate self-ascription leading to group harm. I also argued that theories of cultural  
minority are ill-equipped to deal adequately with this phenomenon, since they fail to 
recognize the fundamentality of groups as well as the fundamentality of conflict in its 
relation to the formation of non-intentional groups. So far in this chapter, I have 
attempted to show that groups of a certain kind are fundamental to Habermas’ account as 
well, in spite of his assertion that at its point of application, the legal system must be 
individualistic in form. And in light of his analysis of feminism, one can also see that 
self-ascription plays a central role in the legitimation of rights, though he does not speak 
of it, as I have, as a right in itself. It remains to be shown then, in what sense the right to 
self-ascription is in fact a right, what kind of right it might be, and where (if anywhere) it 
fits in Habermas’ elucidation of the system of rights. First, however, I would like to 
continue the present line of inquiry beyond Habermas’ example of feminism, in order to 
see whether it applies to other kinds of oppressed groups, and, most importantly, whether 
a general theory of oppression (which Habermas never really provides except in terms of 
specific examples) can be extracted from it. 
This extended analysis is necessary, since Habermas asserts that, compared with 
feminism, “the struggle of oppressed ethnic and cultural minorities for the recognition of 
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their collective identities is a different matter.”124 Already one should note the phrase 
“oppressed ethnic and cultural minorities,” which conflates, I have suggested, two very 
different frameworks for understanding group identity. This difference is made explicit in 
his contrast of women with other oppressed groups, and it lies in the relation between the 
groups’ strong ethical-cultural identity and the weak ethical-political identity of the 
citizenry as a whole. “Women’s cultural self-understanding is not given due recognition,” 
he says, “any more than their contribution to the common culture.”125 So, “the political 
struggle for recognition begins as a struggle about the interpretation of gender-specific 
achievements and interests.”126 That is, it begins as a discourse of self-clarification. Yet, 
“insofar as it is successful, it changes the relationship between the sexes along with the 
collective identity of women, thereby affecting men’s self-understanding as well.”127 
Thus the feminist movement represents what David Ingram, following Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, calls a “syncretist transformative” identity politics.128 Through its own internal 
transformation, it transforms other types of identity as well, creating a new mélange of 
collective identification identical to none of its component parts. 
However, Habermas does not see the self-clarification of cultural and ethnic 
identity as similarly transformative. “From the point of view of members of the majority 
culture,” he says, “the revised interpretation of the achievements and interests of others 
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does not necessarily alter their own role in the same way that the interpretation of the 
relations between the sexes alters the role of men.”129 There is some truth to this claim. 
The oppression of women is unique for many reasons, and it should not be conflated with 
the oppression of other minority groups, not least because women are not, after all, a 
numerical minority. And it is also true that cultural groups can sometimes, under normal 
circumstances, pursue their own way of life in isolation from the “majority” culture. But 
oppression represents a departure from the normal circumstances of collective identity 
formation. Oppression, as I have argued, is precisely the suppression of the kind of self-
ascription that can make cultures appear autonomous and self-enclosed. And insofar as 
oppression is relational, it cannot be overcome without transforming its constitutive 
relation between oppressor and oppressed groups. Racial oppression, for example, 
involves (if not derives from) unwarranted feelings of superiority on the part of the 
“majority” race, made concrete in a variety of measures that share in common the attempt 
to inscribe inferiority as a part of what it means to be a member of a “minority” race. In 
this case then, the reconstruction of a positive collective identity for racial minorities 
must also transform the self-understanding of its oppressor group. Otherwise, the weak 
national solidarity required of a successful democratic order collapses under the weight of 
different factions that each see themselves as superior to the others.  
In other words, though there are important differences between women and other 
social groups, Habermas fails to identify the common conditions under which any such 
group can be called oppressed. Habermas likewise fails to recognize the relational 
dimension of oppression as well as the transformational character of self-ascription. 
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These failures must be attributed to adopting the problematic framework of “cultures” 
in order to address the problem of oppressed groups. This framework presupposes 
intentionality as a defining characteristic of group membership, and so it understands the 
task of political integration as a matter of integrating pre-established worldviews. But 
oppression involves not just the struggle for recognition of a pre-established collective 
identity, as Habermas seems to suggest. It is the struggle for the very conditions 
necessary to construct such a vision of collective identity. Sometimes, as in the example 
of class and, according to some, race130, the political goal is recognition of the fact that 
the collective identity ascribed to a certain group is illegitimate; that there is in fact no 
basis for identification except the shared experience of oppression. In such cases, the goal 
is not group autonomy but self-eradication through transformation of society as a whole. 
The concept of culture is equally ill-equipped to speak to these kinds of cases. In sum, 
though Habermas’ discourse theory provides a sophisticated model of what I have called 
normative intentionalism – the idea that socially relevant group membership ought to be 
based upon voluntary association, even if it currently is not – it is not explanatorily 
sufficient to ground the practice of democracy in nations where oppressed groups exist. 
This is because oppressed groups do not necessarily share an “ethical-cultural” identity, 
even though they do share an ascribed collective identity. This latter type of identity 
cannot be understood in terms of a “discourse of self-clarification” or a consensus on a 
conception of the good. It must be understood in systematic terms. I will now turn to such 
an explication.   
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Pathologies in the Actualization of Rights 
Habermas is as aware as anyone of the systemic inequalities present in actually 
existing liberal democracies. More than most contemporary political theorists in fact, 
Habermas understands and takes seriously these empirical failures. This sensitivity to the 
shortcomings of the liberal-democratic state may be attributable to the influence of the 
tradition of critical theory on Habermas’ work. As a retrieval of Marxist theory in light of 
developments in post-industrial capitalist societies, the question of group (namely class) 
membership and the problem of the oppression of the working class were central 
problems for first-generation critical theory. Theorists like Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse aimed to show how the so-called freedoms of liberal 
democracy actually mask a more fundamental social domination, a domination 
manifested on the one hand in a technocratic state bureaucracy that replaces democratic 
decision-making with expert knowledge, and on the other in a mass mediatized “culture 
industry” that precludes even informal public criticism and ensures consent to the given 
form of social organization.131 Of course, for critical theorists, these new forms of 
domination grow from and supplement the old form of domination: class exploitation. 
The technocratic state and the culture industry are the latest means by which the capitalist 
mode of production reproduces itself at the respective political and cultural levels.  
From a philosophical perspective, critical theorists linked these forms of 
domination to reason itself. By subsuming the particular under the universal, reason 
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itself, they thought, implies the erasure of difference and a “leveling abstraction,” and 
so sets the groundwork for domination. Following Max Weber, they saw modernity 
undergoing a process of “rationalization” in which the “cultural value spheres” of art, 
science and morality are separated and linked to specific purposive-rational governing 
procedures. Here the Enlightenment project of bringing rationalization to all spheres of 
life takes on an ideological character. The emancipatory self-understanding of this project 
conceals the fact that increased rationalization does not in fact lead to increased human 
freedom, but to its opposite. The rationalization of key areas of social life would lead 
ultimately, they thought, to totalitarianism. This final verdict on reason however, seems 
to preclude rational emancipatory critique, insofar as such critique is itself based in 
reason. So according to some, this increasing suspicion about reason itself undermines 
the very aims of critical theory.  
As a student of critical theory, Habermas recognizes the dangers of technocracy, 
mass media, and economic exploitation, but he aims to address them without undertaking 
an all-encompassing critique of reason. Rather, by identifying norms implicit in everyday 
communication, Habermas reconstructs a form of rationality oriented to reaching 
understanding. This communicative rationality stands in a dialectical relation to the 
instrumental rationality that leads to domination.132 In this way, Habermas sees himself 
escaping the “dialectic of Enlightenment” that leads to the pessimistic vision of 
inescapable domination, instead theorizing a new foundation for critical resistance. This 
brief gloss cannot do justice to the complexity of Habermas’ reconstruction of rationality, 
undertaken mainly in the two-volume Theory of Communicative Action. I mention this 
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project only to demonstrate that concerns about the potential for domination in 
contemporary capitalist societies are at the heart of Habermas’ social theory, and more 
importantly, to show how his bifurcated conception of reason is mirrored in the 
distinction between system and lifeworld, which is of central importance to his political 
theory.  
If communicative rationality is the capability of linguistic beings to come to 
understand one another, communicative action is the realization of this capability in 
discourse. As such, the theory of communicative action provides the substantive 
philosophical basis of discourse theory, which is fundamentally a theory of argumentative 
procedure. The concept of the lifeworld circumscribes the environment within which this 
type of action is possible. It is “the intuitively present…familiar and transparent, and at 
the same time vast and incalculable web of presuppositions that have to be satisfied if an 
utterance is to be at all meaningful.”133 That is, it is necessarily a contextual background 
for mutual understanding. Only when communication fails do these presuppositions come 
to the fore. Habermas gives the example of a construction worker telling another younger 
construction worker to fetch beer for lunch.134 The presuppositions here include factual 
matters (that beer is available for sale, that it is feasible to walk to the store, etc.), as well 
as normative concerns (that it is acceptable to drink on one’s lunch, that the “low man on 
the totem pole” is responsible for this task, etc.). If these implicit assumptions are not 
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present, or misunderstood, then they must be reconstructed explicitly, or else the 
communicative lifeworld breaks down, and communication fails internally.  
The ideally functioning lifeworld represents a space within which interlocuters 
can reach understanding without coercion. As such, the analysis of society from the 
perspective of the lifeworld makes possible a vision of society as guided by the collective 
volition of its members. However, Habermas warns against a “hermeneutic idealism” that 
understands society as a whole in these intentionalist terms. The lifeworld perspective, he 
thinks, must be supplemented by another perspective that theorizes the limits of 
communicative action, as well as its impediments. The systems perspective then, takes 
into account precisely those tendencies that Weber and early critical theorists saw as all-
encompassing. Modern social systems like the state and the economy do take on an 
instrumental logic of their own, which is separate in principle from the rationality of 
collective action. In the first place, this is simply because increasing social complexity 
makes direct intentional control of complex social systems impossible. Perhaps in small, 
primitive societies, social organization could be understood solely in intentional terms. 
But in societies like ours, Habermas thinks, we cannot exchange goods and services by 
way of coming to mutual agreement about the value of goods in each case. So, a market 
economy arises, governed by the principle of supply and demand (or, if one prefers, the 
“commodity form”), to “unburden” the lifeworld of this demand. Similarly, we cannot 
feasibly come to agreement about every law or policy that presents itself in the political 
arena. So a representative system arises to carry out this task, a system which has, as the 
earlier analysis shows, a form and logic of its own (the individualistic “legal form”).   
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In and of themselves then, Habermas does not find these systems problematic. 
They arise to meet the needs of lifeworlds overburdened by social complexity. However, 
the instrumental rationality they employ as means to human ends does suffer from the 
dangerous tendencies that early critical theory identified. The logic of the commodity 
form, for example, tends by its very nature to expand beyond its proper scope, since 
capitalism cannot reproduce itself except through constant growth. This expansion is both 
horizontal, seeking out new markets for goods and services, and vertical, commodifying 
areas of human life previously considered sacred, or at least not subject to principles of 
exchange. The relinquishing of political authority to professional politicians also tends to 
expand beyond its necessity, insofar as it begins to view all political decisions as expert 
matters, creating a “democratic deficit” that undermines its own legitimacy. These are 
examples of the “colonization of the lifeworld” by systemic imperatives. With the image 
of colonization, Habermas means to acknowledge the dangers of Weberian 
rationalization that previous critical theorists recognized while still maintaining a 
theoretical space for critical reflection and transformation of these very systems.  
The purpose of this excursus into Habermas’ sociological framework of system 
and lifeworld is to see whether it is adequate for understanding oppression in systematic 
terms. More precisely, insofar as oppression inhibits the collective formation of will and 
identity characteristic of the lifeworld, and insofar as oppression is systemic (in a way yet 
to be fully worked out), one might say that oppression could be fruitfully conceptualized 
as a colonization of the lifeworld. But oppression does not seem to be a system in the 
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same way that the economy or the state is, though it does operate through and within 
these systems. In what sense then, can oppression be thought of as a system? 
In the first place, the claim that oppression is systemic means that it is not simply 
reducible to the intentions of any particular group. I have claimed that neither oppressed 
nor oppressor groups should be conceived in intentionalist terms. The case, I think, is 
clear enough for oppressed groups, who are classified and defined in ways that do not 
depend on the will or consent of their members. One may think though, that insofar as 
oppressor groups benefit from oppression, and even perpetuate it, both actively and 
passively, such groups ought to be understood intentionally. That is, it is tempting to 
conceive of oppression as a conscious, collective project undertaken by oppressor groups. 
In Habermasian terms then, oppression would be a form of communicative action located 
within the lifeworld of oppressor groups, but aimed at destroying the communicative 
capacities of targeted groups. Indeed, in talking about oppression under the rubric of 
“movements whose collective political goals are defined primarily in cultural terms,” 
Habermas seems to lend credibility to this interpretation, and the standard of comparison 
among oppressed groups becomes the extent to which their own intentionally constructed 
self-understanding does or does not transform the self-understanding of other groups, or 
of society as a whole, understood here in terms of a communicative lifeworld.135 
This intentionalist or “lifeworld” understanding of oppression contains some 
truth, but it misses crucial features of oppression. In many cases, for example, it is useful 
for conceiving the historical origins of systems of oppression. Charles Mills’ theory of 
the “racial contract,” for example, sees racial oppression arising from an explicit 
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historical agreement on the part of whites to subjugate nonwhites, as the reader will 
remember from the first chapter. Somewhat similarly, Habermas’ early work The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere shows how the market economy and the 
oppressive class system that it engenders have their roots in the universalization of the 
particular collective self-understanding of the bourgeois class, institutionalized according 
to a principle of publicity.136 As opposed to “scientific” interpretations of historical 
materialism then, Habermas shows how capitalism and its characteristic mode of 
legitimation come into being through collective, intentional action. Yet both of these 
theories admit (even emphasize) that this original intentionality gets institutionalized or 
“reified” in systems that no longer depend upon explicit intentional direction. Thus Mills 
distinguishes between “signatories” to the racial contract and its “beneficiaries,” the 
former representing the active constructors of the system of racial oppression (its 
“framers,” as it were), and the latter representing the passive recipients of a system of 
privilege.137 
In short, it is necessary to distinguish between the (nonetheless important) project 
of a genealogical analysis of the origins of oppression, for which intentionalist analysis 
may suffice, and the project of identifying (and eliminating) oppression in its current 
form, for which intentionalist analysis is insufficient. Once oppression is 
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institutionalized, it takes on a systemic form that does not depend upon consent or 
intentional guidance for its reproduction. Today, focusing primarily on the intentions and 
attitudes of groups and individuals runs the risk of leading to the mistaken but all too 
familiar conclusion that since (some assume) prejudicial attitudes are less prevalent now 
than in the past, racism, sexism, and other systems of oppression no longer present the 
same challenges as they did for past generations. Rather, even if tomorrow, by some 
miracle of revelation, every person was purged of all prejudice and truly saw all others as 
their equals, oppression would remain so long as the structures that advantage some 
groups over others remain in place. At best, such a revolution in personal attitudes could 
provide the motivation to dismantle these structures of oppression, but it would not mark 
the end of oppression itself, as some think. 
Oppression as “colonization of the lifeworld” captures the initial intentionality of 
oppression as well as the semi-autonomous character it takes on once reified into 
systems. Once collective, willful oppression is solidified in systems of law, “objective” 
economic imperatives, and so on, oppressor groups are “unburdened” of the physical and 
psychological requirements of oppressing. Whites for example, can now enjoy all the 
privileges of whiteness while simultaneously professing a cheery attitude of liberal 
tolerance. They can enjoy higher wealth and wages without the moral turpitude 
associated with expropriation. And they can hold the highest offices and positions while 
resting assured that everyone else had “equal opportunity” (no “special treatment”) to 
hold them as well. In this way, the white psyche is insulated from the potentially harmful 
effects of oppressing, and is thereby enabled to construct a positive individual identity, 
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supposedly separate from its membership in the white race.138 Moreover, as Rousseau 
noted, oppression is necessarily institutional, insofar as it can only exist within the 
established institutions of civil society, and not in the “state of nature” as Hobbes, Locke, 
and others surmised. This is because in the lawless state of nature, the physical strength 
and psychological resolve required to thoroughly dominate another human being goes 
beyond the capabilities of any one individual, or would, at any rate, require such an 
individual to “expose himself voluntarily to a much greater hardship than the one he 
wants to avoid.”139 So, one can say that oppression unburdens the white lifeworld in a 
physical, as well as psychological sense. In Weberian terms, the brute force of slavery is 
differentiated into various “rational” systemic mechanisms. 
As one can imagine, these systemic mechanisms look very different from the 
perspective of those they oppress. Here the system does not enable the construction of 
identity, but rather prevents such collective self-identification through colonization of the 
lifeworld. And insofar as this colonization inhibits collective action precisely in the 
sphere that has the greatest impetus to transform the system, it serves the goal (like all 
colonizations) of system reproduction.140 In other words, the unburdening function of 
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oppression and its colonization function are unequally distributed in ways that 
facilitate system reproduction. Thus, as phenomenological accounts of oppression are 
especially adept at showing, oppressed identities are often felt as limiting rather than 
enabling. Linda Alcoff points out how in certain contexts – classroom discussions of 
race, for example – one’s race or gender undermines one’s authority and makes fruitful 
conversation difficult. In such cases, “the available options of interaction seem closed 
down to two: combative resistance without hope of persuasion, or an attempt to return to 
the category of non-threatening other. “Neither," she notes, “can yield a true relationship 
or dialogue.”141  Here then is an unambiguous example of the ways in which systems of 
oppression, manifested in a kind of visual registry, literally impede communication.    
Unfortunately, Habermas’ generalized analysis of the colonization of the 
lifeworld does not shed much light on the differential distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of systems. Still, it does make some sense to analyze systemic oppression in 
general as well as particular terms. That is, though in one sense oppression benefits 
oppressors at the expense of those they oppress, in another sense, systems of oppression 
colonize the lifeworld of all citizens, insofar as oppression inhibits the ability of the 
citizenry to exert democratic control over systems in general. A society divided by 
oppression cannot reflexively actualize a system of rights in the way that Habermas 
outlines. This is because the vehicle or “sluice” through which communicative action 
exerts its political will – the public sphere – requires that no participants are privileged 
over others, such that the agreements produced are motivated solely by the force of the 
                                                 
141
 Linda Alcoff. “Toward a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment,” Radical Philosophy 95, May/June, 
(1998): 26 
  
92
better reasons, and not by coercion. Yet oppression is precisely a system of privilege 
and coercive power – a system, as I have demonstrated, that inhibits the very capability to 
achieve mutual understanding even at the level of “ethical-cultural” self-understanding. 
Habermas recognizes this obstacle, but in his early attempts to understand democratic 
will formation in discursive terms, he aims to surmount it by claiming that social 
inequalities must be “bracketed” in public discourse, such that participants deliberate “as 
if” they were social equals. Nancy Fraser has convincingly criticized this presumption, 
doubting “whether it is possible even in principle for interlocuters to deliberate as if they 
were social peers in specially designated discursive arenas when these discursive arenas 
are situated in a larger societal context that is pervaded by structural relations of 
dominance and subordination.”142 It is unreasonable to think that the effects of these 
larger social structures – which discourage women and minorities from being outspoken, 
which provide unequal educational resources, which turn publicity in general into a 
commodity that only the most well-off can afford – can be simply neutralized for the 
purposes of public discourse. There is a significant difference between conceptually 
bracketing inequalities in order to demonstrate the possibility of reaching mutual 
understanding, as Habermas does in elucidating his discourse theory in general, and 
actually bracketing inequalities to effectively achieve such understanding. While the 
former is an impressive philosophical feat, the latter is a futile act of political 
imagination. 
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Rather, as Fraser rightly concludes, the discursive interpretation and 
justification of rights in a political public sphere (that is, democratic legitimation itself) 
requires actual substantive equality. And substantive equality in turn requires (in fact, 
entails) freedom from oppression. Habermas himself has come to accept this criticism. In 
Between Facts and Norms he notes, in an unusually provocative tone, that “only in an 
egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of class and thrown off 
the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation can the potential of an 
unleashed cultural pluralism fully develop.”143 Yet beyond acknowledging it, Habermas 
seems not to take the criticism to require any significant revisions to his procedural 
account of legitimation. That is, he doesn’t seem to appreciate the extent to which 
oppression corrupts and renders impotent the very discursive procedures he takes to be 
central to democratic will-formation. Insofar as such will-formation takes place through 
actual public discourse, and insofar as oppression inhibits this type of discourse in the 
very sphere that Habermas places at the crucial intersection of the formal state apparatus 
and the informal associations of civil society, oppression introduces an aporia into 
Habermas’ reflexive mode of justification. Individual legal rights cannot be actualized 
because the forum in which they receive their legitimation becomes “desiccated.” But 
this desiccated public sphere itself cannot be “repoliticized” without the participation-
securing force of individual legal rights. In short, if democracy and legal rights are 
internally related in the way Habermas describes, than crises of democratic participation 
necessarily lead to crises in the justification of rights, and vice versa. In spite of his 
scattered condemnations of oppression, Habermas seems not to appreciate the seriousness 
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of oppression as a crisis of just this sort, and so he fails to address it systematically. 
Some have suggested that this may be a principled oversight, since as a committed 
proceduralist, Habermas cannot justify strong condemnations of oppression with recourse 
to a substantive conception of justice.144 But even if democracy and individual rights 
could be uncoupled, individual rights would be inadequate to prevent oppression, for all 
the reasons presented in the first chapter. Instead, I have suggested that groups must be 
understood as possessing a right not to be oppressed or, formulated positively, a right to 
self-ascription. Let me now turn, finally, to the specification of this right.  
The Right to Self-Ascription: Its Type and Justification 
What does it mean to say that groups possess a right to self-ascription? What 
status does such a right have within a democratic system of law? Is it “internally related” 
to democracy in the same way that individual rights are? In the first place it would seem 
that group rights cannot be legal rights, since Habermas insists that legal rights are, by 
definition, individualistic in form. Yet in more recent work, published after Between 
Facts and Norms, Habermas seems to take a softer stance on this matter, granting some 
weight to the idea of group rights. In his most recent examination of the politics of 
“multiculturalism,” for example, he claims that “citizens in underprivileged conditions 
have the right to compensation when the opportunities and resources are missing for 
them to use their rights according to their own preferences and value-orientations.”145 
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This assertion admits of another level of rights, rights that apply when the 
“opportunities and resources” necessary to actualize individual rights (i.e. a functioning 
public sphere) are lacking. The type of compensation entailed by a “right to 
compensation” is not specified, though one can conclude from Habermas’ critique of the 
social welfare state that financial remuneration will not be sufficient to empower citizens 
as participants in the kind of discourses necessary for actualizing individual rights. At any 
rate, it does not immediately follow that such a right must be a group right. However, in 
explicating the kind of right he has in mind, he admits that the “incomplete inclusion” of 
oppressed groups “makes the introduction of collective rights understandable.”146 
Further, he characterizes such collective rights as “rights to self-assertion,” which aim to 
secure the conditions necessary for forming a stable collective (or “ethical-cultural”) 
identity.147 Such rights are necessary since it is only against the background of healthy 
(that is, self-ascribed) collective identities that group members can subsequently develop 
into individual persons and legal subjects. 
Here Habermas conceives of something very close, if not identical, to what I have 
called the right to self-ascription. However, this right is prior and external to the 
individualistic legal order. Habermas explains: 
These relations of recognition, reaching beyond sub-cultural boundaries, can be 
promoted only indirectly – not directly – by means of politics and law. Cultural rights 
and a politics of recognition can strengthen the capacity for self-assertion by 
discriminated minorities, as well as their visibility in the public sphere, but the value-
register of society as a whole cannot be changed with the threat of sanctions. The aim 
of multiculturalism – the mutual recognition of the equal status of all members – 
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requires a transformation of interpersonal relations, which is produced via 
communicative action and ultimately gets into full swing only by way of debates over 
identity politics within the public sphere.148 
 
In this passage Habermas attempts a sort of sleight-of-hand, admitting that the “relations 
of recognition” from which oppression departs are beyond the proper scope of legal 
regulations, but nonetheless implying that they can still be legitimated procedurally, by 
way of debates “within the public sphere”. However, “the mutual recognition of the equal 
status of all members” cannot be both a goal and a precondition of a functional public 
sphere. In other words, if oppression contaminates the very procedures by which rights 
are legitimated, as Fraser, myself, and others have argued, and as even Habermas seems 
to admit with his acknowledgement of compensation rights, then group rights aiming to 
“compensate” for the loss of procedural legitimacy cannot themselves be legitimated by 
reference to those same compromised procedures. That is, the right to self-ascription 
stands outside of the “internal relation” of democracy and individual rights. 
So the question becomes, how can such a right be justified, if it is prior both 
conceptually and empirically to the individualist system of legal rights?  What could it 
mean, for Habermas, to possess a right outside of the internal rights-democracy relation? 
Here it becomes necessary to distinguish between legitimation, which is the purely 
procedural means of obtaining legitimacy through consent, and justification, which 
requires substantive argumentation. The difficulty, of course, is that depending upon how 
strictly one understands Habermas’ procedural and pragmatic orientation to political will 
formation, justification might for all practical purposes be reducible to legitimation. Then 
the substantive force of any given argument –what makes it justified – is simply that it is 
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the result of a discursive procedure adhering to certain rules.  Here one runs up against 
the limit of Habermas’ discursive conception of rights. Since the right to self-ascription 
makes possible the very discursive procedures oriented to actualizing individual rights, it 
cannot itself be justified procedurally. As Axel Honneth has it, Habermas “cannot grant 
the demand for social equality conceptual priority over the principle of democratic will-
formation; he has to make it dependent upon the contingent state of politically articulated 
goals.”149 However, the right to self-ascription, grounded as it is in the competency of 
groups to construct and interpret their collective identity, must be derived from a 
substantive commitment to the value of a certain kind of collective freedom. Habermas 
admits as much in saying that collective rights gain their efficacy primarily from 
communicative action and not from the purely procedural legitimating force of law. 
Therefore, the right to self-ascription cannot be understood as an individual legal right in 
Habermas’ strict sense. It must rather be understood in a broader way, as having moral 
content, and perhaps even as a human right, understood in a particular sense. Such a right 
is nonetheless presupposed by the conception of individual legal rights outlined above. 
Honneth’s recognition theory provides some further insight into how a right to 
self-ascription might be conceived. For Honneth, the normative force of rights derives 
from an underlying structure of recognition with moral content. Somewhat similarly to 
Habermas’ conception of intersubjectivity (though influenced as much by Hegel as Kant), 
Honneth sees the mutual recognition characteristic of intersubjectivity as the precondition 
for the kind of autonomy that is presupposed by not only systems of law, but also 
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conceptions of morality and of ethical life. In other words, Honneth sees mutual 
recognition as the foundation not only of law, but of social theory in general, including 
intimate relations and associational ties (or relations of “solidarity”). In the intimate 
sphere, relations of love (comprised of not only erotic, but also parental and filial love as 
well as friendship) make possible the development of self-confidence: the ability to 
recognize one’s needs and desires as important. In the sphere of law, rights relationships 
provide each individual with the self-respect that accords to autonomous persons as self-
legislating beings. This type of respect undergirds the legal equality necessary for the 
kind of collective, democratic will formation that Habermas describes. Beyond legal 
equality however, persons must also develop a sense of self-esteem, deriving from the 
recognition of those particular talents and characteristics that make them unique, and so 
different from others. In the cultural sphere then, relations of solidarity (which Honneth 
conceives in terms of voluntary association around shared interests) form the background 
against which such self-esteem can develop.150 
These three relations to self – self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem – 
developed through the internalization of intersubjective relations to others, represent the 
foundation upon which personal identity is built. Without them, persons cannot develop 
into the autonomous individuals that modern social, political, legal, and moral theory 
most often assumes. This foundational intersubjectivity comes very close to Habermas’ 
account of the intersubjective basis of discourse, as described above. Further, the account 
of a legal sphere of rights based upon formal equality separate from the “cultural” sphere 
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of voluntary association mirrors Habermas’ distinction between the individual subject 
of law and the “ethical-cultural” identity of persons. The crucial difference however, is 
that while Habermas sees intersubjectivity as providing the possibility of producing 
normatively binding agreements through discourse, Honneth sees this intersubjectivity 
itself as normative, taking empirical “struggles for recognition” and the 
phenomenological experience of disrespect as evidence of this normativity. This results 
in the further difference that while Habermas subsequently develops specialized, 
independent discourses for each of the spheres of morality, law, and ethics, Honneth 
develops a comprehensive view of society as a scheme of social cooperation, in which 
legal rights play an important, but not exhaustive part.  
From this more general (but also, in a sense, more concrete) perspective, one can 
see that the procedural justification of rights (which is not incompatible with Honneth’s 
account) is only a part, albeit a crucial one, of a functioning democratic society. Since the 
ability to engage in discourses in general depends upon not only the self-respect provided 
by legal equality, but also the self-confidence provided by intimate relations and the self-
esteem provided by associational life, the latter two activities or aspects of the lifeworld 
must also be seen as foundational to political life, and so appropriately protected. If one 
thinks of such protections in terms of rights (perhaps in terms, again, of human rights) it 
makes some sense, as I will now argue, to speak of rights outside of the framework of 
legally enforceable claims, even though both Honneth and Habermas tend to speak of 
rights only in that highly specific sense. One particularly productive way of 
understanding rights in this extra or pre-juridical sense is in terms of capabilities, a 
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notion that has received much theoretical attention in recent years, and shares a 
certain affinity with Honneth’s recognition-based theory. 
Drawing in certain ways from Marx as well as Aristotle, the capabilities approach 
to rights suggests that what it means to have a right is to be capable of utilizing it 
effectively. Thus rights point to one or more underlying capabilities which are themselves 
derived from a minimalist notion of human flourishing: the basic conditions under which 
any human being has a chance of pursuing a worthwhile life, however he or she 
understands that. That is, whatever one’s culture, identity, or “conception of the good,” 
there are certain basic necessities, such as food, water, and shelter, as well as more truly 
human needs (those associated with what Marx called our “species being”) like the need 
to associate with others and, perhaps, the need to express creativity through productive 
labor, without which any human life must be considered impoverished. This minimally 
substantive notion of human flourishing must be seen, capabilities theorists argue, as 
preceding rights, political or otherwise, and its actualization must be seen as the object of 
those rights themselves. 
Of course, such a justificatory strategy requires the difficult and controversial task 
of specifying which capabilities are in fact universally necessary for human flourishing, a 
task that Martha Nussbaum, for example, takes on directly by providing no less than a list 
of “central human functional capabilities.”151 My argument here is more modest. I would 
suggest first, that even if one finds the project of listing the central human capabilities 
problematic, the capabilities approach to rights suggests that a procedural approach to 
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justification by itself is inadequate. To quote Martha Nussbaum, “on the general issue 
of political justification, it is plain that people’s intuitions about how to proceed vary 
greatly: some think we only put things on a sound footing when we devise a procedure 
that generates the good as an output, and others (including I myself) tend to think that our 
intuitions about the central capabilities are at least as trustworthy as our intuitions about 
what constitutes a good procedure.”152 This means that rights, political and otherwise, 
have an intrinsic value, in addition to their instrumental value in relation to the task of 
political will-formation.153 My second, specific suggestion then, is that the right to self-
ascription must also be seen as having an intrinsic value, in addition to its instrumental 
value in making possible individual rights of the type discussed above. It points, that is, 
to a model of intersubjective human flourishing: an ideal of associational life that is not 
exhausted in or reducible to the ideal of the flourishing individual. And though it is not 
necessary for my argument to fully describe such a model, let it suffice to say that its 
presuppositions (say, that human beings are language users, for one) would likely prove 
far less controversial than those that underlie an individualist model of human flourishing 
that depends upon the politically and ontologically loaded view of persons as rational, 
autonomous subjects.  
Such substantive accounts of the justification of rights, Honneth’s as much as 
Nussbaum’s, understand human rights ultimately in moral terms. Yet they can avoid 
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Habermas’ objection to theories of legal right derived from morality if, contra 
Honneth, one recognizes that the sphere of legal relations is not exhausted by its respect-
securing function. That is, though legal rights may be crucial for developing the self-
respect necessary for moral agency, and though likewise persons may be said to have a 
moral claim to such legal recognition (a “right to have rights” as some put it), it does not 
follow that legal rights must be justified in moral terms. That persons have a moral right 
to legal recognition in general does not establish the legitimacy of any right or set of 
rights in particular. These rights must still be legitimated in their own terms, through the 
types of discourse that Habermas describes. One might say then, that the morality of legal 
rights underdetermines their legitimacy as laws. Rather, moral, or human rights, like the 
right to self-ascription, and the structure of recognition from which they can be derived, 
stand in a “complementary” relation to legal rights, as Habermas recognizes.154 This 
means on the one hand, as I have tried to emphasize throughout this chapter, that 
procedures aimed at justifying legal rights must be supplemented by substantive moral 
principles in lifeworld contexts that “meet them halfway.”155 On the other hand, as has 
yet to be fully clarified, the complementary relation of legal and moral rights also means 
that the latter must be supplemented by legal protections in order to be rendered effective. 
The crucial point, however, is that legal and moral rights are distinct, and that the 
former must not be seen as derivative of the latter. As theorists of human rights have 
often pointed out, it seems intuitively plausible that persons have certain rights even if 
those rights are not solidified in law, for example, in places where child labor, slavery, 
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and other forms of exploitation are still “legally” practiced. Yet even where such 
abuses are prohibited in law (and assuming even that these prohibitions are well-
constructed and more-or-less effective), they fail to clarify the positive aspects implied by 
the moral right. In other words, purely negative legal prohibitions are not sufficient to 
ensure the development of self-confidence (for example) in the way Honneth prescribes. 
Rather, the development of the requisite self-confidence requires a specific kind of care 
that is better captured in the positive formulation, ‘the right to adequate care,’ and this 
positive element cannot be dictated by law. That is, the law cannot prescribe the meaning 
of ‘adequate care’. It can only prohibit certain gross violations in a negative fashion, and 
perhaps uphold certain widely accepted positive elements, like public education and basic 
health care. This further testifies to the pre-legal (or perhaps extra-legal) character of a 
robust notion of rights.    
Likewise, the collective right to self-ascription stands outside the realm of law 
proper, since, as Habermas recognizes, “a legal obligation to be in solidarity would be a 
contradiction.”156 Further, though one might see legal devices like the right to free 
association, freedom of religion, non-discrimination measures, and so on as 
complementary to the right to self-ascription, the link is much more complex in this case, 
due to the fact that these measures apply in the first place to individuals rather than 
groups.157 The further problem with such measures is that in practice they have tended to 
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take the existing demography of social groups as a given, aiming at best to provide 
individual group members with equal resources and equal representation, rather than 
securing the ability of groups to (re)construct their own collective identities. In other 
words, the link between the moral right of groups to self-identify and the complementary 
legal protections that aim to prohibit actions inimical to that right is strained by the fact 
that the primary barriers to self-ascription are not individual acts but systemic tendencies. 
Unlike individual crimes, which correspond readily to legal remedy in a formally 
individualistic system of law, the perpetrators of group harm are more difficult to 
pinpoint, making legal remedy by way of such a system problematic. Still, it is not 
unthinkable that a system of law that considered oppression more carefully could find a 
way to buttress the right to self-ascription through legal rights. Even if this were to 
happen however, the right to self-ascription would be conceptually distinct from legal 
rights as such. 
In short, just as legal rights are, under ideal circumstances, actualized in 
discursive processes of political will-formation, the substantive right to self-ascription is 
actualized by way of “struggles for recognition” in which groups aim to reconstruct and 
reinterpret their collective identity; that is, by a so-called “identity politics”. Insofar as the 
justification of rights requires social equality, it presupposes struggles of this kind, such 
that the right to self-ascription is a precondition for the individual rights reflexively 
justified in formal political discourses. In this regard, recognition theory and capabilities 
theory provide similarly appropriate supplements to Habermas’ procedural theory of 
democracy and rights. The views are not mutually exclusive. In fact they are 
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complementary for understanding not only the legitimacy of democratic law in a 
general sense, but for understanding how such an ideal can be achieved given the current 
state of society, and the existence of oppressed groups. Further, the vision of identity 
politics largely shared (at least) by Habermas and Honneth provides the key to 
understanding how the problem of oppression can be addressed democratically. Yet many 
worry that the turn toward identity and recognition in political theory sets a dangerous 
precedent, overlooking distributive injustices, fetishizing identity, or legitimizing 
“illiberal,” intolerant, or undemocratic groups. In the next chapter then, I will provide an 
account of identity politics that avoids such worries; one that is informed by the problem 
of oppression I have outlined, that avoids the pitfalls of multicultural liberalism I have 
identified, and that can fit within a more general theory of democracy like the one 
described above.      
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
 IDENTITY POLITICS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
In the first chapter of this work, I began with a critique of liberal multiculturalism 
based upon its inability to adequately address the issue of oppression: the ways that 
oppression problematizes the group concepts that it employs as well as the theory of 
group rights that it develops. One of the main problems with this view is that it 
understands group membership in what I have called intentional terms. That is, it sees 
group membership as paradigmatically consisting of the aggregation of conscious, 
voluntary, individual choices about who one associates with and why. This model of 
group membership, I have argued, does not capture (and even obfuscates) the nature of 
membership in oppressed groups, which are based largely on external, non-voluntary 
forces. Yet I distinguished a descriptive intentionalism of this sort from normative 
intentionalism, in order to capture the insight that groups ought to be able to self-ascribe 
their collective identity, even if they are currently prevented from doing so in oppressed 
societies like our own. In the second chapter then, I developed the guiding idea of 
normative intentionalism in terms of a “right to self-ascription.” I showed how that right 
could fit within a Habermasian theory of democracy appropriately supplemented by 
Honneth’s morally infused notion of “struggles for recognition,” as well as an “identity 
politics” that both see as crucial to the practice of democracy and the justification of 
rights. In this chapter, I will flesh out this notion of identity politics and defend it against 
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the many objections that have been raised by that controversial notion. In particular, I 
will demonstrate that identity politics properly conceived does not uncritically fetishize 
identity, nor does it legitimize any and all collective identities. Rather, by understanding 
how collective identity is discursively constructed, and thus governed internally by 
certain rules of discourse, it becomes clear that identity politics can be seen as a 
normative enterprise crucial to a functioning democratic society, and not just as a politics 
of self-interest located at the level of groups rather than individuals.                                                     
Such an analysis must take care not to conflate its ideal and non-ideal aspects, 
however. Just as one must distinguish between descriptive and normative intentionalism 
in order not to overlook oppressed groups, one must distinguish between what might be 
called retributive identity politics – identity politics undertaken by oppressed groups 
aimed at ending their oppression – and the kind of identity politics that would remain a 
crucial part of ideal democratic functioning even in non-oppressive societies. As Linda 
Alcoff nicely summarizes, “the desire to be free of oppressive stereotypes does not 
necessarily lead to the desire to be free of all identity.”158 The goal of shedding 
oppressive stereotypes then, does not exhaust the scope of identity politics. Rather, 
insofar as collective identity provides the context within which even ideal democratic 
deliberation takes place (as I argued above), one must also theorize the role of collective 
identity in relation to the ideal of democracy itself. For lack of a better term, I will refer 
to this latter kind of identity politics as discursive-democratic identity politics, without 
meaning to imply that retributive identity politics is somehow undemocratic. Insofar as 
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possible then, my analysis of identity politics and its objectors will follow this 
analytic distinction. Ultimately however, the link between the two forms must also be 
made clear, in order to demonstrate that identity politics is not a mere recreation of a 
politics of self-interest.  
Retributive Identity Politics 
Identity politics, in some sense a recent phenomenon, nonetheless draws from and 
in some ways continues a tradition of collectivist thinking dating back at least as far as 
Marx. Indeed, Marx was perhaps the first to show how systems of oppression manifest 
themselves through the construction of ascriptive identities: lord and serf, freeman and 
slave, bourgeoisie and proletarian.159 Under capitalism specifically, it was the proletariat 
as “universal class” that, through pursuing its own liberation, held the key to the 
liberation of society generally. Thus the Marxist program of proletarian revolution can be 
understood, to a certain extent, as a kind of identity politics. Of course, Marx’s blindness 
to other sorts of conflicts and oppressions – patriarchy, white supremacy, anti-Semitism, 
and so on – was in part what cast shadows of doubt upon his theory of historical 
materialism. Yet despite these shortcomings, the allocation of a “world-historical” task to 
a particular social group was in fact historically new, and, important criticisms 
notwithstanding, provided a model for future identity politics focused on overcoming 
other forms of oppression.  
In the wake of the fragmentation of the traditional working class as Marx 
conceived it, collective identity became a central concern for the Marx-inspired tradition 
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of Critical Theory. Once increasing social complexity and unanticipated 
developments in the division of labor rendered doubtful Marx’s predictions about 
proletarian revolution, Critical Theory faced the task of reconceptualizing class in a way 
that could make sense of these empirical developments, or else locating the potential for 
revolutionary transformation in another kind of collective identity. Such a task was part 
of the broadly interdisciplinary research program undertaken by the “Frankfurt School” 
Institute for Social Research. Habermas inherited this program, which he pursued 
primarily in the general philosophical terms of a reconceptualization of rationality 
capable of “structural transformation”. However, Habermas’ general theory of rationality 
was complemented by an empirical concern for locating “new conflict zones” capable of 
utilizing “communicative rationality” for (revolutionary) transformative ends, especially 
in his early writings. In “Technology and Science as Ideology,” for example, Habermas 
argue that despite the demise of a unified and clearly distinguishable working class, class 
distinctions persist in a “generalized interest in perpetuating the system…in a structure of 
privilege.”160 By “structure of privilege,” Habermas means to point to the fact that, 
although the traditional class-based division of labor (between wage laborers and owners 
of capital) has given way to more complex divisions, a latent class structure remains, 
visible by the clear discrepancy among the life chances of different groups (for example, 
between the growing underclass of service industry workers and most other sectors of 
society). And in lieu of proletarian revolution, Habermas anticipates “a new conflict 
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zone,” which “can only emerge where advanced capitalist society has to immunize 
itself, by depoliticizing the masses…in the public sphere administered through mass 
media.”161  
Remembering that this essay was written in the politically turbulent year of 1968, 
when student activism throughout the world appeared to be gaining steam as a formidable 
social force, it is not particularly surprising that Habermas tentatively located the 
potential for such a “new conflict zone” within this (privileged) sector of society. Yet, it 
is surprising that Habermas virtually dismisses the equally turbulent struggles around 
race and racism that also marked the period. “Who will activate this conflict zone is hard 
to predict,” Habermas admits, but “neither the old class antagonism nor the new type of 
underprivilege contains a protest potential whose origins make it tend toward the 
repoliticization of the desiccated public sphere.”162 Habermas does not explicitly identify 
racism and white supremacy in his discussion of the “structure of privilege,” but the 
familiar racial inequalities in education, employment, and general life chances make it 
reasonable to include these forms of privilege within this structure, even though they are 
not particularly new. One then ought to ask: what do these struggles lack such that 
Habermas doubts their ability to repoliticize a “dessicated” public sphere? Why must this 
new zone of conflict emerge out of the ranks of the privileged? In response to this 
question, Habermas offers a few brief observations. First, student activists’ “social 
origins do not promote a horizon of expectations determined by anticipated exigencies of 
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the labor market.”163 Their critical perspective, in other words, is not primarily 
determined by the necessity of finding and keeping work. Accordingly then, “students are 
not fighting for a larger share of social rewards in the prevalent categories: income and 
leisure time,” rather, “their protest is directed against the very category of reward 
itself.”164 Habermas, following Marcuse (indeed, he dedicates this essay to him), assumes 
that transformation of existing structures of legitimation can only be undertaken by those 
who have transcended their necessity. The struggles of the underprivileged, similar in this 
respect to traditional labor struggles, “merely” desire full inclusion in the system that 
excludes them: full citizenship, better wages, and etc. 
In hindsight, Habermas’ optimism about the transformational potential of student 
protest may appear somewhat naïve. Yet such necessarily vague speculation illustrates 
that Habermas did not underestimate the importance of actualizing a potentially 
revolutionary new form of rationality in real political movements, and that this 
“unfinished project of modernity” would not be undertaken by philosophers and 
politicians, but by the people themselves. Of course, “the people” can be a dangerous 
placeholder, and this early essay betrays a troubling tendency in Critical and Marxist 
theory, tracing back at least to Leninism, to see the masses as too deceived, too 
disenfranchised and too utterly dominated to successfully fight for their own liberation, 
such that that task must be undertaken by advocacy, be the vanguards professional 
revolutionaries or student activists.     
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If contemporary identity politics does in fact break with the class-based 
“identity politics” of Marxism and Marx-inspired theory, then the break is found here. 
Consider, for example, the relatively recent “Black Feminist Statement” of the Combahee 
River Collective, which Alcoff considers the “locus classicus” of contemporary identity 
politics, and which asserts as a matter of strategy that the best and most consistent 
advocate for ending the oppression of a particular identity group is that group itself.165 
This seemingly commonsense claim (and to some extent the very existence of such a 
statement) belies Habermas’ claim that structural transformation must come from within 
the ranks of the privileged. Of course, the continued oppression of the very identity group 
represented by this black feminist Collective prevents us from deeming it a complete 
success, and so makes evaluating Habermas’ claim about successful transformation more 
difficult. Such a definitive falsification would involve specifying “structural 
transformation” in a more precise way, a project that would not get one very far at any 
rate, since both Habermas and the members of such a Collective would probably agree 
that neither privileged nor underprivileged groups have as yet achieved that weighty task. 
Still, there is certainly some evidence that the Civil Rights Movement, to take one 
example of “underprivileged” identity-based political movements, brought about 
important transformations, at least in the legal structure, even if these successes are in 
new danger of being dismantled by neo-liberal “reforms”.166 Similarly, the feminist 
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movement brought about wide ranging transformations in the legal system as well as 
in civil society, such that Habermas, in his later writings, often holds up the “feminist 
politics of equality” as a model for a transformational identity politics. Yet these writings 
show a continued hesitance to ascribe the same capacity for transformation to “cultural 
and ethnic minorities,” perhaps for some of the same reasons elucidated in “Technology 
and Science as Ideology.”167 This is not to say that women are not oppressed or 
“underprivileged” as a group, but, as Habermas implies and recent feminism 
acknowledges, since women are present in every group and level of society, they may be 
privileged in some respects (for example, as white women) while nonetheless oppressed 
in others. However, insofar as this is also true of most (if not all) other identity groups 
(for example, men enjoy the privileges of sexism and male supremacy even within 
oppressed groups), it does not justify a conceptual distinction between women and other 
“minorities”. 
Rather, there are more compelling reasons to be hesitant about identity politics as 
it is straightforwardly set out by the Collective’s Statement and the many other groups 
that followed their example, reasons that overlap with perhaps the most common 
objection to identity politics generally. This objection fears that linking politics to 
identity may undermine the potential for a shared solidarity around issues of (in)justice, 
reinforce illegitimate social divisions, and generally “balkanize” society in ways that at 
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best problematize democratic decision-making and at worst give rise to violent 
clashes between identity groups.168 More than remnants of Leninist vanguardism, it is 
probably this worry that inspires the mature Habermas’ hesitance about certain kinds of 
identity politics, mirrored in his objections to Westphalianism and the traditional 
conception of the absolute sovereignty of nation-states understood as “peoples”. In recent 
work, Habermas rejects the understanding of political membership as derived from a 
strong collective identity, be it ethnic, national, or even mythical.169 He sees such a view 
of the polity, which undergirds the traditional conception of the nation-state (at least in 
origin) as “inextricably bound up with the Machiavellian will to self-assertion by which 
the conduct of sovereign states in the arena of the “great powers” had been guided from 
the beginning.”170 That is, a conception of politics that makes identity a requirement for 
political inclusion risks substituting a reified, insular, and ultimately arbitrary 
homogeneity for the "higher-level intersubjectivity of a discursive agreement between 
citizens who recognize one another as free and equal."171 At worst, such a conception 
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risks relegating the political other to the status of mortal enemy ala Carl Schmitt, 
against whom the most extreme forms of violence can be perpetrated.172   
These are serious concerns, as the atrocities committed by the Third Reich as well 
as more recent waves of genocide and ethnic violence continue to demonstrate. But do 
such lethal dangers really lie beneath the surface of the seemingly simple claim that the 
oppressed themselves are the staunchest opponents of their own oppression? The 
applicability of the criticism to contemporary identity politics (as opposed to allegedly 
sovereign nation-states or historically insular and xenophobic political movements) relies 
upon at least two assumptions, both of which turn out to be false. 1: Identity itself is 
static, and not a product of the "higher-level intersubjectivity” embodied in discursive 
deliberation, and 2: The elimination of their own oppression is the sole objective of 
oppressed identity groups, an objective that is not linked in any way to a larger concern 
for social justice and “structural transformation.” 
Regarding 1, few serious social theorists would still hold that identities, collective 
or personal, are determined by biology, anthropology, history, or other “objective” 
factors.173 Rather, it has become commonly accepted that identity is “socially 
constructed,” though there is no little confusion over the exact meaning of this 
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fashionable phrase.174 At minimum, social constructivism about identity asserts that 
collective identities such as race, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and so on are not 
biological or historical facts, but social categories that are more or less actively 
constructed and reconstructed by human beings acting in concert. The qualification 
“more or less,” however, points to a crucial ambiguity in this general description. 
Namely, it does not say how human beings acting in concert construct their identities, nor 
does it specify the extent to which such a process is constrained or unconstrained, just or 
unjust. So, though one might see constructivism as similar to what I have called 
intentionalism, there is actually an important difference. Intentionalism implies that 
collective identities are socially constructed by the group members themselves, while 
constructivism in general allows for the possibility that collective identities are 
constructed in other ways, including ways that make certain groups experience their 
collective identity as imposed and constraining. So, a non-intentionalist approach to 
group membership and collective identity can still be constructivist, as I will demonstrate 
shortly.  
Additionally, social constructivism often asserts that personal identity is not 
simply reducible to collective identity, such that one cannot deduce personality 
characteristics like timidity, intelligence, or sexual prowess from the “fact” that an 
individual is a member of a certain racial or gender category. Rather, individuals 
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construct their personal identity in part by interpreting, adopting, or rejecting their 
group memberships. It appears initially that these two levels of construction are 
conceptually separable. One might think it possible to hold, for example, that ‘man’ and 
‘woman’ are somehow natural or biological categories, but still reject the stereotypes 
traditionally attached to gender roles, acknowledging that these roles are based on 
contingent cultural values rather than biological facts. Conversely, one might hold that 
such social categories are thoroughly fictitious, yet maintain that they have gained such 
wide acceptance that they nonetheless limit the ability of individuals to accept or reject 
them.175 For example, one might think that though race is socially constructed, it does not 
follow that individuals in racially categorized societies can simply choose not to be the 
race that has been ascribed to them.176 That is, one could hold that personal identity is 
socially constructed insofar as persons construct it from available collective identities, 
some of which might not themselves be socially constructed, but natural, biological, etc. 
Or, one could hold that collective identities are socially constructed, but that they can, in 
certain cases, fully determine the personal identities of those that they purport to describe.  
One can see then, that beyond the rejection of fully deterministic accounts of 
identity, social constructivism lends itself to a wide variety of interpretations, from 
postmodern accounts that see the construction of one’s self as an ethical or aesthetic 
project undertaken by individuals, to structural accounts that find the collective identities 
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artificially imposed by systems of power just as constraining as identities 
“determined” by biology, anthropology, and etc. However, when social constructivism 
takes the fact of oppression seriously, it must admit that the spectrum of opportunities 
and constraints involved in constructing identity is not uniform across all groups. The 
postmodern vision of identity construction as a liberating ethical or aesthetic project may 
be a more apt description of how privileged groups willfully construct their own 
identities; but for oppressed groups, their socially constructed identities may nonetheless 
be experienced as external limitations or constraints. This is because, as noted above, 
social constructivism is often less than clear about who is doing the constructing, let 
alone about the political ramifications of that question. In the previous chapters, I have 
distinguished ascriptive from intentional (self-ascriptive) identities, and argued that 
oppression consists in the attempt to eliminate self-ascription leading to group harm. The 
point to make here is that even ascriptive identities can be understood as socially 
constructed; in short, that “socially constructed” does not automatically translate into 
“freely” or “intentionally constructed.” Again, the latter must be understood as a 
characteristic of privileged groups. Indeed, part of the reason for distinguishing 
retributive and democratic identity politics is to emphasize this insight.  
The discursive interpretation I will propose has the further advantage of 
specifying the relation between the construction of personal identity and the construction 
of collective identity. In short, intersubjectivity provides the link between these two 
interpretive poles. Insofar as the construction of personal identity takes place within a 
context of social relations – that is, insofar as the idea we develop of ourselves is shaped 
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by others – it is already a collective process. Likewise, the personal identities taken 
on by individual group members also shape the collective identity of the group(s) to 
which they belong. Black presidents, female soldiers, gay athletes and other individuals 
have slowly transformed the very idea of what it means to be a member of certain identity 
groups, and what such groups are capable of. Under normal (that is, ideal) circumstances, 
this reciprocal process of collective and personal identity formation is not necessarily 
political. This is why Habermas characterizes private autonomy, including, for example, 
individual choices about what type of life to pursue, as entitlements to “suspend” or 
“drop out” of communicative action contexts.177 However, under oppressive conditions, 
the strategic political program of oppressed groups may include intentionally guiding 
members to pursue certain private goals, as exemplified by certain kinds of minority 
scholarships aimed at placing group members in occupations where they are traditionally 
underrepresented. This is a further example of how collective and personal identity 
mutually shape one another.  
I will describe this discursive conception of identity formation in greater detail in 
the following section. For now, I mean primarily to point out that the construction of 
identity is (or at least can be) a result of a “higher level intersubjectivity,” a fact that 
Habermas recognizes by describing identity in terms of “ethical-cultural discourses” (see 
2.2). So, the rejection of identity politics for fear of balkanization and lack of democratic 
solidarity turns out to be unwarranted. In the end, group differences pose no greater threat 
to democratic practice then individual differences, since both ideally arise from the same 
intersubjective processes. This does not mean that all identity groups are open and 
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inclusive, any more than all individuals are tolerant and law abiding. Both claims are 
easily disproved on empirical grounds alone. However, from the fact that some identities 
may be problematic for democratic societies, it does not follow that identity itself is a 
problematic concept. On the contrary, the need to distinguish between “good” and “bad” 
identity politics calls for a more nuanced theory of identity that recognizes the 
complexity of identity and the multiplicity of its ways of relating – healthy and unhealthy 
– to the general polity. 
The second assumption underlying worries about balkanization and separatism 
mirrors certain standard criticisms of social contract theory and its basis in individual 
“rational” egoism. Such criticisms point out that the overlapping self-interest in security 
of person and property that alleges to be the rational foundation for political authority is 
in fact a mere modus vivendi, too weak and strategic to provide lasting political 
stability.178 Such a minimal agreement would risk collapsing as soon as one or some of 
the parties to it found sufficient strength and resources to bend it to their own advantage. 
Similarly, opponents of identity politics fear that the picture of identity groups concerned 
solely or even primarily with their own oppression marks a return to a “state of nature” 
type politics of warring factions, only now with groups rather than individuals as its 
fundamental actors. Such critics may nonetheless sympathize with the project of 
eliminating oppression. Yet they see a wider coalition around injustice generally as the 
necessary democratic foundation for such a project, a foundation they think is 
undermined by those who would limit solidarity to members of one’s identity group.  
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Such a criticism raises important concerns, but it caricaturizes serious 
conceptions of identity politics. For one, few if any proponents of identity politics oppose 
developing wider political coalitions, nor do they reject support and solidarity from 
outsiders. The Combahee River Collective, for example, espoused a commitment to a 
fairly orthodox Marxist revolutionary agenda in addition to their particular “self-
interested” concern for ending their own oppression. Their commitment to fighting for 
their own liberation was in the first place a simple recognition of the fact that outside 
support and solidarity for their cause was sorely lacking, rather than unwelcome. 
Secondly, their Statement must be understood in opposition to an orthodoxy that held that 
racism, sexism, and other identity-based injustices must be subjugated to class-based 
injustice, and were therefore best addressed “after the revolution”. To the contrary, they 
believed that a successful revolutionary movement must first overcome false, ideological 
divisions within the ranks of the proletariat, divisions based upon race, gender, sexuality, 
and so on, effectively reversing the priority of identity and class-based struggles.  
However, even this simplification is misleading, since the relationship between 
“self-interested” identity politics and a more general politics of liberation is not a 
question of temporal or even conceptual priority. Rather, if one understands oppression in 
the way that I have described it, collective struggles for self-ascription are both self-
interested and socially progressive. That is, the analogy between the self-interest of 
classical liberalism’s pre-political individuals and the “self-interest” of oppressed groups 
in oppressive societies breaks down once the democratic character of struggles for self-
ascription is made clear. Insofar as self-ascription is a general requirement for a 
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flourishing democracy, particular struggles to that end already coincide with a more 
general interest in social justice in a way that the private pursuit of individual self-interest 
(which in any case, in the classical liberal tradition, usually amounts to the quest for 
private property) does not. 
 Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres demonstrate this point nicely in their book The 
Miner’s Canary, in which they argue that racial identity represents a barometer of sorts 
for the health of American democracy generally. Their apt metaphor is worth quoting at 
length: 
Miner’s often carried a canary into the mine alongside them. The canary’s more 
fragile respiratory system would cause it to collapse from noxious gases long before 
humans were affected, thus alerting the miners to danger. The canary’s distress 
signaled that it was time to get out of the mine because the air was becoming too 
poisonous to breathe. Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner’s 
canary: their distress is the first sign of a danger that threatens us all. It is easy enough 
to think that when we sacrifice this canary, the only harm is to communities of color. 
Yet others ignore this problem at their own peril, for these problems are symptoms 
warning us that we are all at risk.179 
 
Part of the risk that Guinier and Torres point to is the risk of oppression: the risk that 
ascriptive identification will come to plague all identity groups, and not just racial 
minorities; a risk that is demonstrated, for example, in the difficulties and identity crises 
often experienced by progressive white youths who wish to affirm a positive, yet 
antiracist white identity.180 Racial identity thus has a “diagnostic function” as a locus for 
gauging the health of democracy generally. But their conception of racial identity is also 
“activist” insofar as it utilizes “collective identity as a site for democratic participation,” a 
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political strategy that they find worthy of generalization.181 Thus political activism 
coalesces around “race” (understood as a set of political concerns typically associated 
with people deemed “racial minorities,” rather than biologically or otherwise 
deterministically) but comes to include other groups as well, insofar as its goals are vital 
to the practice of democracy generally. In short, Guinier and Torres demonstrate that 
struggles against racial oppression are always already struggles for social justice 
generally, insofar as the goals they pursue “self-interestedly” are, in reality, in the interest 
of everyone (or at least, the vast majority of us).  
 What we have then, is a precise inversion of Habermas’ claim that structural 
transformation must come from the ranks of the privileged (a claim that he no longer 
defends at any rate, as demonstrated by his admission that feminism and other kinds of 
identity politics play a crucial role in transforming public debate and expanding 
exclusionary public spheres), and a defense of a certain kind of inclusive identity politics 
(though Guinier and Torres do not use that term) that is not just a politics of competing, 
collective self-interests. I will discuss race and racial identity explicitly in the following 
chapter. For now I only mean to point out that conceptions of identity politics worth 
taking seriously need not lead to balkanization and separatism, nor need they be elitist or 
vanguard. The point is simple enough: Underprivileged identity groups can and do 
represent a “conflict zone” capable of structural transformation, as they are well (and 
perhaps even best) suited to fight oppression in the interest of democracy, in part since 
the force of this kind of injustice is felt by them most directly, and by no means in an 
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abstract way. It remains to be seen whether identity would continue to be the locus of 
political action under ideal democratic conditions.    
Discursive-Democratic Identity Politics 
The previous section analyzed identity politics as a strategy for fighting 
oppression. As such, it falls under the rubric of non-ideal theory, an enterprise that has 
been sorely neglected at least since the dominance of the Rawlsian paradigm in Anglo-
American political philosophy. One may grant everything that was said there, and 
nonetheless maintain that in an ideal, non-oppressive democracy, identity would be 
irrelevant to the practice of democracy. In fact, such a claim often motivates the 
negligence of issues of oppression and other injustices in mainstream political theory. 
Moreover, even those who do address certain kinds of identity (namely cultural identity) 
in political terms, such as Kymlicka and other multicultural liberals, rely on a distinction 
between ideal and non-ideal theory in order to justify excluding other kinds of identity 
(namely racial, gender, and other “disadvantaged” identities) that they think would no 
longer be relevant in ideal democracies. I have previously argued that such exclusions are 
unjustified.182 Yet, such theorists are right at least that, in a more just world, identity 
would relate to politics in a different, less agonistic way. In what follows, I will outline 
how that relation might be understood. 
In the first place, it is necessary to understand that the scope of ideal theory is 
contestable. In order to be useful, ideal theories must paint a picture of society that is 
actually achievable, or at least closely imitable. They must be, to use Rawls’ term, 
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“realistically utopian.”183 Accordingly, even an ideal society will be confronted with 
problems related to immigration, disability, individual prejudice, crime, and so on.184 
Some individuals will be better off and others worse. And collective identity will 
presumably still play a key role in how individuals understand themselves and their 
political interests. The crucial difference is that, in an ideal democracy, these problems 
and social facts would be dealt with in a fairer, more democratic way, such that the “least 
well off,” again to use a Rawlsian phrase, would not include a disproportionate number of 
any one identity group, nor would it involve the kind of debilitating and systematic 
poverty one sees today. Nor would immigration favor some identities over others, 
criminal law treat members of one group differently from others, and so on. In other 
words, one’s life chances would not be significantly determined by one’s group 
memberships and collective identities. It does not follow, however, that identity would 
cease to be politically salient.  
So how would identity function under ideal democratic conditions? That is, what 
kinds of collective identities would such conditions produce and/or accommodate? One 
way to begin such an analysis is negatively, by ruling out certain kinds of identities. Most 
theorists of democracy agree that not all collective identities will be acceptable. Rawls 
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admits, for example, that though an overlapping consensus on basic principles of 
political organization, he thinks, would be acceptable to the vast majority of 
“comprehensive doctrines,” it can (or must) nonetheless legitimately exclude certain 
extreme views that are incompatible with the idea of society as system of social 
cooperation.185 Similarly, Habermas acknowledges that even an appropriately democratic 
constitutional state, one that assured equal rights and participation as well as provided 
due recognition to “minority cultures” and other historically underrepresented (or, as I 
prefer, oppressed) groups, can (or must) nonetheless legitimately exclude 
“fundamentalist” groups that refuse to acknowledge basic principles of freedom and 
equality.186 And in a different, but related vein, David Ingram argues that the affirmation 
of white identity is an illegitimate form of identity politics, since it is bound up with 
unjust privileges and a history of domination in ways that “subaltern” identities are not.187 
At some level, these claims mean to circumscribe the limits of liberal toleration. Yet just 
as much, they assert that certain collective identities are unacceptable in democratic 
societies; that they have no legitimate claim to recognition. Such a claim cannot be 
arbitrary. It must be guided by some principle or set of principles that explains why some 
collective identities are worthy of recognition while others are not. 
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Further, such a set of principles will be the same that, in light of the assertion 
by defenders of identity politics that though some identity politics are inimical to 
democracy, not all are, allow one to distinguish “good” identity politics from “bad”. I 
submit that, just as the discourse principle can be “operationalized” in the spheres of 
morality and law, it can also be applied to the “ethical-cultural” sphere, providing a 
speculative picture of what identity politics might look like under ideal conditions. Here 
one must proceed cautiously. I do not mean to suggest that government, or for that matter 
philosophy, has any legitimate role in collective identity formation. It is not the job of the 
state or the philosopher to police identities. However, even an ideal democracy must have 
some non-arbitrary means of determining its legitimate constituency. As Schmittean 
political theorists have aptly pointed out, a completely inclusive democracy would not 
only be empirically implausible, but is actually a self-contradictory idea.188 Democracy, 
by definition, involves the constitution of a people, or demos, that understands itself in 
part by distinguishing itself from outsiders. Yet one need not take this to mean that the 
process by which such a body is constituted is somehow beyond morality, legality, or 
reason. The essence of Habermas’ alternative to such a radical decisionism lies in the 
claim that the constitution of the demos can itself be legitimated democratically, if only in 
a retroactive way.  
As chapter 2 demonstrated, this process of legitimation is embodied, on the one 
hand, in formal democratic institutions that transform public opinion into the rule of law, 
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and on the other hand, in an informal public sphere fueled, in part, by identity 
politics. Under non-ideal conditions, where oppression still structures social and political 
life, (what I have called “retributive”) identity politics has the dual function of 
reinterpreting collective identity internally, combating negative stereotypes and replacing 
them with a positive group image, and expanding the scope of equality externally, 
through political action oriented toward a wider public sphere. The former function is 
what Habermas calls “self-clarification,” while the latter represents the potential for 
“structural transformation” inherent in this kind of discourse. To note this “dual 
function,” however, is not to suggest that the two activities are distinct or separate in 
practice (such that first a group clarifies its identity, then it engages in action oriented 
toward wider publics; or that it could have a sub-group or committee dedicated to self-
clarification and a sub-group or committee dedicated to external political action). Rather, 
the activity of self-clarification itself effects changes in society at large, just as it depends 
in certain ways upon the recognition of those outside the group. Still, the conceptual 
distinction is coherent and useful, and further, it seems plausible to think that under non-
oppressive conditions the self-clarification function might be “uncoupled” to some extent 
from the structural transformation function. This does not mean that collective identities 
would become completely independent and self-sufficient, but only that the construction 
and exploration of identity would not have to simultaneously fight for its very 
preconditions. Thus all group identities would be constructed under the conditions of a 
“communicative freedom” that is already enjoyed by privileged groups. I have conceived 
such a freedom, as it applies to groups, as a right to self-ascription, and argued that such 
  
129
a right is foundational, in a certain sense, for individual rights. For oppressed groups, 
the denial of this basic right is in large part what gives moral weight to their struggles for 
recognition. Indeed, though the mantra “by any means necessary,” may be a slight 
rhetorical exaggeration, the severely disabling character of oppression may in fact justify 
political tactics that would, under normal conditions, be unjustifiable.189 
Yet what justificatory force remains for identity politics once oppression is 
eliminated and the right to self-ascription is universally actualized? The answer is that 
identity politics is inevitable, even under ideal conditions. Group membership is the 
medium through which one first sees oneself as a political being, one whose associations 
with others can be collectively organized and regulated. And so it is not surprising that it 
is as members of groups that individuals develop their particular political consciousness, 
and that it is groups rather than individuals that are most influential in political processes. 
Such a statement is fairly uncontroversial if one thinks first of interest groups: political 
parties, lobbyists, voluntary associations, and so on. Yet, as Amy Gutmann suggests, 
“people’s interests and understanding of their interests are just as identity-driven as their 
identities are interest driven.”190 As described in the previous chapter, it is only within the 
context of collective identity that individuation (and so also the construction of an 
individual “interest” or political orientation) can develop. Identity then, is an irreducible 
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feature of democratic political practice. Yet, it does not follow that any and all 
identities must be equally recognized and respected.  
In terms of a legitimate coercive mechanism, all that can be required of collective 
identities is that they assent to basic constitutional principles. Thus all identities would be 
bound together by this “weak constitutional patriotism.” Yet beyond this basic condition, 
(and beyond the cautious proceduralism that Habermas’ mature thought expresses) the 
seeds of a radical, emancipatory social ideal still link Habermas’ discourse theory with 
his earliest attempts to theorize genuinely human interests. Thus, even though Habermas 
repeatedly emphasizes that questions of ethics (and thus ethical-cultural identities) are not 
subject to the same process of universal justification as questions of morality, justice, and 
law, when an interviewer asked him if he thought that, in an ideal society, ethical 
questions of the good and moral questions of the right would overlap, he answered in the 
affirmative, if somewhat tentatively.191 This suggests that the discourse ethic may indeed 
provide a picture of how groups would construct their identity under ideal conditions, 
even if such a picture is largely speculative. One might even continue to call such a 
picture ‘normative,’ if one could imagine a non-coercive normativity, the sense of which 
would be more akin to the psychoanalytic sense of ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ rather than the 
objectively moral sense of ‘binding’ or ‘enforceable’. Such an extension of discourse 
theory in a (realistically) utopian direction seems to me consistent with what Habermas 
himself has characterized as a continuous research program uniting all of his work, a 
program that aims to locate in human reason a radical, universal potential for liberating 
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us from domination in general and organizing all aspects of our lives in a 
(communicatively) rational way. To use Habermas’ own words, “discourse ethics, though 
organized around a concept of procedure, can be expected to say something relevant 
about substance as well and, more important perhaps, about the hidden link between 
justice and the common good.”192 What follows is an attempt to illuminate this link 
without collapsing its poles, and without denying the plurality of collective identities (and 
so, conceptions of the good) even under ideal conditions. 
The discourse ethic finds a norm valid insofar as it “could meet with the 
agreement of all those concerned in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse.”193 Habermas specifies such an agreement by way of four pragmatic rules of 
discourse: 
1. Nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded (the 
inclusiveness condition). 
2. All participants are granted an equal opportunity to make contributions (the 
equality condition). 
3. The participants must mean what they say (the sincerity condition). 
4. Communication must be freed from external and internal coercion so that the … 
stances that participants take on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely 
by the rational force of the better reasons (the freedom condition).194 
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In applying these principles to the process of (ethical) identity formation, the first 
principle goes to the heart of the matter, though it certainly does not settle it, since the 
determination of whose contributions are relevant circumscribes group membership. That 
is, the relevant contributions to a conception of collective identity are those that come 
from the “inside,” from members themselves.195 This is the very meaning of self-
ascription. However, this does not mean the principle is unproblematic, as internal 
conflicts over who counts as a full-fledged member of a group (and so whose 
contributions are relevant) are common, and provide no shortage of difficult examples for 
theorists of group rights and sovereignty. Consider, for example, case of Santa Clara 
Pueblo v Martinez, in which a Pueblo woman brought suit against her tribe for its 
practice of denying tribal membership and its benefits to the children of women who 
marry outside of the tribe, while extending membership and its benefits to the children of 
men who marry outside of the tribe. The final Supreme Court decision on the matter, 
which upheld the sovereignty of the tribe in determining its membership even to the point 
of discriminating against its female members, may seem to be in line with what I have 
called the right to self-ascription. Yet in actuality the self-ascription of one group – the 
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Pueblo tribe – is bought at the price of the self-ascription of another – women – 
whose ability to construct their collective identity in positive terms is undermined by 
practices such as these.196 So the right to self-ascription cannot provide a definitive 
answer to conflicts like these. Rather, as I have previously suggested, such conflicts must 
be adjudicated on a case by case basis. However, when “insiders” petition the 
government to intervene on behalf of an internally oppressed group, the extent to which 
the groups in question approximate the discursive ideal of identity construction (for 
example, the extent to which they take seriously the “equality” and “freedom” conditions 
of discourse) can be taken into account when choosing which identity group to favor. 
This way of balancing the interests of different groups in cases where some decision must 
be made, and where even inaction amounts to favoring one conception over another, 
differs from externally coercing groups to be or be seen a certain way. 
Multicultural liberals focus especially on cases like this because they think that, 
unlike problems of affirmative action, reparations, and other “temporary” group 
concerns, conflicts between the values of sovereign “national minorities” and “our own” 
liberal values of freedom and equality are inevitable, even in ideal multicultural states.197 
They take such conflicts then, to be something like pure problems of ideal political 
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theory, as ineluctable in the realm of politics as Kant’s antinomies in the realm of 
metaphysics. Yet often this is far from the truth. In fact, as I argued in the first chapter, 
the cultural conflicts that multicultural liberalism takes as paradigmatic are often just as 
subject to historical contingency as those it dismisses as problems of non-ideal theory. In 
the Martinez case, for example, it has been argued that the subjugation of women was in 
part codified by earlier federal laws which modeled certain misogynist structures present 
in the majority culture and its legal system.198 Far from being an authentic expression of 
tribal sovereignty then, the exclusion of women may be seen in part as an adoption of 
external attitudes and practices leading to oppression (in Habermasian terms, a 
colonization of the lifeworld).  Thus taking sides in such “internal” conflicts no longer 
appears as cultural imperialism, but as a way of rectifying our own past injustices.  
My point here is that difficult cases like these may not be as enduring as some 
theorists imagine them to be, and that, under more ideal circumstances, when groups are 
truly left to construct their own identity without coercion, the results would normally 
meet the criteria listed above. To be clear, this is a descriptive claim, but one with 
normative significance. If groups do have a right to self-ascription as I have argued, and 
if we have a picture of what it would look like to exercise that right, then that picture 
becomes “regulative” in the sense that it can show us whether current identity 
constructions are nearer or further from the ideal.199 This claim is also difficult to 
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confirm, given its speculative nature and the lack of empirical evidence available. 
However, I believe its validity can be determined by the following premises: 
   1.  Persons, as language users, strive to reach understanding with one another.  
2. Intersubjectivity provides the context within which such understanding can be 
reached.  
3. Coercion and “colonization” inhibit the capacity to reach understanding. And 
therefore:  
4. Groups who coerce their members will be rejected by them, provided other 
intersubjective contexts are available. 
The first two premises are central to Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which 
demonstrates that linguistic understanding is possible only against the background of 
certain normative assumptions, understood as “validity claims” to truth, sincerity, and 
rightness.200 This means that communication itself presupposes the possibility of 
normative agreement, that linguistic meaning is inseparable from the intersubjective 
context in which it is produced through communication. From this foundational linguistic 
competency, Habermas deduces the potential for rationally guiding our collective lives 
and the social, political, and economic systems that (ideally) facilitate such a task, 
through collective, communicative action. However, as I illustrated in Chapter 2 (sec. 3), 
when unregulated by communicative “steering mechanisms,” these systems “colonize the 
lifeworld” and impede its ability to create meaning and reach understanding, thus 
becoming coercive rather than (communicatively) rational. This is the meaning of the 
third premise, which sees successful communication and coercion as mutually exclusive. 
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One can conclude from these premises that groups that do not provide the 
communicative resources for creating meaning (for the present purpose, the meaning of 
being an ‘X,’ that is, collective identity) will tend to be abandoned by their members, 
provided that other intersubjective contexts for identity formation are available.  
 This last proviso is important, as it explains why, in reality, group members often 
do not abandon their groups, even when they fail to meet the discursive criteria listed 
above. In many cases, no alternative contexts exist for internally oppressed groups to 
construct positive alternative identities, so they remain within collectivities that may be 
debilitating. That individuals may refuse to exit groups that constrain them even to the 
point of violating their rights further demonstrates the importance and even 
unavoidability of group membership. Yet group members may choose not to leave 
oppressive groups for other reasons as well. Herr highlights these reasons in her account 
of the “insider’s perspective” on minority cultures.201 Herr argues that the views of 
“cultural insiders” must be taken seriously, even when they defend cultures that internally 
oppress them. Instead of seeing such a defense as false-consciousness, internalized 
oppression, and so on, we should recognize, she thinks, that even oppressed members 
often find (at least potential) value in their groups, and so are more interested in 
reforming it internally than outright rejecting it, or opening it up to transformation from 
outsiders who fail to grasp the internal complexity of the culture.  
 Thus Herr notes the “democratic potential” of even oppressive groups, and argues 
that the morally justified response toward minority cultures is not to liberalize them, but 
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“to open up and protect the channels of internal democracy so that cultural insiders 
are empowered to voice their differing views free from intimidation and coercion.”202 
Again, the principles of discourse capture this potential nicely. That is, even if groups 
lack the characteristics of inclusiveness, equality, sincerity, and freedom, one might still 
see them as evolving toward such an ideal through internal reforms. Still, this does not 
contradict the conclusion that members will eventually abandon their groups if these 
reforms do not come about, or if at least some progress is not made such that one could 
still believe in their “democratic potential.” Both possibilities however, abandonment and 
reform, equally support the thesis that under ideal conditions, groups would tend to 
display the characteristics made explicit in the discourse ethic, since, together, they 
demonstrate a kind of social selection, in which groups either evolve toward an internally 
democratic structure or are abandoned or replaced by more democratic alternatives.  One 
might call this the democratic selection thesis.  
 Such a thesis does, however, contradict the claim that groups or “cultures” have a 
general right to survival, regardless of how they are viewed by others, or even by their 
own members. Against Taylor, who defends this claim most eloquently, Habermas argues 
that governments should not, and even cannot guarantee the survival of any particular 
group.203 This is first of all because successful collective identities are inevitably 
confronted by changing circumstances – modernization, immigration, environmental 
crises, and etc. – to which they must adapt. Healthy collective identities are thus 
constantly being reinterpreted and transformed by their members such that they remain 
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relevant and useful as contexts for individuation. Collectivities that fail to adapt in 
this way pay the price of irrelevance and eventual extinction. Yet “to guarantee survival 
would necessarily rob the members of the very freedom to say yes or no that is necessary 
if they are to appropriate and preserve their cultural heritage.”204 It would, in other words, 
fail to satisfy the fourth rule of discourse, the freedom condition. That is, governments 
can protect collective identities that are valued by their members, but they cannot force 
members to value particular collective identities. Doing so would involve the same kind 
of coercion that makes forced assimilation, official disrespect, discrimination and other 
state interventions in collective identity normatively reprehensible.  
 In addition to a lack of alternative intersubjective contexts and the desire for 
internal reform, there is at least one more important factor for understanding why groups 
fail to embody the discursive principles listed above, namely, the lack of material 
resources: poverty, unemployment, economic crisis, and other “traditional” concerns of 
leftist, labor-oriented politics. This concern for the material bases of abstract rights has 
sometimes been presented in opposition to “recognition” based theories like Honneth’s 
and (perhaps) Habermas’, and also to identity politics in general. In the following section 
then, I will address this concern and argue that identity politics can and does encapsulate 
concerns of distributive justice as well as recognition of collective identity. Before 
beginning this analysis however, it is necessary to address what I have called the sincerity 
condition of discourse, and its relation to collective identity formation.  
 The requirement that discursive participants must mean what they say may seem 
strange, not least because insincerity seems much more difficult to identify, let alone 
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prohibit, than inequality, exclusion, or coercion. Yet it makes more sense, again, if 
one views it as a description of uninhibited identity construction rather than a prohibition. 
That is, under circumstances of oppression, there are many reasons why groups might 
take a strategic, rather than sincere (or, to use a dangerous term, authentic) stance toward 
their collective identity. In the first place, they might outright refuse to elaborate their 
collective identity in the terms available in public discourse. Ingram’s point that such a 
“refusal to enter into the established discourse may well represent a principled moral 
stance against oppression and injustice,” applies just as well to ethical-cultural discourses 
as moral ones, especially when the “established discourses” caricature a group’s identity 
in harmful ways.205 Secondly, oppressed groups are sometimes forced to construct their 
identities reactively, in ways that combat harmful stereotypes, but these (re)constructions 
may well be strategic, and just as ‘essentializing” as those they mean to combat. For 
example, even Kwame Anthony Appiah, who vehemently rejects “race” as a false and 
useless concept, nonetheless recognizes that “racial identity” cannot simply be done away 
with for the purposes of political action.206 Rather, it is something that must be used 
strategically and even “ironically” until it is no longer necessary: that is, until oppression 
is eliminated and collective identity can be constructed sincerely, without concern for 
how it may function strategically. 
 Finally, the phenomenon of “passing” also provides a good example of how 
oppressive conditions may sometimes require insincerity. While the individual 
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motivations for passing surely vary, some oppressed individuals who “pass” as white, 
straight, Christian, and so on, presumably do so to avoid some of the hardships associated 
with being or being seen as who they “really” are.207 Without delving too deeply into this 
complex issue, it is clear at least that, where the negative consequences of being a 
member of a certain group are eliminated, the strategic motivation to conceal one’s 
membership in that group is also. This is why the sincerity condition is included in the 
features of identity construction under ideal circumstances. By no means, however, does 
this condition require constructing some ideal of authenticity to which groups or their 
members can be held accountable, an undertaking which is problematic at best. Having 
described this and the other conditions in some detail then, let me now move on to the 
analysis of the material conditions for self-ascription, and the objections raised by those 
who see identity politics as insufficiently attentive to those conditions. 
Misrecognition and Material Deprivation 
By understanding oppression in terms of the denial of the right to self-ascription, 
and (retributive) identity politics as the struggle to actualize this right, one might think 
that I have missed something crucial about oppression. Namely, one might object that 
oppression often if not always involves material deprivation: inequalities in income, 
wealth, and in accessing vital resources like education, health care, adequate housing, and 
so on. One might object, in other words, that I have not accounted for distributive 
injustice as a feature of oppression. Admittedly, I have not discussed the distribution of 
resources in great detail. However, this is because I believe that the distributive 
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inequalities experienced by oppressed groups are conceptually separate from 
oppression itself. In other words, it is not because they experience distributive inequality 
that oppressed groups are oppressed. Rather, oppression makes groups vulnerable to 
economic exploitation and distributive injustice. Certainly the converse is true as well: 
economic exploitation and distributive injustice make groups (and individuals, since 
groups are no longer necessarily fundamental for understanding issues of distribution, or 
at least, my arguments up to now do not entail this claim) vulnerable to oppression. Yet 
this is no reason to conflate the two phenomena. Somewhat similarly, Nancy Fraser, 
argues that distributive injustice and “misrecognition” are conceptually distinct, even if 
they are often empirically linked.208 I disagree with her claim, however, that identity 
politics, as I understand it, is insufficient for addressing the distributive injustices 
associated with oppression. 
In her exchange with Honneth, Fraser argues that a suitable approach to issues of 
social justice must employ a “perspectival dualism.”209 It must, as I have done above, 
attempt to identify the “intersubjective” conditions of just social organization: the 
conditions of reciprocity and mutual respect that make possible substantive equality. On 
the other hand, it must also identify the “objective” conditions of just social organization, 
including, most importantly, just distribution of the material resources necessary to make 
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formal political rights effective and actionable. While these two perspectives tend 
toward different “folk paradigms” of justice – the recognition-based identity politics of 
the “new social movements” on the one hand, and the traditional distribution-based 
politics of labor on the other – Fraser recognizes that in reality, most if not all social 
justice movements can and should be understood as making both distributive and 
recognition-based demands. Thus, her perspectival dualism suggests that all social 
injustices should be analyzed from both perspectives simultaneously, rather than using 
the language of recognition for some and the language of redistribution for others, and 
without subsuming one perspective under another in a reductive fashion. 
I fully agree, and this is why, though oppression may often entail distributive 
injustice (in some cases fulfilling the definitional requirement “leading to group harm”) 
and vice versa, I have taken care to keep the two conceptually distinct. I disagree, 
however, with Fraser’s estimation of identity politics as necessarily reducing issues of 
justice to issues of recognition, and thereby neglecting distributive injustice or, as she 
puts it “conspir[ing] to decenter, if not extinguish, claims for egalitarian 
redistribution.”210 This claim is mistaken both empirically and conceptually. In the first 
place, the empirical claim that identity politics has somehow eclipsed redistributive 
politics is misleading, since most identity-based movements, from Black Nationalism, to 
feminism, to the struggles of indigenous “national minorities” have given a central place 
to concerns over distribution. Alcoff provides an extensive list of such identity-based 
political movements and their demands for redistribution:  
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     African American political organizations like the NAACP and the Black Radical 
Congress have called for reparations for slavery; women’s organizations like NOW 
have demanded an end to gender-based pay inequities; and NARAL (the National 
Abortion Rights Action League) has demanded access to abortion for poor women. 
The National Council of La Raza has organized for welfare rights, home loans for 
Latinos, and improvement of public schools, and the National Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force has fought for an end to job and housing discrimination and universal access to 
AIDS medication as well as health insurance for domestic partners.211 
 
Even the Civil Rights movement, with its assimilationist aims and its focus on equal 
recognition under the law, nonetheless gave central place to distributive claims.212 Far 
from “decentering” claims for redistribution then, identity-based political groups like 
those above would seem to bring them into sharper relief, if only because they see 
themselves, as the Black Feminist Collective did, as the most dedicated advocates for 
such claims. 
 Further, even though I have focused on ascriptive identification (what Fraser and 
Honneth would call “misrecognition”) as the antithesis of the right to self-ascription, it 
does not follow that such an approach cannot also identify distributive and/or material 
impediments to self-ascription. For one, the group harm characteristic of oppression 
derives as much from material deprivation as from stereotypes, insults and other less 
tangible harms. Indeed, part of what makes undeserved material inequalities morally 
egregious is that they devalue one’s sense of worth. When considering inequalities 
between groups then – say, wage disparities between men and women, or whites and 
blacks – part of what makes these inequalities unjust is that they unjustly devalue group 
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identities. One of Honneth’s central theses is that, as a matter of empirical fact, most 
often it is this experience of disrespect that fuels social struggles, rather than material 
necessity. I think Honneth’s empirical/phenomenological claim here is correct. Still, it is 
not necessary to reduce distributive injustices to their phenomenological basis in 
misrecognition, as he does, in order to defend identity politics in my sense. That is, 
identity politics may be important and defensible even if the development of an intact 
identity is not the fundamental goal of normative politics, as Honneth asserts. There is 
nothing contradictory about defending a conception of identity politics and 
simultaneously recognizing that some injustices may have nothing to do with 
misrecognition, or that the ability to develop an intact identity may have material as well 
as social and psychological prerequisites.213 In fact, insofar as certain identity groups may 
have disproportionate experiences of distributive injustice, it is not surprising that 
concerns for redistribution are often brought into the public eye through the lens of 
identity.                                               
  The perspective of distribution also helps to identify deviations from discursive-
democratic identity formation other than those discussed above. That is, unjust patterns of 
distribution may explain why groups fail to embody the principles of discourse even if 
other intersubjective contexts are available to their members, and even if the groups and 
their members have little interest in internal reforms in the interest of greater 
inclusiveness, equality, and so on. Consider, for example, neo-Nazi skinheads. Given that 
such groups have arisen mostly in diverse urban settings in England and the United 
                                                 
213
 I am skeptical that there are “purely” distributive injustices, but even if there were, it would not 
undermine the argument. 
  
145
States, it would be implausible to suggest that no alternative contexts for collective 
identity formation were available to their members. It is equally implausible, in my 
opinion, that such groups hold any promise for becoming more inclusive and democratic, 
since their beliefs are fundamentally inimical to democratic principles of freedom and 
equality.214 One might think then, that the existence of such groups provides a 
counterexample to what I have called democratic selection. However, if one looks at that 
group from the perspective of material distribution, the reasons for the deviation become 
clearer. Rather than any pre-existing racial animosity, sociologists have found that the 
reasons young whites join racist skinhead groups are largely the same as the reasons why 
urban youths join gangs in general: unemployment or lack of meaningful work, lack of 
quality education, abusive or neglectful upbringing, and so on.215 In fact, the first “skins” 
expressed no racial ideology at all, being primarily a movement in fashion and music.216 
It was only against the background of increasing unemployment, combined with new 
waves of immigrants willing to work for lower wages that the skinhead movement 
became aligned with the racist, nationalist ideology of the National Front, amongst other 
ideologues, through the familiar scapegoating that misplaces blame for structural 
deficiencies on vulnerable identity groups.   
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I presume then, that distributive justice would go a long way toward making 
hate groups like neo-Nazis irrelevant, at least insofar as it would eliminate the kinds of 
economic vulnerability that such groups exploit. Similarly, conflicts over scarce 
resources may often be prevented by eliminating the relevant material scarcity, and thus 
conflicts at the level of “recognition” may never arise. Concerning skinhead culture 
again, it is far from clear that the original movement would have developed an affinity 
with white supremacist ideologies against the background of full employment. At any 
rate, examples such as these further demonstrate the necessity of retaining an “objective” 
material orientation alongside intersubjective concerns for recognition. Otherwise, if one 
begins phenomenologically, as Honneth does, from the experience of misrecognition, one 
cannot distinguish between legitimate cases of oppression and illegitimate oppression 
claims (like the claim sometimes made that white men are now oppressed by minority 
groups) that may nonetheless be sincerely felt. I cannot address the question of what 
distributive arrangements would be most conducive to the right to self-ascription here, 
nor the larger question of what pattern or patterns of distribution are required by justice in 
a more general sense. I only mean to point out that the analysis I have undertaken here is 
not incompatible with such lines of inquiry, as Fraser and others seem to worry.  
Finally, in light of my extended consideration of groups, group harm, and 
collective identities, one might wonder whether or how class membership fits within the 
picture of oppression that I have sketched herein. Admittedly, I have intentionally 
avoided this issue, in the first place because I am wary, as noted in the first chapter, of 
conflating significantly different kinds of harm under the umbrella term ‘oppression,’ as 
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is often done when the term is used imprecisely. That is, insofar as the concept of 
class denotes some relation to economic exploitation, my intuition is that it is 
significantly different enough from the processes of oppression that I have described to 
merit separate analysis. It is not my intention to provide such an analysis here. However, 
I do think a few tentative points can be made, which suggest that it would not be entirely 
impossible to speak of something like ‘class oppression.’     
Complicating the matter somewhat is the fact that the meaning and referent of the 
very term ‘class’ has come to be the subject of significant disagreement. The traditional 
notion of class as used by Marx, wherein one’s class is determined by one’s relation to 
the means of production, has been rendered problematic by developments in post-
industrial capitalism that have created new sectors of the workforce that do not seem to 
fit neatly into the distinction between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Further, the rise of 
purely distributive, income-based understandings of class (lower class, middle class, etc.) 
are problematic as well, not least because they miss the fundamental conflict between 
classes and the exploitation of the “lower” classes by the “upper”. A useful reconstruction 
of the concept of class must invoke qualitative as well as quantitative criteria. Fear and 
uncertainty about job prospects and job security, extreme dissatisfaction and despair in 
the face of lifelong menial labor, as well as falling wages, loss of benefits, and the 
increasing gap between rich and poor bind the vast majority of workers together 
regardless of their various relations to the means of production. Marx understood this 
well enough, which is why he linked the experience of (what he called) alienation to the 
purely material logic of capitalist exploitation. That is, the fundamental injustice of 
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capitalism is not quantitative (that wealth is “redistributed” from the worker to the 
capitalist in the form of surplus value claimed as profit), but qualitative (that this 
distribution causes the misery of the worker, upon which the capitalist’s affluence 
depends).217 If such a claim is to be defended today, it seems to me that one must not lose 
sight of these qualitative features. And oppression, as I have defined it, may be among 
them. That is, the qualitative harms arising from a certain (capitalist) form of social 
organization might be thought to include a distinctly collective harm to a particular class 
(say, workers): the inability to collectively define themselves, which would entail, 
somewhat obviously, the right to organize trade unions and the like, but also the ability to 
disband or reject their group identity entirely. That is, the necessity of entering the 
workforce in a certain capacity, for example, as a laborer, and the harmful effects 
resulting from that arrangement, might be understood as a violation of the right to self-
ascription, and so an instance of oppression. Again, this tentative thesis would need to be 
worked out in much greater detail, taking special care not to conflate oppression, 
exploitation, alienation and other conceptions of harm, as I have consistently warned 
against in the present work, and avoiding the kind of reductionism that sees class as prior 
to other kinds of collective identity.218   
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I take it then, that identity politics as I have described it does not suffer from 
blindness to distributive injustice and material deprivation, nor from a myopic focus on 
issues of recognition. My claim is that identity politics plays a crucial part both in 
resisting oppression (retributive identity politics) and in a functioning democracy 
(discursive-democratic identity politics). I do not claim that it is the only part of those 
enterprises. There is room as well for theories of distributive justice, though it is not my 
intention to offer one. I have only aimed to show that identity politics and concerns for 
distribution are not incommensurable, and that, in reality, they often manifest in the same 
social phenomena.  
Conclusions and Synopsis 
This and the previous two chapters represent the heart of my thesis on oppression 
and its remediation through identity politics justified in reference to a fundamental group 
right to self-ascription. I consider this approach a superior alternative to the dominant 
approach to collective identity and group rights, an approach I have called multicultural 
liberalism. The first chapter presented the critique of that approach, and set out the 
outlines of an alternative by offering a definition of oppression and a preliminary account 
of the type of group right that such a definition entails. The second chapter further 
specified this right, and argued that it must be considered foundational in a certain sense 
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for traditional individual rights, at least insofar as such rights are interpreted 
discursively. This argument also coincides with and builds upon the critique of 
multicultural liberalism insofar as the latter employs a purely individualist approach to 
rights, and insofar as this approach is in part what leads to an intentionalist view of group 
membership, with all the problems that that entails. I draw upon Habermas’ discursive-
democratic theory of rights because I believe that his is the best and most plausible theory 
available, since it preserves the best features of liberalism and communitarianism while 
avoiding the most serious pitfalls of either, and since, unlike many other contemporary 
theories of rights and democracy, it retains the potential for radical, structural 
transformation. I have tried to avoid a dogmatic Habermasianism however, in 
acknowledging important criticisms of Habermas’ rigorous proceduralism, especially 
those that point out the necessity of a substantive orientation toward issues of justice and 
morality, an orientation that Habermas frequently takes for granted. Still, I do not think 
such criticisms are fatal to Habermas’ general project. That is, there is no contradiction 
involved in providing both procedural and substantive arguments for a right to self-
ascription actualized through a certain kind of identity politics. Indeed I take it that both 
perspectives are necessary since oppression undermines real-world justification 
procedures on the one hand, and since, on the other hand, substantive commitments are 
themselves constructed in a discursive fashion.  
One of the chief advantages of this approach is its ability to distinguish between 
those groups that are worthy of respect and recognition and those that are not, based upon 
criteria that are, if not neutral, at least widely acceptable to the citizens and collectives 
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that populate multicultural liberal-democracies today. These criteria too are both 
procedural and substantive. They are procedural insofar as they are derived and adapted 
from a discourse-ethical approach to moral justification, and they are substantive insofar 
as, when applied to ethical-cultural discourses on identity, they represent something like 
an intersubjective model of human flourishing, or so I have argued. These criteria (that is, 
the “rules” or “principles” of discourse) may be helpful when collective identities conflict 
in such a way that resolution defaults to the State, but they are not best understood as 
coercive regulations. Rather, they provide a speculative ideal of how collective identity 
could be constructed under non-coercive conditions. That is, if identities are socially 
constructed, then it is important to ask how current relations of power affect those 
constructions, as well as whether and how such constructions might look different under 
more ideal conditions. And if identity is politically salient, as I have argued it is, then the 
construction of identity is an inherently political process. The discursive-democratic 
model of identity formation specifies an ideal relation between socially constructed 
identities and normative political structures: a relation of communicative freedom. It 
provides a link, in other words, between identity politics and concerns for social justice in 
general. 
 If such a theory is valuable, then it ought to be able to engage and clarify current 
debates about identity. In the following chapter then, I will consider the debate 
concerning racial identity as a sort of test case. This debate provides a useful point of 
application since one of its central questions is whether a collective identity that has been 
constructed largely as a means of oppression can be reconstructed in a normatively 
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justifiable way, or whether it must be abandoned altogether. It considers, in other 
words, the possibility of transforming an oppressive, ascriptive identity into a positive, 
self-ascriptive identity, precisely the process that I have outlined in general philosophical 
terms in the pages above. Using the discursive-democratic model of identity construction 
as a guide then, my aim is to determine whether racial identity would be justifiable under 
ideal, non-oppressive conditions. Let me now turn to this final task. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
THE FUTURE OF RACIAL IDENTITY: A TEST CASE 
 
 Racial oppression represents one of the most normatively pressing injustices of 
our time. More specifically, racial (and other kinds of) oppression represents a serious 
challenge to the dominant, culture-based conception of group identity and group rights, or 
so I have argued. It is this challenge – one which multicultural liberalism fails to meet – 
that motivates the attempt to develop an alternative framework for understanding group 
identity and group rights, a discursive framework based upon a (Habermasian) 
conception of intersubjectivity, and a right to self-ascription derived from that 
conception. Now such a framework must be put to the test, first to show that it is better 
equipped to address the very omission that motivates its development (an easy enough 
task given the relative lack of attention paid to racial oppression in the dominant 
approach, and one that, at any rate, has largely been argued for in the previous pages), but 
more importantly, to show that it can prevail even in the dominant approach’s own terms, 
the terms of ideal theory. Recall that the dominant approach’s primary justification for 
omitting oppressed groups and oppression-based theories of group rights refers to the 
superiority of ideal theory, and depends upon the claim that such alternative theories are 
at best temporary and philosophically contingent, while its own approach represents a 
principled, non-contingent account of group rights understood as “inherent” in certain 
kinds of (cultural) group membership. Contrary to this claim, the discourse-theoretical 
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explication of the right to self-ascription provided in the previous chapters is itself an 
ideal theory of a certain sort, one that is also “inherently” justified in reference to group 
membership in the most general terms, but one that accounts for and gives central place 
to “non-ideal” concerns, especially oppression. In this chapter I will apply this theory to 
the particular case of racial identity, entering a contemporary debate that, to my mind, has 
yet to produce a satisfactory response to the question of the future of racial identity. The 
structure of the argument is as follows. I begin by providing an extremely brief history of 
the development of the concept of race and of racial classification, in order to make clear 
why many find the concept inherently linked to racism and racial oppression. Yet despite 
this history, and against Appiah and other racial eliminativists, I argue that racial identity 
can be discursively justified, and thus uncoupled from its ascriptive origins as a tool or 
aspect of racial oppression. I then discuss examples of what a discursively acceptable 
conception of racial identity might be like, as well as examples of discursively 
unacceptable conceptions.219 I take it that the success of this argument will further 
demonstrate the value (both relative and inherent) of the theoretical framework developed 
in the previous pages. 
Race and Racial Oppression: Another ‘Internal Relation’? 
If one judges a concept solely by its history and origins, then the concept of race 
would seem to be doomed from the start. This is because the idea of race as it first 
emerged in the 17th century was both scientifically false and ethically dubious. Yet its 
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importance in understanding the development of modern society is not understated by 
Francois Bernier, widely agreed to be the first to use the term ‘race’ in his 1684 essay ‘A 
New Division of the Earth,’ when he says that the differences among races is “so 
remarkable that it may be properly made use of as the foundation for a new division of 
the earth.”220 Still, Bernier’s reflections on race are largely conjectural, based on his own 
travels and observations of phenotypic differences among the peoples he encountered. 
And though he reflects extensively on the relative beauty of different races (at one point 
hypothesizing that “you do not find handsome women in the countries where the water is 
bad, or where the soil is not vigorous and fertile”221) he does not yet link these 
phenotypic differences to differences in intelligence and character, nor does he purport to 
give a scientific account of how races relate to the human species in general. 
A scientific conception of race first emerged, as has only recently been brought 
into the light of philosophical scrutiny, with the great philosopher Kant (and also, to some 
extent, the great botanist Linnaeus).222 The “discovery” of the type of human diversity 
that Bernier documents, along with the Enlightenment’s fetishistic obsession with 
classification and taxonomy produced intense debates as to the relation of race and races 
to the human species as a whole. In particular, the question of whether different races 
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evolved (to use the term somewhat anachronistically) from the same “root genus” 
(monogenesis) or whether they evolved separately, from different and unrelated ancestors 
(polygenesis), was a matter of serious contention. Against proponents of polygenesis, 
Kant argued that all human beings came from a single line of descent, but that that line of 
descent was subject to variation due to the actualization of different “seeds” 
corresponding to “natural predispositions.”223 And though he thought that all such seeds 
were present (as potencies) in the earliest human beings, only one became irreversibly 
actualized in each race according to a variety of environmental contingencies (heat, 
humidity, diet, and so on). Kant thus posited four basic races, white Europeans, black 
Africans, red Huns (from which he supposed Native American peoples to have 
descended), and olive-yellow Hindus (including most of the Asian peoples known to 
Europe at that time), from which he thought all other racial variations could be derived.224 
Even if this particular conception of race was controversial among European 
thinkers, the “natural predispositions” that Kant saw as corresponding to his four races 
were surely taken as intuitively unproblematic. That is, that the white European 
represented the closest living example of the “root genus” of all racial “deviations” was 
considered (by the Europeans themselves of course) obvious, evidenced by Europe’s 
possession of “the most fortunate combination of influences of both the cold and hot 
regions,” that “the greatest riches of earth’s creation are found in this region,” and that 
“the human beings living in this region were already well-prepared to be transplanted into 
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every other region of the earth.”225 By contrast then, the “natural disposition” of the 
other races were supposed to exhibit varying degrees of deficiency, including in their 
ability to grasp and thus self-apply the moral law, with Asians coming closest to whites, 
despite their supposed difficulties with abstract concepts, Native Americans being 
furthest (he describes their “natural disposition” as a “half-extinguished life power”) and 
Africans falling somewhere in between, amenable at least to servitude.226 As is apparent 
then, Kant’s theory of race is also and simultaneously a theory of racial hierarchy – that 
is, a theory of white supremacy. Of course, this would not have been a novel conclusion. 
One must imagine that the “fact” of white supremacy would have been, for white 
Europeans of that time, close to an unshakeable intuition that any theory of race must 
account for just as much as it must account for questions about the genesis of different 
races. Yet it may be more surprising to the contemporary reader encountering this 
embarrassing and heretofore concealed connection – that, as Mills says, “modern moral 
theory and modern racial theory have the same father.”227 
Further, as much as Kant’s idea of race rests on questionable (to say the least) 
ethical premises, it also rests on bad science. As one might guess, modern science has 
discovered nothing resembling the “seeds” that supposedly determine racial membership, 
nor have the peculiar hypotheses of Kant and his contemporaries regarding the causes of 
different skin colors, bone structures and facial features borne any scientific fruit. In fact, 
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even after the revolutionary scientific programs of Darwin and Mendel, the search for 
a scientific basis for race turns out to be in vain.228 It is now widely accepted that no 
biological or genetic basis exists for the organization and classification of human beings 
into different races. So why then does the idea of race persist, both in everyday 
understanding and in a variety of academic contexts? The question is especially pertinent 
given the fact that “racialism,” understood as the belief that there are different, discrete 
races of human beings, is, or at least has been historically, bound up with racism, 
understood as the belief that “races” can be organized hierarchically according to 
intelligence, character, or some other measure of value (a belief that, insofar as it 
organizes and rationalizes systematic harm to those groups it ascribes to “inferior” races, 
is constitutive of racial oppression). 
A common-sense answer to this question is that, though race is not “real” in any 
deep scientific or metaphysical sense, it is still an important concept for understanding 
contemporary social reality, given that racial categories still structure the experiences of 
individuals and the functioning of institutions in “racialized” societies. One need not 
believe in God to understand the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition (or, to use Appiah’s 
example, one need not believe in witches to understand the functioning of the concept of 
witchcraft in early colonial New England). One can continue to hold that such concepts 
have a social reality, even if one denies that they are real in the deeper senses above. In 
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relation to race, such a position has come to be called constructivism.229 Racial 
constructivists accept that race has no biological foundation, yet they argue that, as a 
result of human action and the widespread, consequential successes of false theories like 
those presented above, race has come to be inscribed in the institutions and practices of 
contemporary societies in ways that cannot be illuminated without recourse to some 
conception of race. Accordingly, they hold that race does have a socio-historical reality, 
even if it cannot be linked to biologically significant “racial” differences.  
One of the earliest attempts to elucidate a constructivist account of race is given 
by W. E. B. Du Bois, who notes that while races “perhaps transcend scientific definition, 
nevertheless, [they] are clearly defined to the eye of the Historian and Sociologist.”230 Du 
Bois thus suggests that a race is a “vast family of human beings, generally of common 
blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both 
voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or 
less vividly conceived ideals of life.”231 Aside from the talk of “common blood” then, Du 
Bois’ conception of race emphasizes the historical and derives from shared historical 
experience and a notion of shared “ideals of life.” Such ideals, he thought, are racially 
specific, such that each race of humanity has its own unique contribution to make to 
human history and civilization in general, including the “Negro race,” which he thought 
had “not as yet given to civilization the full spiritual message which they are capable of 
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giving.”232 Thus Du Bois advocated for racial institutions like the American Negro 
Academy, in hopes that they could assist in fulfilling such a historical task.  
Du Bois’ socio-historical conception of race has become a focal point for 
contemporary debates about race and racial identity. Racial eliminativists argue that since 
the concept of race has no real referent (and moreover, since “race-thinking” is often 
morally problematic), it should be discarded altogether. Kwame Anthony Appiah, one of 
the most fervent proponents of racial eliminativism, argues succinctly that “there are no 
races. There is nothing in the world we can ask race to do for us,” in short, that race 
“refers to nothing in the world at all.”233 His earliest arguments to this end take the form 
of a critique of Du Bois’ idea of race. In “The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the 
Illusion of Race,” Appiah carefully challenges Du Bois’ definition of race, arguing that it 
ultimately relies on and presumes a scientific account of race, even though Du Bois 
himself recognized that such an account is implausible.234 As Appiah points out, the talk 
of “family,” “common blood,” and even common “impulses” and “strivings” all 
presuppose a view of race as something that is biologically inheritable, i.e. a (pseudo) 
scientific view. If there is any hope of replacing such an account with a socio-historical 
one, it is to be found in the idea of shared history and traditions. Yet these criteria, 
Appiah thinks, turn out to be insufficient, as they lead to a certain circularity. “When we 
recognize two events as belonging to the history of one race,” he says, “we have to have a 
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criterion for membership in the race at those two times, independent of the 
participation of the members in the two events.”235 This criterion cannot be common 
history, since “we would have to be able to identify the group in order to identify its 
history.”236 In other words, common history in the most general sense is shared by all of 
humanity. But in order to identify a particular history, say, black history, one must 
already have some way of determining who is to count as black, and so whose history is 
going to count as black history. According to Appiah, this lack of foundations leads Du 
Bois to constantly fall back on the scientific conception of race, with all of its 
corresponding difficulties, not surprising since, for Appiah, there is no other foundation, 
as race itself is a meaningless concept. In Appiah’s own words “substituting a 
sociohistorical conception of race for the biological one…is simply to bury the biological 
conception below the surface, not to transcend it.”237  
This reading of Du Bois, and the corresponding rejection of even constructivist 
accounts of race has given rise to serious debate. Paul Taylor, for example, challenges 
Appiah’s claim that Du Bois’ reliance on common history involves a vicious circularity. 
Such an objection, he thinks, only holds if “there is nothing to be said about this history 
except that it is The History of The Race.”238 Yet, Taylor argues, there is a more plausible 
interpretation of “common history” than this. It may indeed be impossible to identify 
black history in a totalized sense, as the history that all and only black folks share, 
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without first knowing who counts as black. Yet this does not preclude identifying 
certain “parallel experiences” of “concrete individuals” that “when relevantly similar 
enough, justify putting those who’ve lived them into the same category.”239 This 
understanding of common history, the essence of which is captured in Du Bois’ claim 
that “the black man is a person who must ride Jim Crow in Georgia,” avoids the problem 
of circularity.240 In the terms that I have developed in the previous pages, one might say 
that the experience of oppression is the common history that links black folks together, 
since, after all, systemic racial oppression has never had a great deal of trouble 
identifying its victims. 
Similarly, Lucius Outlaw criticizes Appiah’s strategy of considering each of Du 
Bois’ criteria for racial membership individually, instead of recognizing that, for Du Bois, 
race is a “cluster concept” determinable not by any single criteria, but by “several 
properties taken disjunctively,” such that any one criteria is sufficient, but no one criteria 
is necessary.241 To point out that such an approach is inadequate as a definition of race is,  
Outlaw thinks, to misunderstand Du Bois’ project, to assume that he was in search of a 
concept of races as “natural kinds” or “heritable racial essences,” as Appiah does. This 
project, Outlaw claims “was not simply – or even primarily – an effort devoted to 
definition and taxonomy. Rather it was a decidedly political project,” a project involving 
“prescribing norms for the social reconstruction of personal and social identities” and 
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“rotating the axis” of a vertical cultural value system which placed the cultural 
achievements of white Europeans at the top and those of African descent at or near the 
bottom.242   
 Both of these criticisms see Appiah’s approach to Du Bois’ conception of race as 
inadequate and/or inappropriate to the subject. In emphasizing the political and pragmatic 
nature of the project (Du Bois was after all, as Taylor points out, a committed 
pragmatist), both Taylor and Outlaw transform the question from whether the idea of race 
refers to anything “real” to whether the concept is useful for political praxis. Appiah 
seems to worry that the notion of race necessarily (or as it were, unnecessarily) limits the 
ability of persons to develop their own identities in a free and creative way (i.e. that they 
are essentially ascriptive). Further, he seems to think that the notion of race inhibits the 
social theorist’s ability to achieve a “hermeneutical understanding” of groups and group 
identities, as opposed to a fixed and rigid account of human types. Yet these alternative 
readings of Du Bois suggest that intentionality is at the heart of the race concept – that 
race is “real” in the same way as money or holidays are: because we (at least some of us) 
have agreed to give meaning to the concept. If such meanings lack precise referential 
boundaries, it is because they are always contestable and often contested. Du Bois’ 
conception of race then, must be seen as an attempt to contest the dominant conceptions 
of his time, which linked biological racial essences with hierarchical differences in moral, 
intellectual, and cultural capacity. Such a conception could still be challenged, though 
challenging it on metaphysical grounds misses the point, and Appiah seems at times to 
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recognize this, as his metaphysical arguments often slip into moral and prudential 
argumentation. 
 In such practical discourses however, eliminativism faces serious challenges, for 
if race truly doesn’t exist, then how can race-based policies ever be justified? 
Eliminativism, in other words, easily lends itself to a certain kind of conservative “color-
blind” social policy. Such an approach to social policy proceeds from the ostensibly 
admirable normative principle that one’s race should not matter in determining one’s life 
chances; that, to use Martin Luther King’s oft quoted (and oft misinterpreted) words, 
one’s opportunities and social position should be determined by the “content of one’s 
character” rather than the “color of one’s skin.” Today such a principle has the 
legitimating force of near consensus, even if its implications are the subject of serious 
disagreement. Yet, as is often missed by those who enlist Dr. King in their struggles 
against affirmative action and other perceived instances of “reverse racism,” such a 
principle is aspirational. That such a dream might one day become reality does not mean 
that in the present, where race and racism still do affect the life chances of raced persons 
in profound ways, one can eliminate such inequalities by ignoring them, and even making 
of their mere mention a kind of social taboo, an always illegitimate use of the “race card.” 
Such an approach to social justice serves to conceal and thus perpetuate already existing 
inequalities in the name of equality itself. That is, “color-blind” liberalism errs in a way 
similar to multicultural liberalism. It presumes that what ought to be – racial equality on 
the one hand, and voluntary group membership on the other – already is.243 
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 In Color Conscious, Appiah purports to take constructivist criticisms as well 
as concerns for social policy seriously, returning to and refining his metaphysical 
arguments against race, but ultimately conceding that it may be wise to retain a 
conception of “racial identity” for political purposes. Here Appiah acknowledges that 
“race” (a term he renders in scare-quotes to consistently remind the reader of his 
metaphysical skepticism as to the existence its referent) is  not only an ascriptive 
signifier, but that it is also central to non-ascriptive “identification,” which he 
understands as “the process through which an individual intentionally shapes her projects 
– including her plans for her own life and her conception of the good – by reference to 
available labels, available identities.”244 He acknowledges, in other words, that despite 
their complicated history and relation to racist practices of classification and hierarchy, 
racial identities may nonetheless be important and valuable to the persons they purport to 
classify, thus resisting a view that he nonetheless claims to be sympathetic to, a 
“metaphysical” conception that “count[s] nothing as a racial essence unless it implie[s] a 
hierarchy among the races.”245 Rather, he allows room, as it were, for a “recreational” 
conception of racial identity that sees one’s “race” as a part of, but not wholly or even 
largely determinate of one’s personal identity, similarly, he thinks, to the way that some 
Americans identify with their Irish or Italian heritage. Appiah thus recognizes that, at 
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least at the level of conceptual abstraction, race and racism are not logically or 
conceptually connected, even if their empirical co-development suggests otherwise.246   
 Still, these concessions to constructivism do not amount to an abandonment of 
racial eliminativism. Eliminativists like Appiah may concede that racial identities are 
important in the short term, for challenging and resisting racism both in its structural 
manifestations and in its individual psychological effects, while still insisting, as Appiah 
does, that “we need to go on to the next necessary step, which is to ask whether the 
identities constructed in this way are ones we can all be happy with in the longer run.”247 
He implies that racial identities would not be satisfactory in the long term (presumably 
meaning under more ideally just conditions), since they have a tendency to be “too tightly 
scripted” and to “go imperial,” overshadowing and even being supposed to determine 
other aspects of one’s personal identity. Yet this is the extent of his argument against 
racial identities under more just social conditions. Nowhere does he argue that racial 
identity necessarily leads to these undesirable consequences. His final word is only that 
the “fruitful imaginative work of constructing collective identities for a democratic 
nation” must “recognize both the centrality of difference within human identity and the 
fundamental moral unity of humanity.”248 A conception of racial identity that met these 
conditions would presumably be acceptable. In the next section then, I will present and 
defend a conception of racial identity that would meet such conditions, further specified 
in the terms I have outlined in the previous chapter. That is, I will defend a conception of 
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racial identity that is discursively justifiable, and that proceeds from Outlaw’s 
intuition, shared by many, that racial identities are important “even if, in the very next 
instant, racism and invidious ethnocentrism in every form and manifestation were to 
disappear forever.”249 
A Discursively Justifiable Conception of Racial Identity 
Anyone who has attempted to discuss outside of the halls of academia the claim 
that race doesn’t exist knows that the thesis is generally met with confusion and even 
hostility. This is true, in my experience, across the spectrum of racial identification. 
Blacks, whites, Latinos and Asians object equally, even when they understand the 
arguments against biological or scientific conceptions of race. One might chalk this up to 
a deep, perhaps even unconscious need to justify and protect racial privileges on the one 
hand, and to an equally deep, internalized oppression on the other(s). One might think, 
more simply, that the majority of people, who have come to accept a certain folk 
understanding of race, are just wrong. Lots of people have been wrong about lots of 
things in the past, and the fact that many people believe something does not make it true 
or even valuable. Yet beyond indoctrination, ignorance, or other pernicious reasons, the 
idea that people resist racial eliminativism because race is important to them at least 
deserves consideration. That is, if race and racism are logically separable, as even Appiah 
admits, then perhaps they are socially and politically separable as well. 
As is apparent from his comments above, Outlaw is perhaps, among philosophers 
at least, the most serious proponent of such a project. In the introduction to his work On 
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Race and Philosophy, he sets out to defend a conception of race as a “real, 
constitutive aspect of determinate populations of human beings,” a conception he sees as 
a third way between deterministic, “scientific” conceptions that see race as a fixed 
biological essence and accounts (both eliminativist and constructivist) that see race as 
arbitrary, ideological, fictional, or otherwise unreal.250 By contrast, Outlaw understands 
races as “social-natural kinds”: groups defined in reference to both social-cultural and 
physical-biological characteristics, or more precisely, groups defined by physical-
biological characteristics as they are interpreted, contested, and given meaning by 
different socio-cultural groups in different historical periods. In short, the fact that the 
meaning and extension of race is variable and contested throughout history and into the 
present does not mean that it is arbitrary and meaningless. Rather, Outlaw proposes that 
races develop and evolve, “as do all things in the natural world, but in ways that are 
characteristically human.”251 And though he concedes that racism and racial oppression 
have significantly affected the currently dominant racial ontology, he nonetheless thinks 
it wise to entertain the possibility that more or less distinct racial groups might be “the 
result of bio-cultural group attachments and practices that are conducive to human 
survival and well-being, and hence must be understood, appreciated, and provided for in 
the principles and practices of … a liberal, democratic society.”252 
In other words, the biological evolution of human groups is itself conditioned by 
normative regulations – rules about mate selection, treatment of “outsiders,” duties to our 
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environments, and so on – in ways that, presumably, are not the case for other 
animals. The constitution of races is the result of such normative arrangements, and 
serves no less a purpose, Outlaw thinks, than the survival of the group. Race (or perhaps 
race-ing), then, is an inherently normative enterprise, even as it draws from and 
transforms our physical and biological “nature” in a reflexive manner. The crucial task 
for Outlaw is to show that such an enterprise need not result in the kinds of racism and 
“invidious ethnocentrism” that have tainted so much previous thinking about race, and 
resulted in the kinds of oppressive institutions and practices that structure societies today; 
that is, that the constitution and preservation of races can be  “guided by norms that we 
hope – and our best judgments lead us to believe – will help us to achieve stable, well-
ordered, and just societies, norms bolstered by the combined best understandings 
available in all fields of knowledge that have to do with human beings and that are 
secured by democratically achieved consensus.”253 
I am hesitant to agree with Outlaw about the evolutionary necessity of racially 
defined human groups, not least because, for all of his insistence on the importance of 
incorporating the insights of natural and human sciences, he cites very little empirical 
research to support his own view. But perhaps this is excusable, since it is difficult to 
determine whether the conclusions of such research would hold under more ideal (non-
racist) social conditions anyway. That is, there is no way to determine whether, for 
example, observable expressions and tendencies of solidarity among racial minorities are 
the result of some inherent commonality, or whether they are contingently effective 
means of combating racial prejudice. The problem is that there is no non-racist “control” 
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society to establish the extent to which such conclusions are contingent upon current 
social conditions, where racism is still a relevant variable. This leads one to conclude, 
with David Ingram, that “even if it were true that cultural and physical similarities 
functioned as principle loci for group solidarities in the past, it is not necessary that they 
continue to do so in the future.”254 This is especially true given Outlaw’s own emphasis 
on the way that socio-cultural norms can transform “human nature” itself. One must 
imagine that such a dynamic anthropological adaptability would include (at least in 
principle) the ability to transcend even the “necessity” of racial identification.  
Still, even if racial identification is not a matter of evolutionary necessity, one 
might nonetheless grant the desirability, or at least, acceptability of a “voluntary 
separatism based on positive attraction of those who think, act, talk, and (yes) look alike 
… rather than on hatred of those who are different from oneself,” as even a critic of 
Outlaw like Ingram does.255 This line of investigation shifts the focus away from natural 
history and empirical fact and engages directly with those norms that “help us to achieve 
stable, well-ordered, and just societies,” norms that are “secured by democratically 
achieved consensus.” Such an approach is separate in principle from the question of 
whether racial identification is necessary, since one could have a conception of human 
nature (for example, one which sees humans as naturally selfish, sinful, evil, or 
murderous) in which highly undesirable and even immoral phenomena are nonetheless 
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understood as natural and thus necessary.256 In the previous chapter I argued that 
norms of discourse are helpful and appropriate for understanding collective identity 
formation, and for circumscribing the limits of identity politics. As I mentioned there, 
there is a certain peculiarity about using universalizing procedural norms to illuminate the 
construction of particular collective identities. This peculiarity is brought into even 
sharper relief when placed within the concrete context of racial identity, since the very 
argument about “conserving” races is precisely about maintaining certain differences and 
appreciating the legitimacy (or, for Outlaw, inevitability) of certain kinds of exclusion. 
What would it mean, for example, to include everyone who could make a “relevant 
contribution” in discourses about racial identity? And to what, one might wonder, would 
they contribute? If one wants to use a discourse-theoretical approach to understand racial 
identities and their justifiability, one must clarify these complex issues. 
The kind of exclusion at issue here is different from the (asymmetrical) tactical 
kind of exclusion that oppressed groups might demand based upon their oppression – the 
exclusion of men from all-woman groups, the formation of exclusive black or Latino 
organizations, and so on. That kind of exclusion or separatism is often justified based 
upon non-ideal circumstances: imbalances of power that make oppressed groups 
vulnerable in ways that other groups are not, and therefore merit special protections that 
for other groups (men, whites, etc.) would be unjustified. Exclusion from (even ideal) 
discourse is a different matter. It does not derive from asymmetries of power, so much as 
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considerations of relevance. My exclusion, for example, from discourses about the 
meaning of Polish-American identity need not be based upon the oppression of Polish-
Americans, but on the simple fact that I am not Polish, and so my contributions are not 
relevant. This kind of exclusion is not insidious, since it is based on rational 
considerations rather than power or coercion. Yet how, to return to the question at hand, 
does this kind of exclusion apply to discourses on racial identity in particular?  
A strict defender of Du Bois could fairly straightforwardly interpret the 
inclusiveness condition by arguing that relevant contributions come from members of a 
particular race, defined by some combination of physical, cultural, and historical features, 
and that their contributions are contributions to the unique “message” of the race. Yet 
even if Du Bois’ conception of race holds up to scrutiny, the idea that each race has a 
unique historical and even “spiritual” message is one that even defenders of Du Bois 
hesitate to endorse. To “conserve” races is one thing, but to advocate this kind of racial 
teleology seems to return to the problematic view that one can derive differences in 
character, ability, intelligence, and so on, from racial differences. At any rate, the idea 
that individuals of the same race share some robust purpose or historical task does not 
mesh well with post-metaphysical approaches to normative justification, and 
underestimates the diversity of perspectives among individual members of a particular 
race. In perhaps more familiar terms, it is false (and also not theoretically necessary) to 
presume that members of the same race share a strong conception of the good.257  
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Rather, “relevant contributions” could be interpreted as contributions to an 
ongoing project of interpreting the meaning of racial membership. Such a project begins 
(and has begun) with those who share a certain history of parallel experiences, as Taylor 
notes, but it need not exclude those who don’t share those experiences, or whose 
experiences are atypical. For example, the contributions of mixed-race persons have 
emphasized the inadequacy of a binary system of racial identification based on the 
illusion of racial purity. Perhaps the first to give sustained philosophical attention to the 
idea of mixed race, Naomi Zack shares Appiah’s skepticism about the existence of races. 
In Race and Mixed Race, she provides similar arguments to show that race has no 
scientific foundation and further, that folk criteria of race, which attribute racial 
membership based primarily upon heredity, fail to achieve their purported goal of 
completeness (such that all persons would have a designated racial membership), since 
mixed-race persons do not fit within their classificatory scope.258 Still, even though she 
denies that races are “real” in any important sense, she does consider the possibility of an 
acceptable, non-binary system of racial identification. She asks her readers to imagine 
two races, P and Q:  
If the society in which P’s and Q’s lived were value-neutral about P and Q, then S and 
T, as mixtures of P and Q, might privately decide that they were both P and Q or that 
they were perhaps a different race, O. If racial designations were important for some 
reason (albeit still value-neutral), then individuals such as S might insist that the 
“authorities” recognize the existence of O. Alternatively, T’s, who were more Q than 
P, might shrug and call themselves Q’s. There might also be U’s, the offspring of P-
Q’s and P’s, who were more P than Q, and these U’s might call themselves P’s or 
insist on a new racial designation, N. At any rate, it would be possible, if society were 
neutral regarding P and Q, to speak of individuals who were mixed P and Q, and to 
leave it up to those individuals to support research into their own new racial 
characteristics and ultimately make a decision about how, as individuals of mixed 
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race, they wished to be regarded racially. If racial categories were important for 
some reason, and if society were neutral about them and there were a fair degree of 
freedom and self-determination in that society, then that might be the dynamic of 
racial change.259 
 
This passage nicely illustrates how the right to (racial) self-ascription is central to a 
normatively justifiable conception of racial identity. Zack’s point is that “if racial 
categories [are] important,” racially mixed persons (and insofar as the idea of racial 
purity is essentially a myth, we are all “mixed” to some degree) should be able to choose 
their racial identifications, either from existing options or by creating new collective 
identities. This requires that racial identities be open and inclusive to a degree, but it does 
not require that they include everyone, anymore than any kind of actually existing 
discourse must (or even could) include every living person as a participant. In short, 
racial groups need not (and cannot) include everyone in order to approximate the norm of 
inclusiveness. This is both a descriptive claim – that, as a matter of fact, not everyone 
sees themselves as having a stake in discourses about the meaning of being black, Asian, 
mixed-race and so on – as well as a normative claim – that the exclusion of certain views, 
such as those that would denigrate or disrespect group members, is legitimate. Again, the 
point here is that the relations of inclusion and exclusion that constitute the discursive 
entity are not, contrary to the views of Schmitt and his followers, arbitrary or coercive, 
but rational – that is, agreeable in principle to all. That is to say, the norm of 
inclusiveness derives from the universal importance of collective identity for human 
development, rather than the relative importance (relative, that is, to the dominant race) 
of maintaining dominance, which is the underlying principle of most previous schemes of 
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racial classification such as the “one drop rule.” My only worry about Zack’s 
hypothetical description is that it seems to imply that racial identity is an individual and 
“private” matter, rather than a kind of “public meaning” as Guinier and Torres note (and 
as all collective identities are, as I argued in Chapter 2). If this is in fact her meaning, 
then I fear the project of racial (re)construction that she describes may succumb to the 
kind of postmodern schizophrenia that Walzer convincingly criticizes.260  
Similarly, Linda Alcoff draws from the history of Latin American racial 
identification, in which mixed race is the norm rather than the exception, to develop a 
positive reconstruction of mixed race or “mestizo” identity.261 In the first place, this 
“new” racial designation is meant to account for the experiences of people who have no 
place in the dominant, bi-racial system of classification; to create a “linguistic, public, 
socially affirmed identity for mixed race persons.”262 Yet, it is also more than a mere 
addition to the available options for racial identification. Again, insofar as we are all 
racially mixed in one way or another, mestizo identity confronts the dominant idea of 
race, in which all persons have a distinct, non-overlapping, hereditary racial identity with 
an alternative model valued for its “inclusivity and dynamism.”263 Mestizo identity is not 
just about giving a name to the nameless. It rather competes in the realm of racial 
                                                 
260
 See my discussion of Walzer’s “On Involuntary Association” in Chapter 1.4. 
 
261
 Linda Alcoff, “Mestizo Identity” in American Mixed Race: The Culture of Microdiversity. edited by 
Naomi Zack, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995. 
 
262
 Alcoff (2006): 282. 
 
263
 In developing this model, Alcoff draws from Mexican philosopher Jose Vasconcelos’ idea of “la raza 
cosmica,” the “cosmic race,” which she describes as a theory of racial “inclusivity.” See Jose Vasconcelos. 
The Cosmic Race, La raza Cosmica: A Bilingual Edition. translated by Didier T. Jaen. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1979.  
  
176
discourse to encourage the already named to rethink their identity as well. Still, even 
though such a racial identity could, in principle, apply to everyone, Alcoff does not insist 
that it must. She preserves the possibility, in other words, that Q’s could still “shrug and 
call themselves Q’s.” In accordance with the freedom condition of discourse, Alcoff’s 
conception of mestizo race encourages us to rethink our racial memberships, but it does 
not coerce us to do so. Mestizo racial identity then, is a good example of a discursively 
justifiable conception of racial identity. 
Having outlined a positive proposal then, let me continue to clarify the application 
of discursive principles to the construction of racial identity by outlining a conception 
that I take it would not meet those conditions.  
White Racial Identity 
Is it the case, one might wonder, that whites, when confronted with a confusing 
array of diverse racial identities, might simply shrug and call themselves white? That is, 
could whiteness continue to exist as an option for racial identification, and if not, what 
options does this leave for persons traditionally considered white? The question is an 
especially pressing one if collective identity is of constitutive importance in the ways that 
I have described, and since one might think that the lack of a positive reconstruction of 
white racial identity leaves a void that is too often filled by traditionally racist, white 
supremacist conceptions of whiteness. The answer, I believe, is that white identity is not 
discursively justifiable, mainly because it is inherently coercive and exclusionary, failing, 
at least, the first and fourth conditions of discourse. Yet, I will argue, this lack of 
justification need not cause too much worry, since white identity lacks the intersubjective 
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resources and benefits of other kinds of collective identity, such that, in the absence 
of other, illegitimate kinds of benefits (i.e. all of the economic, political, psychological 
and social benefits associated with being in a position of relative dominance) one 
wouldn’t expect it to remain of much use to those it purported to describe anyway. That 
is, in precise opposition to the standard view that sees whiteness as the norm and 
nonwhiteness as the deviation or exception, I will argue that white identity is actually the 
anomalous identity, one that, when uncoupled from the system of racial oppression in 
which it formed, fails to provide the benefits typical of collective identity. If this is true, 
and if one accepts what I have called in the previous chapter the “democratic selection 
thesis,” then one should expect that white identity would eventually be replaced by more 
useful and democratic forms of collective identification. The outlines of such alternatives 
are already visible even in our own society, and demonstrate that the illegitimacy of 
white racial identity does not leave white people “marooned” without any resources for 
collective identification. 
In order to begin to understand why white racial identity is illegitimate, one must 
understand its history, and the conditions under which it formed.  Presumably, white 
racial identity stands in some relation to European heritage, though one should be 
cautious about equating the two. Previous to the eighteenth century, the idea of race as 
denoting specific lines of descent still marked a division between the “noble races” of 
European stock and their ignoble, though nonetheless similarly pigmented countrymen.264 
At its most general, this idea of race allowed for a commonality among nations or 
peoples, circumscribing the membership of the French, German, or English “races.” It 
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was only in the New World, where English and other Europeans were confronted 
with the reality of slavery, that whiteness came to denote a commonality among 
Europeans of different types.265 Putatively setting aside old and deeply ingrained internal 
inequalities, the express purpose of such an identity was to distinguish the free European 
from the enslaved African, based upon the latter’s supposedly inherent dependency. In 
this way, slavery could be reconciled with the nascent values of liberalism. This 
opposition of slave and freeman is at the root of the United States’ binary racial system, a 
system into which successive waves of immigrants would be forced to assimilate. 
Such a collective identity, which depended upon the lack of discursive equality, 
coercion in a most concrete form, and systematic exclusion of “relevant contributions,” 
would obviously not meet the discursive conditions for legitimating collective identity. 
On the face of it however, this historical fact does not preclude the possibility of a 
positive reconstruction of white identity that recognizes the illegitimate origins of 
whiteness in order to replace them with new, more appropriate foundations. If black 
racial identity, which was born from the ignorant, hateful, and false ascriptions presented 
above, can be reconstructed and reinterpreted in a positive way, one might think then, 
that white identity could be similarly transformed. This is a version of what Ingram calls 
the “symmetry thesis,” the idea that “if it is legitimate for oppressed racial and ethnic 
minorities to affirm their respective racial and ethnic identities, then it must be legitimate 
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for whites to do so as well.”266 Ingram rightly rejects such a thesis, on account of the 
fact that the many asymmetries of power that advantage whites over nonwhites provide 
strategic and political reasons for nonwhite racial solidarity, pride, and even “defensive” 
racism that do not exist for whites. Yet whether such an argument would still hold in 
contexts defined by more symmetrical relations of power (that is, by greater equality) 
among races is less than clear. One might think that under such conditions, where 
strategic concerns no longer provide compelling reasons for defensive racial solidarity, 
the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of racial affirmation could be determined in a 
general way, a way that would apply equally to both whites and nonwhites. 
To the contrary, I think that white identity can be shown to be illegitimate even 
under ideal political circumstances. The problem with whiteness is not, ultimately, that its 
substantive commitments are somehow immoral, undesirable, or vicious. Rather the 
problem, in this context, is that whiteness lacks any substantive foundation. There is no 
underlying value that can be retrieved, reinterpreted, or rediscovered when the unsavory 
exterior of privilege, power, and violence is stripped away. Whiteness is, at bottom, 
empty. Despite all of the positive characteristics that supposedly correspond to European 
culture – rationality, temperance, beauty, virtue, and so on – whiteness, as an identity 
meant to bind together diverse European cultures and distinguish them collectively from 
those Europeans meant to oppress, is a purely negative construction. It is defined, as the 
brief history of its birth above illustrates, by what it is not. Whites are not (and cannot be) 
slaves; whites are not savages; whites are not, above all, Africans. Likewise, and still 
today, one’s whiteness is determined primarily by the absence of non-white ancestors, 
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unlike non-whiteness, which is determined, according to the one-drop rule, by the 
presence of (at least one) non-white ancestors. The complete lack of substance, and 
corresponding lack of verifiability of such a “unity based on an absence” is, strangely 
enough, illuminated by Zack’s intentionally opaque representation of the essence of 
whiteness, which notes that “the sole determinant of A’s whiteness is the absence of any 
individual who is defined by the presence of one individual who cannot be defined by the 
absence of those individuals whose absence defines A.”267 If this sounds like Hegelian 
logic, it is no coincidence. As black thinkers from Fanon to Du Bois have never failed to 
recognize, the modern binary racial system is a nearly literal instantiation of Hegel’s 
master/slave dialectic. Though whites hold coercive power over nonwhites in a variety of 
ways (objective as well as subjective), white racial identity itself depends wholly upon 
the subjugation of its racial other for its existence. Without that power, the seemingly 
solid notion of whiteness melts into air. To state the conclusion simply: white racial 
identity depends upon and only exists within the context of white supremacy. 
In concrete terms, this means that, despite its privileged status, white identity fails 
to provide for its members the resources typical of other collective identities. Insofar as 
certain presuppositions structure interaction and communication among whites (such as 
the presumption of white superiority, and the presumption that all whites unconditionally 
accept and defend the privileges of whiteness, and so on), it may be possible to speak of a 
white lifeworld. Such a lifeworld enjoys a social and political privilege which is 
reproduced through acceptance of its central presumptions. Nonetheless, it must be 
understood as culturally impoverished. This is because the privileges of whiteness are 
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often (but not always) bought at the cost of the loss of the cultural, ethnic, and 
national identities from which whiteness recruits. In the United States, what is important 
above all is not one’s Italian-ness, Irish-ness, and so on, but one’s whiteness. Yet the 
latter does not provide resources for social integration, identity formation, and mutual 
understanding equivalent to the former. This is why, as Noel Ignatiev quips, “the typical 
‘white’ American male spends his childhood as an Indian, his adolescence as an Afro-
American, and only becomes white when he reaches the age of legal responsibility.”268 
This desire for “crossover” (one might add the adolescent fetish for Zen Buddhism and 
other vaguely “eastern” ideas) attests to the inadequacy of white identity as a basis for 
relating to others on equal footing in increasingly diverse social settings.269 Unlike other 
racial identities, which are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as having a certain content, 
whiteness is thought to lack content, such that, for example, often only nonwhites are 
described as “ethnic.”270 The result is that whiteness has come to be synonymous with 
‘boring’, ‘average’ and ‘conformist,’ none of which are things that adolescents (who, 
after all, are engaged in the project of identity formation more directly than any other 
demographic) want to be. 
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Moreover, the background assumptions involved in affirming a white identity 
(and thus reproducing a white lifeworld) actually impede, rather than facilitate 
communication oriented toward mutual understanding. As Mills notes “part of what it 
means to be constructed as ‘white’… is a cognitive model that precludes self-
transparency and genuine understanding of social realities.”271 For example, most whites 
today seem genuinely puzzled about blacks’ insistence on the reality of racial oppression, 
since they believe that everyone’s life chances are determined primarily by effort and 
willingness to work hard. If certain groups fail to succeed, then it must be the result of a 
lack of such qualities, or a lack of the motivation to develop them. Such a view is 
consistent with the familiar statistics on racial inequality, as well as with the background 
assumption of white superiority, in this case, superiority of motivation, ingenuity and 
industry. Similarly, whites in the not-so-distant past convinced themselves that nonwhites 
were not fully human, that they evolved from a different species, that some had tails and 
magical powers. Such false presumptions are the girders that support the white lifeworld, 
a lifeworld maintained by the exclusion of those who would dispute its false history and 
willful ignorance. In other words, white identity, like the Aryan racial identity of the 
Nazis, is founded upon an elaborate mythology that corresponds only tangentially to 
historical reality. Such a system of false beliefs replaces the “rational force of the better 
reasons” with coercive power. When that coercive power is abolished, those background 
assumptions are easily debunked, and the identity that they support collapses. The result 
is a lifeworld that is severely disabled in its public communicative competency. The 
various handbooks on “racial etiquette,” “getting along with black people” and so on 
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provide an illustration of this communicative disability that would be humorous if its 
consequences were not so serious.272 
 So where does this leave young whites who want to distance themselves from the 
unjust advantages of whiteness and pursue more just social interactions? If collective 
identity is important, as I have suggested it is, not just for political action, but for human 
flourishing in general, then what identity can they claim as a basis for their own lives and 
their own political agendas? Crossover and experimentation with nonwhite identities is 
one possibility, as indicated above. Yet one must proceed cautiously with such a 
suggestion, since crossover always runs the risk of expropriation, and since willingness to 
adopt the style, music, and “culture” of nonwhite peoples does not necessarily imply 
willingness to accept them as equals, let alone take up their struggles as one’s own. Still, 
a cautious optimism about sincere crossover (let us not forget the third principle of 
discourse here) is part of the story about what “whites” are supposed to do with 
themselves in the wake of the abolition of whiteness. The other thing to note is that, 
although it may be unreasonable or unnecessary to presume that racial identity would 
disappear in an ideal society, it is not unreasonable to presume that it would be less 
important. Whereas in our society, Howard Winant observes, “to be without racial 
identity is to be in danger of having no identity,” race might be less prevalent, if still 
important to some, in a more just society.273 As Ingram notes, “in struggling against 
racism there are many positive nonracial identities whites can embrace – religious, 
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secular humanist, and civic patriotic.”274 Also, one should not underestimate the value 
of art, sport, and other activities as a means of constructing a meaningful identity with 
others. Being involved with an underground music scene, an art collective, an organized 
sport like football or basketball, or a less organized sport like skateboarding can provide a 
sense of identity and community that provides resources similar to acceptable forms of 
racial identity, and can even, under the right circumstances, foster critical consciousness 
about the illegitimate identities that such communities replace.275 Further, I see no reason 
to limit the scope or value of such collective identities to non-ideal (“struggling against 
racism”) identity politics. While they may be instrumentally valuable as a means for 
creating solidarity with other forms of anti-racist identity politics, they are also valuable 
in themselves, as functional contexts for communication and socialization, and would be 
so even (or perhaps especially) under more ideal social circumstances.  
Regarding the seemingly strange idea that some might have racial identities while 
others do not, I imagine there was a time when it seemed equally absurd for someone not 
to have a religious identity of some sort, even if it was “atheist” or “heretic”. I imagine 
also that, for the people of that time, it would have been difficult to imagine religious 
identity as an object of choice, such that some people could choose none at all. Similarly, 
it is difficult for us to imagine a world in which some groups choose to define themselves 
racially, while others simply do not. But such a world is within the realm of the possible, 
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and would be justified in reference to the discursive principles I have discussed in this 
chapter and the last.  Therefore I think the worry about the lack of constructive 
alternatives for identity formation for white (or perhaps “formerly white”) people is 
overstated. One must take care here however, so that the situation does not become one in 
which only nonwhite people are considered “raced,” while only (formerly) white people 
are considered raceless, a situation that would mimic the problematic normalization of 
whiteness that already exists today. Such a result does not, however, follow necessarily. 
The key is to assure that the right and ability to choose whether or not to identify oneself 
racially is equally available.    
Culture Reconsidered 
At the outset of this investigation, I criticized theories of group rights based upon 
the (instrumental) value of culture, largely because the intentionalist account of group 
membership that they presuppose fails, as a matter of social ontology, to account for the 
existence of non-intentional, oppressed groups, and therefore fails, as a matter of political 
morality, to provide a means for addressing the injustices experienced by such groups. 
Still, I noted there that, despite the failure of intentionalism as a descriptive starting point, 
intentionalism as an aspirational, normative goal is nonetheless defensible. That is, 
people ought to be able to freely choose their group associations and collective identities, 
even if, at present, large segments of society are not. One might wonder then, whether a 
normatively justifiable conception of race, one in which racial identities are freely chosen 
rather than ascribed, would have more in common with cultural groups than they 
presently do. Something like this intuition seems to be behind both theories, like Gould’s 
theory of “intercultural democracy” discussed in the first chapter, that see culture as 
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being more amenable to individual and collective interpretation (“more open and 
more fully free”276) than conceptions of race, and so aim to replace conceptions of race 
with conceptions of culture, as well as theories, like that of Alain Locke and other 
founding members of the Harlem Renaissance, that aim to interpret race in cultural terms, 
without necessarily replacing it. In these final pages, I do not intend to develop my own 
conception of culture that could encompass the kinds of racial identity that I have argued 
would be acceptable under ideal discursive conditions, mostly because, as I have 
suggested throughout, I find the conception of culture too ambiguous and imprecise to be 
of very much use, beyond even the particular misuses it suffers at the hands of 
multicultural liberalism. Rather, I will conclude by arguing that even under ideal 
conditions, it would be unwise to think of races as cultures in the strong sense that 
multicultural liberals prescribe. This argument does not deny, however, that “culture,” 
under some understanding of that term, might be a part of what it means to be a member 
of a racial group, as Du Bois’ disjunctive conception of race suggests. Yet the extent to 
which one describes self-ascribed racial identities as “cultural” is largely a matter of 
semantics, and does not significantly alter the substance of the conception of self-
ascription I have defended. Therefore I will limit myself to critical comments relating to 
the conception of culture specific to multicultural liberals like Kymlicka.  
Though the explication of a normatively justifiable conception of racial identity 
that I have just undertaken occurs at the level of “ideal theory,” it is wise not to forget the 
non-ideal considerations that motivate it, especially insofar as these considerations shed 
light on the dangers of understanding race in cultural terms. I concluded the previous 
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section with the claim that, under ideal conditions, the right and ability to choose 
whether and how to identify oneself racially should be equally recognized. One could say 
the same, I think, for culture, provided that one recognize that this is precisely not the 
case within the present system of racial ascription, in which the ability to self-ascribe 
one’s cultural membership is not equally recognized. For example, imagine a white 
American with Irish, German, and Armenian heritage. Such an individual is free to 
choose whether and to what degree to identify herself with one, some, or all of these 
heritages, either superficially, say, through taking special interest in St. Patrick’s day 
festivities, or more seriously, by say, joining ethnic organizations, continuing or 
inaugurating ethnic traditions, and so on. Now imagine an “African-American” (the term 
itself seems to limit at the outset the possibility of cultural self-ascription, and thus makes 
apparent the unequal distribution of such a possibility) with (of course) African, but also 
English and Irish heritage. Imagine, in fact, that he or she is not an African-American at 
all, but English, or Irish. The cultural self-identification of such a person as English or 
Irish, beyond mere citizenship (which, to be sure, raises its own set of concerns) is likely 
to be met with a certain amount of confusion, especially in the context of American racial 
classification. Such a claim would likely lead, as Mills points out, to the further puzzling 
and ontologically confused question: “Yes, but what are you really?”277 Compounding 
this inequality is the fact that the brutal reality of slavery has made it difficult if not 
impossible for most black folks to determine their heritage any more specifically than is 
given by the general term “African,” thus denying them the richness of detail available to 
one who claims not European, but Italian, Greek, or Swedish heritage. Again, this must 
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be understood in terms of inequalities in both the opportunities for cultural self-
ascription, as well as the social recognition of those opportunities that do exist, and 
suggests that the greater freedom and openness of the concept of culture that Gould (and 
others) point to is itself a product of a certain kind of privilege.  
Whether this would remain true in an ideally just society is less clear. In one 
sense, the extent to which race and culture might have a greater overlap under conditions 
of free self-ascription is outside the scope of philosophical speculation. That is, the extent 
to which a legitimate racial group understood itself in relation, for example, to a cultural 
understanding of the African diaspora could only be determined by that group 
themselves. That, again, is the very meaning of a right to self-ascription. Suffice it to say 
that nothing in the previous pages rules out that possibility. As I said, however, I will 
limit my concluding comments to the strong conception of culture at work in 
multicultural liberalism, and suggest that discursively justifiable conceptions of race 
would not fit that description. This is, in the first place, because the conception of culture 
as “societal” or as a “social imaginary,” involves, on the one hand, a separate and more or 
less complete governmental and economic institutional structure, and on the other a one-
to-one relation of the culture to systems of religious belief, language, knowledge, and 
practice. Of course, most racial groups today do not differ from one another to such an 
extreme degree, especially within a given territory. Even the most radical proponents of 
black cultural and/or political nationalism would have to acknowledge this fact, admitting 
that the desirability of separate institutional structures and even separate territories is 
motivated more by non-ideal political concerns for resisting oppression than by an 
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attempt to accommodate significant cultural differences.278 On the other end of the 
spectrum, I see no reason to preclude, a priori, the possibility that racial groups could 
overlap the boundaries of otherwise extremely diverse “societal cultures”. This, after all, 
is the sentiment behind theories of diaspora, which posit an important commonality 
among groups that may have very different languages, customs, institutions, and 
practices, a commonality that cannot be simply reduced to an interest in combating 
oppression, or some other non-ideal concern.279 
To state the matter more precisely, the objection I mean to refute is one that 
would deny at the outset Kymlicka’s claim about the “unusual” status of black Americans 
as neither national minorities nor ethnic groups. Rather, one might assert that black 
Americans do in fact possess a “societal culture,” present in the practices and institutions 
of impoverished inner-city ghettos, and so should in fact be considered national 
minorities.280 Or one might claim, as certain strands of black nationalism have, that the 
United States ought to recognize the social, political, and economic autonomy of black 
urban centers, a claim that also presupposes a kind of black societal culture, though as a 
solution (or at least a strategic necessity) rather than a problem to be overcome.  
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It is undeniable that racialized urban ghettos do possess a kind of autonomy 
not present in other sectors of society, both in the troubling way that exclusion, 
segregation, and oppression force one to fend for oneself, and in the more promising way 
that such systematic injustices tend to produce practices and forms of solidarity that may 
be inherently desirable in spite of the undesirable conditions from which they arise. Yet 
both of the above sorts of views underestimate the extent to which such communities 
remain bound up with the larger society and “culture” in general. One can see this, for 
example, in the history of black music which, far from being autonomous, can only be 
understood in relation to the social and political contexts from which it arose, and which, 
reciprocally, is essential to any understanding of “American” music as a whole. 
Economically as well, the urban ghettos play a crucial role in the larger economic system: 
as pools for cheap, menial labor, but also as carefully supervised and controlled 
reservoirs for structurally necessary unemployment, as well as nearly unrestricted 
markets for deficient and even harmful goods.281 In other words, the lack of a distinct 
African-American societal culture must be understood in part as a result of black 
exploitation, which is in fact a certain kind of integration, though not one that leaves any 
room for autonomy or self-ascription.  
That is to say, I think Kymlicka is right to note that black Americans fit neither 
the mold of the national minority, nor that of the ethnic group, though I take issue with 
the conclusions he draws from this claim. The idea of a “societal culture,” possession of 
which is a necessary condition for being considered a national minority, does little to 
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clarify the situation of black Americans, nor of blacks in general, as in those 
descended from Africa but populating nearly all nations, societies, and cultures of the 
world. Under current conditions, however, it is understandable that political theorists 
would find value in the task of theorizing foundations for black political solidarity, and 
“culture,” in one sense or another has long played a part in that project. Yet the political 
project of resisting oppression must be distinguished from the creation and development 
of cultural life worlds, and the latter should not be seen as a requirement for the former. 
In We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity, Tommie 
Shelby makes precisely this point, against those who believe that black solidarity must 
include a commitment to black cultural autonomy.282 Shelby identifies eight “tenets of 
black cultural nationalism”: 
1. Distinctiveness: There is a distinct black culture that is different from…white 
culture. 
 
2. Collective Consciousness: Blacks must rediscover and collectively reclaim their 
culture, developing a consciousness…rooted in this heritage. 
 
3. Conservation: Black culture is an invaluable collective good that blacks should 
identify with. 
 
4. Rootedness: Unlike white culture, black culture provides a stable and rich basis 
for…the construction of positive and healthy individual identities. 
 
5. Emancipatory Tool: Black culture is an essential tool of liberation, a necessary 
weapon to resist white domination. 
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6. Public Recognition: The state should refrain from actions that prevent the 
endogenous reproduction of black culture. 
 
7. Commercial Rights: Blacks must become the primary producers, purveyors, and 
beneficiaries…of their culture. 
 
8. Interpretive Authority: Blacks are…and should be regarded as the foremost 
interpreters of the meaning of their cultural ways.283 
 
Of course, all of these claims rise or fall with 1, which I have argued is false if one means 
by culture “societal culture” as Kymlicka understands it. Yet Shelby leaves the meaning 
of culture open here, giving the benefit of the doubt to those who might specify it in a 
more plausible way. And as I mentioned above, nothing in the previous pages suggests 
that the kind of collective identity arrived at through processes of self-ascription could 
not be “cultural” in some slightly weaker sense than Kymlicka’s. So, I will follow Shelby 
and grant this claim, if only for the sake of argument. 
 I am sympathetic to most of the other claims as well. I explicitly defended 4 in the 
previous section, and 6 and 8 are both, in different respects, related to what I have called 
“self-ascription”. 5 is a decidedly non-ideal claim, one which is also probably true, but 
separable from the inquiry at hand, and 7 is also beyond the scope of this analysis, having 
to do with the formal structures of the economy, of which I am not explicitly concerned 
here. Let me focus, then, on 2 and 3, which are quite similar, and in particular on the 
nature of the normative prescriptions presented there (blacks must develop a collective 
consciousness, blacks should identify with and conserve their culture). As Shelby points 
out, there is a fundamental difference between the claim that blacks (or for that matter 
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any group) should be allowed to develop and maintain a racial and/or cultural 
identity, and the claim that blacks (or any other group) are obligated to develop and 
maintain such an identity. The right to self-ascription implies the former, but not the 
latter. As Shelby notes, “it is perfectly consistent with such a right or goal [the right, as he 
has it, to “be free to develop and maintain their cultural identities without being inhibited 
by unjust measures or artificial barriers”] that those blacks who do not desire this form of 
group self-determination are free to cultivate an alternative cultural identity, even to 
assimilate completely to white culture.”284 Yet 2 and 3 do seem to allow for this 
possibility, entailing as they do the stronger claim that blacks are obligated to identify 
with, support and conserve black culture. I agree that this claim is mistaken, such that one 
should not expect or require that all persons now classified as racially black would self-
ascribe as racially or culturally black under conditions of free self-ascription. Thus this 
chapter argues for the possibility of legitimate racial identification, but not for the 
necessity of racial identification. 
 Still, when Shelby concludes from all this that black solidarity does not require a 
shared collective identity, he seems to have in mind the stronger type of collective 
identity that Habermas names “ethical-cultural” identity.285 He does not seem to consider 
the distinction that I outlined in the second chapter, between this kind of collective 
identity and a weaker, “ethical-political” collective identity. Insofar as, as I argued there, 
practical political discourses (such as discourses on racial justice) presuppose and include 
discourses of collective self-clarification, the kind of solidarity he has in mind does in 
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fact entail a weaker kind of collective identity, even if it is only the dynamic, ever-
changing collective identity of interlocuters engaged in such discourses rather than 
enduring racial and/or cultural identities. In other words, as I have argued in the previous 
chapters, the strategic struggle against oppression as well as the ideally functioning 
processes of democratic politics both presuppose and require certain kinds of collective 
identity, the former taking the creation of healthy collective identities as part of its 
strategic political task, and the latter having the luxury of taking them for granted. But the 
concept of culture, again, does little to clarify these collective identities or the processes 
by which they develop. This is true of collective identity in general and racial identity in 
specific. Thus the analysis of racial identity presented in this chapter provides further 
support for the critique of multicultural liberalism given in the first chapter, and gives a 
concrete example of the kind of self-ascription-based identity politics that can be justified 
in discourse-theoretic terms. 
At this final juncture then, I invite the reader to contrast the framework I have 
presented in this and the previous chapters with Kymlicka’s own approach, as per his 
suggestion, based upon “our” moral ideals, which include, for me as much as for him, 
freedom, though not, I have suggested, in the problematic and unnecessarily limited sense 
of individual freedom, and equality, of which oppression makes a mockery. Another way 
one might compare these two approaches is in terms of their respective methodologies; 
not just in terms of a kind of individualism contrasted with a kind of intersubjectivism, 
but also in (not unrelated) terms of the perspective of the observer versus the perspective 
of the participant. The perspective of the observer sets out in advance the characteristics 
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of a particular kind of group, say, a culture, or more specifically, a national minority, 
an ethnic group, and so on, by way of abstracting and generalizing from certain kinds of 
existing groups. Somewhat ironically, given the reliance upon ideal theory as a 
justification for the exclusion of certain kinds of groups, this approach makes it difficult 
to imagine how group affiliations and collective identifications might undergo 
fundamental changes, for example, from ascriptive to non-ascriptive, or vice versa, and 
how such changes bear upon more general social processes like democracy. By contrast, 
the participant perspective leaves the work of determining the nature of group 
associations, cultural or otherwise, to the members of those groups themselves, focusing 
instead on the conditions (both procedural and substantive) that would facilitate this 
process. This is why the right to self –ascription can be conceived without recourse to a 
conception of culture, and why the parameters of a democratic identity politics can be put 
forth without having to link such a politics to any identities in particular.  
If the contrast is made in this way, I hope that the reader will conclude at least that 
there is more at stake in such a comparison than a shift of focus from ideal to non-ideal 
theory. Rather, the approach that I have developed, while paying closer attention to, and 
in a sense beginning from concrete concerns of non-ideal theory, nonetheless suggests its 
own kind of procedural ideal, which differs in important ways from that of Kymlicka and 
other multicultural liberals, as this final chapter demonstrates. I hope that the reader will 
conclude further, that the inability of multicultural liberalism to deal with the issue of 
oppression in general, and racial oppression in particular, marks, in light of “our” liberal 
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values, an unacceptable failure, and that the account that I have developed is, in that 
regard, superior. 
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